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PART I: INTRODUCTION
1
1. Credit Risk and Credit Derivatives
One of the main risks of granting a loan or investing in a debt security is credit risk. Credit risk
is the risk that the borrower of the lending contract cannot fulﬁll key ﬁnancial obligations, such
as repaying the notional or making interest payments. Credit derivatives have been developed
in response to the demand by ﬁnancial institutions to hedge or diversify credit risk, to take on
credit exposures at lower costs, and to manage or trade credit risk independently of the ownership
of the underlying asset. Most credit derivatives take the form of a credit default swap. This
contract transfers the default risk of the underlying corporation or sovereign entity from one party
to another against a predetermined ﬁxed fee. Today, many varieties of this basic contract are traded
in ﬁnancial markets.
Credit derivatives are one of the most important ﬁnancial innovation of the last decade. In a
relatively short time, they have grown to become a large segment of ﬁnancial markets. From 2001
to 2009, the outstanding notional amount increased from an estimated $919 billion to $30 trillion
(ISDA, 2010). As a result, credit risk has gradually changed from an initially illiquid risk to one
that is traded much like other fundamental factors of ﬁnancial risk such as equity, currency, or
interest rate risk.
The liquid trading of credit risk oﬀers many opportunities for ﬁnancial institutions and compa-
nies. It helps them to manage the credit risk exposure by allowing to insure against a deteriorating
credit quality of their borrowers. For ﬁnancial ﬁrms, managing concentration risk is of particular
interest. The standard treatment has been to screen new loan applicants regarding the degree of
additional concentration risk an approval could impose on the current lending portfolio (Batten and
Hogan, 2002). Credit derivatives have the potential to implement a much more ﬂexible approach
to managing concentration risk. Large exposures to concentrated borrowers can simply be replaced
with smaller and more diversiﬁed exposures. Another potential beneﬁt of credit derivatives is their
use in the management of liquidity risk. By transferring credit risk to a counterparty, the original
lender may be able to substitute cash for an illiquid asset, or to conserve costly regulatory capital.
The frequent trading of credit derivatives also allows lenders, borrowers, and investors to directly
compare prices of bonds or loans with market prices of credit risk. Hence, credit derivatives add
transparency to the pricing of credit risky claims by oﬀering a benchmark.
The recent ﬁnancial crisis, however, painfully reveals that the liquid trading of credit risk brings
about not only opportunities but also challenges. Academics and practitioners argue that credit risk
transfer may induce problems related to asymmetric information. For example, incentives of lenders
to analyze and monitor credit quality could be reduced if they have the ability to hedge their credit
exposure. Lower credit discipline could then decrease overall credit quality. While asymmetric
information problems exist in most markets, the credit derivatives market is particularly vulnerable.
The reason is that lending ﬁrms have a much closer relationship to their borrowers than outside
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investors. Hence, by the nature of the credit business, most of the major players in this market are
insiders.
Furthermore, during the recent crisis, many commentators have raised the concern that while
credit derivatives may allow for risk reduction at the individual entity level, it is not clear how they
aﬀect the aggregate risk in the economy at the systemic level. Instefjord (2005), for example, shows
that credit derivatives enhance risk sharing but, at the same time, also lead to further acquisition
of risk which eventually destabilizes the banking sector. Similarly, Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) argue
that the introduction of credit risk transfer can cause the markets for other loan risk-sharing to
break down.
The adequate pricing of credit risk is another unresolved matter. Even though this ﬁeld has
witnessed a tremendous acceleration in research eﬀort aiming at a more profound understanding,
modeling and pricing of credit risk, many problems are still discussed. For example, observed credit
spreads are high relative to the empirical default rates and recovery rates, known as the credit
spreads puzzle (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann, 2001; Huang and Huang, 2003; Chen, 2010).
Moreover, relatively little is known about how cross-sectional diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics
aﬀect credit risk.
From an academic viewpoint, the main objective of research on credit risk must be to contribute
to the discussions of the above mentioned open challenges to support the evaluation of adequate
solutions. The present dissertation follows this avenue by rigorously analyzing three important
open issues of credit risk.
I am grateful to my supervisor Alexander Wagner for his great support and helpful comments
on all three papers which have led to essential improvements. During the process of writing, I have
also proﬁted from valuable discussions and remarks by, among others, Rajna Gibson, Kjell Nyborg,
and Ramona Westermann.
2. Summary of Research Results
This dissertation contains three independent research papers which are brieﬂy outlined in this
section.
The ﬁrst paper “Private Information and Callable Credit Default Swaps” visualizes a speciﬁc
opportunity and challenge of the introduction of a credit derivatives market. Credit derivatives
provide banks with the opportunity to transfer credit risk beyond lending constraints to external
investors. The challenge, however, is that standard credit risk transfer also introduces information
asymmetry costs. If a bank can not credibly signal loan quality, the transfer negatively aﬀects its
incentives to screen and monitor the underlying loans which causes overinvestment, or a market
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breakdown. I show that simple structuring of credit derivatives solves this problem. The basic idea
is that credit risk should be transferred by using a callable credit default swap. As the bank can
signal loan quality by expressing its readiness to pay for the implicit call feature, screening and
monitoring incentives are maintained. The main insight of this paper is that while credit derivatives
can have a negative impact on the economy by undermining screening and monitoring incentives,
adequately structured credit derivatives allow to solve these asymmetric information problems. The
paper also illustrates that stricter regulatory capital requirements may impede eﬀective signaling
mechanisms. This argument is often neglected in the current discussion on how regulatory capital
could help to support ﬁnancial stability.
The second paper with the title “Macroeconomic Conditions, Growth Options and the Cross-
Section of Credit Risk” is joint work with Alexander Wagner and Ramona Westermann. It considers
the pricing of debt if both ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk and macroeconomic risk are incorporated. The central
new feature of our paper compared to the literature in this ﬁeld, which only considers invested
assets, is that ﬁrms are composed of both invested assets and growth options. We show that ﬁrms
with a high portion of growth options in the value of their assets have larger costs of debt for two
reasons. First, options are more volatile than assets in place. Second, because they lose more value
than assets in place when the economy switches to recession, options induce a higher tendency to
default during bad times when marginal utility is high and recovery rates are low. Exploring this
insight allows us to explain stylized facts regarding empirically observed credit spreads, default
probabilities, and leverages. In particular, we show that growth options explain the credit spreads
puzzle, i.e., the fact that standard credit risk models calibrated to historical parameters typically
underestimate the credit spreads observed in reality. Because our model features ﬁrms which are
diﬀerent with respect to the importance of growth options in the value of their assets, we can also
explain the empirical cross-section of both credit spreads and leverage. Additionally, the results
are consistent with observed pro-cyclical aggregate investment spikes and busts, and with counter-
cyclical default clustering. Overall, we suggest that it is crucial to consider the impact of growth
options when modeling corporate credit risk and the impact of this risk on ﬁrms.
The eﬀect of cash holdings on credit risk is analyzed in the last article “The Impact of Managerial
Control over Cash on Credit Risk and Financial Policy”. By introducing a cash policy and manager-
shareholder conﬂicts into a trade-oﬀ model of capital structure, I identify two channels through
which cash aﬀects the credit risk of ﬁrms. First, the fact that managers can use cash to service
debt when equityholders are unwilling to inject funds into the ﬁrm reduces credit risk. Second, as
equityholders anticipate that ceasing to inject funds does not lead to immediate ﬁrm default, they
optimally stop contributing funds earlier in ﬁrms with cash holdings compared to a ﬁrm without
cash. The second channel increases credit risk. Because the two channels depend on individual
ﬁrm and industry characteristics, the insights induce - much like in the previous paper - conclusions
not only about the credit risk of a typical ﬁrm, but also about the cross-section of credit spreads.
Additionally, as managers target excess cash to reduce the probability of ﬁrm default, the insights on
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the eﬀect of cash on credit risk allow to discuss a wide range of stylized facts regarding corporate
cash policy choices. In particular, I explain why managers of ﬁrms with larger distress costs, a
higher yield of liquid assets, higher asset volatility, or higher takeover costs target a larger amount
of excess cash. Hence, the results of the paper shed light on both credit spreads of ﬁrms with
cash holdings and potential agency conﬂicts between managers and equityholders regarding the
corporate cash policy.
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PART II: RESEARCH PAPERS
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Private Information and Callable Credit Default Swaps
August 25, 2011
Abstract
This article analyzes the impact of alternative credit risk transfer mechanisms on bank
behavior. A bank can screen and monitor new loans to collect private information. While
standard credit derivatives allow to transfer credit risk to investors, they negatively aﬀect
banks’ incentives to screen and monitor. The reason is that a bank cannot credibly signal
private information on loan quality to external investors. Fortunately, simple structuring
of full protection credit derivatives solves the information asymmetry problem. In partic-
ular, it is shown that a callable credit default swap reveals a loan’s quality to the investor
by letting him observe the bank’s readiness to pay for the call feature. This signal restores
incentives for beneﬁcial screening and monitoring. The paper also examines the inﬂuence
of regulatory capital requirements on incentives, signaling, and the design of the optimal
credit risk transfer contract.
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1 Introduction
The credit derivatives market segment has been one of the most innovative and fastest-
growing before the breakout of the recent subprime mortgage crisis. Barrett and Ewan
(2006) estimate a market size of USD 5 trillion for 2004. Two years later, the estimated
outstanding notional already amounts to USD 20 trillion, exceeding the US GDP of USD
13 trillion in 2006. Despite the tremendous growth of the credit derivatives market, these
instruments have so far hardly been extended to transfer the risk of bank commercial loans.
One reason, according to Duﬀee and Zhou (2001), is that information asymmetry among
players in the market presents a major challenge. Academics and practitioners argue that
credit risk transfer weakens banks’ credit discipline in the presence of information asymmetry,
which might be one of the central reason for the subprime mortgage crisis. The dramatic
decrease in activity on structured credit derivative markets in 2008, and the enormous impact
of the crisis on the economy painfully reveal the importance to solve the problem.
This paper begins by showing that credit risk transfer adversely aﬀects the screening and
monitoring incentives of lenders. The theoretical results conﬁrm the empirical ﬁndings in
Keys et al. (2008), and Ashcraft and Sanots (2009). The disincentives induce higher costs of
debt ﬁnancing, which in turn causes economic costs. Building on these insights, a new and
distinct way to overcome the problem is introduced, namely callable credit default swaps.
Subsequently, I discuss the optimal design of credit derivative contracts by comparing the
proposed solution to partial protection approaches described in the literature. It turns out
that the optimal security design depends on regulatory capital requirements. While designed
to sustain stability in the ﬁnancial system, these requirements in fact often impede credible
partial protection solutions. As a consequence, callable credit default swaps evolve as the
optimal signaling contract in most cases.
The basic situation I study is the following. Consider three market participants, a bank
(B), an investor (S), and a borrowing ﬁrm (F). Their relationship is sketched in Figure 1.
Suppose that the loan-originating B is subject to credit risk constraints, either by an internal
limit on concentrated lending or by capital adequacy requirements. Thus, B needs to transfer
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the credit risk of a new loan to S via credit default swap (CDS).1 S demands a protection
fee to compensate the expected costs of credit risk. The problem of standard credit risk
transfer techniques is that they reduce B’s incentive to screen and monitor the new loan
because S, not B, now bears the consequences of adverse loan quality. This misbehavior
is anticipated by S, and, hence, reﬂected in a larger protection fee. B consequently faces
information asymmetry costs when transferring credit risk. Additionally, if the protection
fee turns out to be above the loan rate earned, the market breaks down as in Akerlof (1970),
and an otherwise proﬁtable loan cannot be granted (underinvestment). A bank, therefore,
Figure 1: Market participants
faces a basic dilemma: On the one hand, relationship advantages suggest granting loans to
well-known borrowers. On the other hand, undiversiﬁed lending requires credit risk transfer
to reduce a concentration of risk, which induces information asymmetry costs. Relaxing
this trade-oﬀ by decreasing information asymmetry costs is desirable for several reasons:
First, Von Thadden (1998) demonstrates that loans granted to relationship-borrowers increase
proﬁtability in credit markets due to accumulated information. Second, as Duﬀee and Zhou
(2001), and Duﬃe (2007) point out, the positive eﬀect on the economy, and particularly on
banks, is likely to be large if credit derivatives penetrate the market of formerly illiquid,
bank-originated credit risk, and contribute to a more eﬃcient distribution of credit risk in
1A credit default swap is a speciﬁc kind of counterparty agreement which allows the transfer of third party
credit risk from one party to the other. For example, one party in the contract could be a lender facing credit
risk from a third party borrower, and the counterparty in the credit default swap agrees to insure this risk in
exchange of regular periodic fee payments.
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the economy.
I argue that credit derivatives’ ﬂexibility in repackaging risk allows to restore screening
and monitoring incentives, thereby lowering the fair protection fee and preventing a market
breakdown. Following Duﬀee and Zhou (2001), B’s informational advantage is assumed to
be relatively small for short-term payoﬀs, but relatively large concerning the payoﬀs far in
the future. In this situation, consider using a callable CDS (CCDS) contract to transfer the
credit risk to S. A CCDS is a credit default swap which can be canceled at a predetermined
date by the protection buyer. Once this date is reached, and B decides whether to call
the contract, the bank does not have an informational advantage any more because only
short-term payoﬀs remain up to maturity. Hence, the informed B’s readiness to pay for the
implicit call feature constitutes a credible signal of the loan’s quality ex ante. The signal,
therefore, allows to express screening and monitoring eﬀort. B has an incentive to engage
in these activities to lower the protection fee. It thereby reduces information asymmetry
costs, while still achieving the primary objectives of the credit derivative transaction, namely
diversiﬁcation, optimization of economic and regulatory capital, and complete risk transfer.
This logic suggests that by ﬁne-tuning simple credit derivatives, banks can ultimately solve
the basic dilemma, i.e., extend loans to well-known borrowers while transferring excessive
credit risk without information asymmetry costs.
The article relates to a variety of strands of the literature. First, it is based on the broadly
discussed idea of banks having a unique ability to build relationships with their borrow-
ers, thus simplifying monitoring (Diamond (1984)), long-term commitment (Von Thadden
(1995)), and screening. There is a substantial debate among academics and practitioners
about the eﬀects of credit derivatives on bank behavior and the bank-borrower relationship.
Concerns about credit derivatives undermining positive relationship-rents by causing misbe-
havior are expressed in Kiﬀ and Morrow (2000) and Morrison (2005). For example, Morrison
(2005) argues that credit derivatives could adversely aﬀect banks by reducing their incen-
tive to screen and monitor borrowers. The use of credit derivatives may render bank loans
less valuable because the loans would entail less of a certiﬁcation eﬀect. The current article
adds to this debate and states that properly structured credit derivatives do not erode the
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rents generated in the bank-borrower relationship. Second, the paper relates to the discus-
sion among Von Thadden (1995), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Innes (1990), and others on the
application of strategic contracting within ﬁnancial intermediation to mitigate information
asymmetry problems.
For credit markets, the lemons problem and the ability to sell loans if banks have private
information are discussed in Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995). In their setting, buyers realize
that banks are selling loans due to capital constraints. Hence, the former acquire exposures
even when they cannot perfectly screen the ex ante quality of loans, whereby the standard
lemons problem can be avoided. The classical reference to loan sales and information asymme-
try is the paper of Gorton and Pennacchi (1995). They conclude that if a bank can implicitly
commit to holding a certain fraction of a loan, i.e., to provide limited recourse, the moral
hazard associated with the loan sales market is reduced. Similar ideas are subsequently ap-
plied to articles on credit derivatives structured to mitigate information asymmetry problems.
The ﬁrst paper which rigorously considers the implications of credit derivatives for banks’
risk-sharing is Duﬀee and Zhou (2001). The authors show how banks hedging high-quality
loans can use credit derivatives with a maturity mismatch2 to shift the risk of early default
to outsiders. By retaining the risk of late default they avoid the lemons problem. Boot et al.
(1993) provide the basic idea of splitting a risky cash ﬂow into a senior and a subordinated
security: The senior security is considered to be information-insensitive and can be sold to
uninformed investors while the subordinated security is information-sensitive and, hence, tai-
lored to informed investors. Riddiough (1997) extends this reasoning by arguing that loan
bundling admits pool diversiﬁcation which softens information asymmetry. DeMarzo and
Duﬃe (1999) show that pooling and shearing of loans allows the protection buyer to concen-
trate the ”lemon’s premium” in the ﬁrst-loss block. Retention of this informationsensitive
block reduces the total lemon’s premium by aligning the interests of the protection buyer
with those of the protection seller. A variety of papers follows the same idea. Franke et al.
(2007), for example, model the optimal design of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).
According to Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008), ﬁrst-to-default credit derivatives and binary credit
2In a maturity mismatch, the maturity of the credit derivative contract does not match the underlying loan
contract.
12
default basket contracts can be designed in a similar way to signal the ability of banks to
screen their borrowers.
The approaches discussed in the literature concentrate on signaling the bank’s type by
varying the quantity of insurance. This solution is a standard result within the insurance
theory.3 However, credit risk transfer can not entirely relax a bank’s lending constraint
whenever signaling requires to retain part of a new loan’s risk. In contrast, this paper shows
how to signal a loan’s type even though the underlying credit risk is completely transferred
to an investor.
It is important that the credit risk can be transferred completely in the signaling game.
The reason is that market opacity prevents banks from credibly committing to retain part of a
loan’s risk: A bank can transfer the remaining risk silently without informing either party. In
fact, the current regulatory treatment in the Basel II jurisdiction may even encourage banks
to do so in order to avoid the regulatory costs incurred with partially retained credit risk.
An investor, consequently, does not know whether a bank truly retains some risk exposure
and the corresponding incentives to screen and monitor a loan.4 I argue that, in contrast to
partial retention contracts, CCDSs provide a credible signal even if credit derivative trades
are private in line with current market practice. As CCDS fully transfer the credit risk of a
loan, there are no regulatory retention costs and, hence, no regulatory incentives to silently
sell the implicit call feature.
The structure and the price of the credit derivative are the only information required to
signal quality to the investor. The signal does not rely on generally unavailable information
such as whether the lending constraint is binding, the reason why a bank is selling credit risk
(Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995), Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008)), or hard-to-judge reputation
eﬀects (Gorton and Pennacchi (1995)). Finally, the choice of a premium as a signal yields
an additional striking feature: Standard signaling models often use a wasteful signal.5 In
3”Good” banks signal their quality by buying less insurance. ”Bad” banks prefer to buy full insurance and
to reveal their type.
4In line with this argument, there was a very active market for ﬁrst-to-default tranches before the current
crises, which allowed banks to easily sell retained ﬁrst loss pieces.
5In Spence (1973), education is a wasteful signal for the participants in the model. Partial coverage in
Franke and Krahnen (2005), and Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) is wasteful if costs arise due to underdiversiﬁcation.
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contrast, the signaling premium provided in this paper accrues to the investor, an argument
enhancing the marketability and liquidity of credit risk.
For tractability, my model simply addresses two types of loans and two periods. Increasing
the number of types to a continuum, or varying the length of the two subperiods does not
change the basic insights of this paper as long as the structure of the asymmetric information
is maintained. Furthermore, the proposed signaling-mechanism is more beneﬁcial the more
severe the information asymmetry problem.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the structure of the model.
Section 3 discusses adverse selection, i.e., the screening problem, and derives the optimal
contract. In an extension in Section 4, I show that CCDSs increase the monitoring eﬀort
of an intermediating bank, before I combine adverse selection and moral hazard. Section 5
discusses the results and concludes. All valuation techniques and proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 A simple model of adverse selection
2.1 Structure of the model
Consider a risk-neutral, proﬁt-maximizing bank B providing a borrower F with a loan. B
is operating in a speciﬁc loan market and maintains a close relationship to F. The bank’s
incremental costs to screen and monitor the borrower are, therefore, relatively low. If internal
or external constraints on concentrated credit risk are binding, the bank seeks to completely
transfer the credit risk of additional loans to an investor S. Financial markets are assumed
to be competitive, and the risk-free interest rate is zero.
B’s problem is to maximize expected proﬁts out of a given loan and the corresponding
credit derivative. To transfer the credit risk of the borrower’s loan to S, B chooses between
a credit default swap (CDS) and a callable credit default swap (CCDS). The structures do
not diﬀer with respect to the convention that S covers the loss of the reference credit’s face
14
value following a credit event6 in exchange for a fair protection fee. A (European) CCDS,
however, gives B the additional right but not the obligation to call (unwind) the contract
at a predeﬁned point in the future. The structure can be split into its generic components,
namely a CDS and an embedded receiver default swaption (RS)7 with corresponding strike
and exercise date. There are three dates in the model outlined in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Time structure
푇0 is the starting date, 푇1 the call date of the CCDS, and 푇2 the maturity date of the loan.
At 푇0, B decides whether to screen a loan applicant based on public information. Screening
at costs C allows to gather private information which reveals the true CDS rate of F’s loan.
On the basis of this information, B then oﬀers a CDS or a CCDS to S. Without screening,
this oﬀer is based on public information. As soon as S signs the credit derivative contract,
the bank can grant the loan because the lending constrained is relaxed. I only consider one
call date at 푇1. In a CDS, the protection fee payable by B to S is ﬁxed during the contract’s
lifetime from 푇0 to 푇2. Transferring the credit risk of a loan via CCDS includes an option for
B to call the protection at time 푇1. I assume that given its credit risk constraint, the bank
needs to hedge the loan with a CDS after a call. It is, consequently, only worthwhile for B to
call if it can buy new protection at 푇1 up to 푇2 for a lower fee than the one initially agreed.
The information structure of the model deserves a closer description. I distinguish between
freely available public information and costly private information. The former contains loan
6A credit event is a legally deﬁned event which typically includes bankruptcy, failure to pay and restruc-
turing. Note that the correlation between a credit event of B and S is assumed to be zero.
7In a receiver default swaption, the option buyer pays a premium to the option seller for the right, but not
the obligation, to sell CDS protection on a reference entity at a predetermined rate (strike) on a future date.
See O’Kane et al. (2003), page 26.
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pricing parameters including the recovery rate R8 for defaults during the next time interval.
To determine the fair CDS rate at 푇0 for protection up to maturity, however, one does not
only need the recovery rate from 푇0 to 푇1, but also the one from 푇1 to 푇2. The latter piece
of information corresponds to the private information. Loans with a high R from 푇1 to 푇2
(high loans) yield a fair CDS rate 푠퐻 , and loans with a low recovery rate (low loans) have a
fair CDS rate 푠퐿. These fair CDS rates compensate an investor for the credit risk of a loan.
Consistent with market practice, the investor is unable to observe a bank’s credit derivative
contract oﬀers to other third parties, the bank’s lending constraints, and the screening and
monitoring activities.
Figure 2 shows how the structure of the asymmetric information varies over the life of
the loan. The information asymmetry at 푇0 between S and a bank with private information
refers to the recovery rate over the future time interval from 푇1 to 푇2. The key observation to
approach adverse selection is the following: B and S realize at 푇0 that, once they reach time
푇1, there will be no more information asymmetry, since the recovery rate for the proximate
period is public information.
Lacking private information, S observes B’s choice of the hedging strategy, and eventually
updates beliefs concerning the recovery rate of a loan. Let 휇 denote the probability of a high
loan if beliefs are based on public information. 휌 indicates the assessed probability of a high
loan if beliefs are updated after observing the bank’s contract oﬀer. The spreads 푠(휇) and
푠(휌), respectively, then denote the expected CDS rates. They represent the fair protection fee
demanded from S for bearing the loan’s credit risk.
A ﬁxed, risky loan rate i is charged to the borrower F for the loan. Administrative or
operating expenses of the bank can simply be incorporated by reducing i. The bank’s payoﬀ
from using CDSs is formulated as follows:
푀푎푥
[
0, 푉 푓푒푒0,2
(
푖− 푠(휇))] (1)
푉 푓푒푒0,2 is the present value at 푇0 of receiving one basis point of fee payments up to 푇2 as
8The recovery rate is the value of a loan at default.
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long as there is no default. Details on pricing can be found in the Appendix. B grants and
hedges a loan if the overall expected proﬁt is positive (푉 푓푒푒0,2
(
푖− 푠(휇)) ≥ 0). Rejection results
in a present value of zero. The protection fee 푠(휇) payable to S is based on public information
of 휇. It is ﬁxed at time 푇0 up to 푇2.
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In contrast to CDSs, CCDSs allow to exploit the time varying structure of the information
asymmetry. Consider the optimization problem of a bank that has detected a high recovery
credit. The proﬁt of the bank corresponds to
푚푎푥
푃
[
푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖− 푠(휌))− 푃 +퐴퐻 − 퐶
]
. (2)
B earns the rate i from the loan and pays a protection fee 푠(휌) to S. P denotes the
premium paid for the right to call the contract. The economic value of this right is known
to B after screening and corresponds to 퐴퐻 for a high, and 퐴퐿 for a low loan. It depends
(besides publicly known parameters) on the recovery rate R from 푇1 to 푇2, i.e., on the private
information. B and S know at 푇0 that the contract is eventually called at 푇1. As there
will be no more information asymmetry at this date, the value of the call feature to B does
not depend on the private information. Hence, a bank is able to signal the loan’s type by
expressing its readiness to pay for the receiver swaption at 푇0. In particular, after screening
and detection of a high loan, it simply oﬀers a larger P than the premium a bank with a
low recovery credit - or a bank which has not screened - is ready to pay. As a consequence,
only high loans are hedged with CCDSs. S, in turn, updates beliefs to 휌 = 1 which induces
푠(휌) = 푠퐻 . The readiness to pay for the implicit call feature at time 푇0 signals the future
recovery rate, and dissolves information asymmetry.
In the signaling game between B and S, the latter is not perfectly informed about the
loan. Therefore, I follow Osborne (2004) and use the model of a strategic, Bayesian two-
player game with imperfect information. A pure strategy equilibrium is deﬁned as a duple
of actions, one for the investor S and one for the bank B. The actions of each player are
9It seems like repeatedly signing short-term credit default swaps for proximate periods is a solution to the
problem. Unfortunately, this procedure does not relax the credit risk constraint, as the underlying loan is not
fully hedged in a maturity mismatch.
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the following: B can choose to grant and hedge a loan without screening, to stay out of the
market if the expected proﬁt is negative, or to screen and select the appropriate instrument
to transfer the risk of the exposure, i.e., a CDS or a CCDS. In an extension, the bank may
also monitor the loan after the risk has been transferred. S can either reject or accept the
credit derivative oﬀer. The payoﬀ to each player depends on the other player’s action and on
the market environment. In an equilibrium of the Bayesian game, the action chosen by each
player is optimal, given the action chosen by the other player. An equilibrium is explicitly
deﬁned with respect to the perceived probabilities of high and low loans.
2.2 Discussion of the assumptions
The model assumes that S cannot infer the credit’s type by looking at the loan rate. This
assumption is not unrealistic, given that (i) B may not have an incentive to screen the loan to
determine the fair loan rate, (ii) the asymmetry of information aﬀects the loan rate charged
by the bank10, (iii) banks are competing for borrowers11, (iv) the credit is merely one part
of the overall relationship between the bank and the borrower, (v) the bargaining power of
counterparties and the market structure play a role in the determination of the loan rate
as argued in Petersen and Rayan (1995). Rather than explicitly modeling these aspects, I
simply assume that the borrower F pays a ﬁxed loan rate i, and, hence, that i is an imperfect
signal of loan quality.12
Assuming that screening gives a market participant an information advantage for long
maturities, but not for short maturities, deserves some motivation. The intuition is linked
to the one given in Duﬀee and Zhou (2001). Investments of a borrowing ﬁrm and their
performance are publicly observable during the life of the loan, but planned investments are
10Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) agree on the opaque relation between borrower quality and loan rate. They
assume an asymmetric information problem between the borrower and the bank. The form and magnitude of
this asymmetry aﬀects the loan rate charged.
11This argument is provided by Von Thadden (1998): In order to attract borrowers, low loan rates are
oﬀered, leading to expected losses in the short term. Over time, by building up a relationship, information
about the borrower is accumulated, creating an information advantage over other lenders. This information
allows a relationship bank to extract informational rents from the borrower at a later stage, since the former
is able to issue tailored counteroﬀers for its most valuable customers based on its inside information.
12Note that I do not incorporate information asymmetry between the borrower and the bank. If the
borrower knows his own loan type, screening costs are redundant given that debt contracts exist which reveal
the borrower’s type to the bank without relying on a costly signal.
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not. If default occurs early after contract implementation, the recovery rate mainly depends
on existing assets as the ﬁrm has hardly invested in new, planned projects. The parties are,
therefore, likely to agree on the recovery rate of early defaults. In contrast, the recovery rate
of a default far in the future heavily depends on future planned projects. As long as screening
releases information about such plans, the resulting informational advantage mainly refers to
long maturities.
F’s planned projects are indeed diﬃcult to assess for market participants. Due to the
close relationship to the borrower13, guarantee of conﬁdentiality14, oﬀered consulting and
expertise, and F’s access to various bank services, B is in a privileged position to acquire
such information. Evaluating or inﬂuencing the recovery rate over a future interval further
requires that planned projects, netting agreements, collateral arrangements, and securities
held by the bank are analyzed. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume relatively low screening
and monitoring costs for B compared to outside investors.
In light of the results of Gupton et al. (1997), it makes sense to consider the future
recovery rate as the private information. They demonstrate that there is wide variation in
recovery rates even for the same subordination level, which induces that the recovery rate
is one of the most uncertain input parameter in a pricing model. Moreover, Scho¨nbucher
(1999a) shows why diﬀerent perceptions of recovery rates have a relatively high impact on
prices of CDSs. Especially for high default probabilities, disparities in recovery rates result
in profound diﬀerences of CDS spreads.
3 Analysis
3.1 Overview of the results
The outcome of the analysis of adverse selection depends on the level of the loan rate. Figure
3 characterizes four possible scenarios.
13A formal or informal relationship helps to impose pressure upon the borrower or to perform pareto-
improving renegotiations (Gorton and Kahn (2000)). In addition, a relationship can form an implicit contract
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Figure 3: 푠퐿 denotes the fair CDS rate of a loan with a low recovery rate, 푠퐻 the one of a loan
with a high recovery rate, and 푠(휇) is the expected CDS rate based on beliefs 휇 expressing the public
information on the probability of a high loan. The ﬁgure shows four possible scenarios for the loan
rate i : A very low loan rate is characterized by i< 푠퐻 , a low loan rate by 푠퐻 ≤i< 푠(휇), a high loan
rate by 푠(휇) ≤i< 푠퐿, and a very high loan rate by i≥ 푠퐿.
In what follows, I illustrate the low loan rate scenario in detail. Table 1 provides an
overview of the results. Results for the remaining scenarios are discussed in Section 3.5.
Condition for Expected Overall
screening bank proﬁt welfare
First Best 휇(푖− 푠퐻) ≥ 퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 휇(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐶 휇(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐶
CDS No screening 0 0
CCDS (푆푃 > 0)
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿) ≥ 휇(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐶 as in the First Best
퐶/(1− 휇) -SP
CCDS (푆푃 = 0) as in the First Best as in the First Best as in the First Best
Table 1: 퐴퐻 and 퐴퐿 denote the fair value of the call feature on a high, and a low recovery loan,
respectively. C expresses screening costs, 푉 푓푒푒0,2 is the present value of receiving one basis point of
fee payments up to 푇2 as long as there is no default, and SP is the signaling premium. The table
summarizes the results of credit risk transfer for low loan rates in four cases: (i) without information
asymmetry (First Best), (ii) with information asymmetry using a CDS (CDS), (iii) with information
asymmetry using a CCDS given a positive signaling premium (CCDS(푆푃 > 0)), (iv) with information
asymmetry using a CCDS without a signaling premium (CCDS(푆푃 = 0)). For each case, the table
outlines the condition for screening taking place (condition for screening), the expected bank proﬁt
given that the condition for screening is satisﬁed (expected bank proﬁt), and the combined expected
proﬁt of the bank and the investor given the condition for screening is satisﬁed (overall welfare).
3.2 The First Best in an environment of low loan rates
The analysis in this section assumes a low loan rate, 푠퐻 ≤i< 푠(휇), i.e., that the loan rate is
higher or equal to the CDS rate of a high recovery loan, but smaller than the expected CDS
regarding borrowing and repayment beyond the formal explicit legal contract on which it is based.
14Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) show how conﬁdentiality of a bank may encourage its clients to reveal
more information.
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rate under 휇. The First Best is characterized by a market without information asymmetry
among the buyer and the seller of credit risk. It represents a situation where a bank is able
to bear an additional credit risk of a loan itself, or an environment without informational
frictions on the credit risk transfer market. A bank is able to assess the recovery rate of a
new credit for defaults up to maturity. Once this costly information is produced, it becomes
common knowledge. Without information asymmetry, a high or low recovery loan can then
be hedged for a protection fee corresponding to the fair CDS rate 푠퐻 or 푠퐿, respectively.
In what follows the term ”Net Present Value of a loan” (NPV) is used:
Deﬁnition 3.1. The NPV of a loan from 푇0 to 푇2 is given by 푉
푓푒푒
0,2 (푖−푠퐻) for a high recovery
credit, and by 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖 − 푠퐿) for a low recovery credit. It is positive if the loan rate is higher
than the fair CDS rate (good loan), and negative otherwise (bad loan). Whenever the credit
risk is transferred, the NPV of the loan to B is given by 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖− 푠(⋅)), where 푠(⋅) represents
the protection fee.
A bank exclusively relying on public information always turns down a new loan in the low
loan rate scenario, resulting in a market breakdown with zero expected proﬁt. The reason is
that 푠(휇) is higher than the loan rate, yielding a negative NPV for granted loans. However,
a market breakdown induces underinvestment, since good loans are also rejected. Instead
of accepting this outcome, it may be worthwhile for a specialized bank to screen F at costs
C. Once B knows whether being faced with a good or bad loan, it grants the former and
rejects the latter. B prefers to screen at costs C if the expected proﬁt of doing so, i.e.,
휇(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐶, is greater or equal than in a market breakdown.
Proposition 1. For a low loan rate, the bank screens a new loan applicant in the First Best
as long as 휇(푖− 푠퐻) ≥ 퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The analysis reveals that the ability to screen loans is valuable as long as screening costs
are low because it generates positive expected proﬁts in an otherwise unproﬁtable market.
21
The ﬁrst row of Table 1 shows the above derived condition for screening, the expected bank
proﬁt, and overall welfare. Overall welfare incorporates the total expected proﬁt of the loan
and the CDS contract to B and S.15 In a competitive market without information asymmetry,
the CDS is a zero NPV contract. Hence, the overall welfare from the loan corresponds to the
expected bank proﬁt.
3.3 CDSs as a hedging tool in an environment of low loan rates
If a bank keeps on lending to well known borrowers it will reach a point where internal or
external lending constraints are binding. Constraints can be relaxed by credit risk transfer
techniques.
When S decides whether to accept the terms of a CDS, he does so on the basis of some
probability assessment over the set of types of loans underlying the credit derivative contract.
The minimum protection fee for which a risk neutral investor S with public information is
willing to sign a contract hedging the counterparty against the credit risk of a loan is
푠(휇) = 휇푠퐻 + (1− 휇)푠퐿. (3)
If B argues that the underlying loan is of high recovery type, S may update beliefs to 휌,
resulting in a protection fee of 푠(휌) = 휌푠퐻 + (1− 휌)푠퐿 ≤ 푠(휇). A bank will, however, always
claim to be hedging a high recovery credit in an attempt to decrease the protection fee, even
if it has detected a low recovery credit. There are no costs of doing so. Without a possibility
for B to credibly signal the loan’s type, costly screening is useless because it does not allow
to decrease the protection fee by inﬂuencing beliefs. As S anticipates that screening does
not take place in an equilibrium, he continues to believe that a loan is of high type with
probability 휇 and of low type with probability (1− 휇). Given the bank’s strategy, S accepts
a contract with a CDS rate equal to 푠(휇) to cover the expected credit risk. Hence, no new
loans are granted as 푖 < 푠(휇). The Bayesian equilibrium with CDSs is a market breakdown
without screening.
15The model in this paper does not account for additional beneﬁts to F out of a granted loan.
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Proposition 2. Information asymmetry between the bank B and the investor S impedes
screening activities, if lending constraints are relaxed by transferring the credit risk via CDSs.
The loan market breaks down, resulting in underinvestment.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Conceptually, the result for the low loan rate scenario is in line with Gale (1990) and
Hubbard (1998): With asymmetric information, the credit market does not fund all socially
eﬃcient projects. The underinvestment problem is evident in Table 1: Recall that in the First
Best, a loan is screened as long as the screening-condition is satisﬁed, yielding a positive
overall welfare and expected bank proﬁt. Credit risk transfer exacerbates the situation,
resulting in zero proﬁts for all participants in the market.
The advantage of a CDS-market, i.e., the ability to grant proﬁtable loans even though
credit risk constraints are binding, is diluted by screening disincentives due to information
asymmetry. This friction causes costs, as proﬁtable credit markets break down. Banks,
therefore, clearly have an incentive to mitigate the investors’ informational disadvantage.
3.4 CCDSs as a hedging tool in an environment of low loan rates
CDSs provide no signal of loan quality which causes a market breakdown in case of low loan
rates. This section explains how structuring the hedge in a simple way allows to mitigate
information asymmetry costs, and, hence, to prevent a market breakdown.
Let 퐴퐻 express the fair value of the call feature on a high recovery loan, and 퐴퐿 the
one on a low recovery credit. They correspond to the value of a receiver swaption (RS) on
the CDS rate of a high, or low loan, respectively, with exercise date 푇1, maturity 푇2, and
strike 푠퐻 .16 The pricing formula for the RS is given in the Appendix. The following lemma
describes the impact of the recovery rate on the value of a receiver swaption:
16B can buy protection via CDS and synthetically create the possibility to call this contract (replicate a
CCDS) by entering a RS. If the RS is exercised at 푇1, then B additionally sells protection up to 푇2. Combined,
the CDS and the exercised RS exactly oﬀset each other. A CDS is synthetically called (unwinded) at 푇1 in
this way. One is, therefore, able to separate the value of a call feature as the value of a RS.
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Lemma 3.2. The value of a receiver swaption is increasing in the recovery rate:
∂푅푆
∂푅
> 0. (4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3.2 allows B to signal the underlying loan’s type by expressing the readiness to
pay for the implicit call feature of a CCDS. For an equilibrium, one ﬁrst needs to ensure that
S participates in the credit risk transfer contract. His participation, or individual rationality
constraint (IR) requires that
푃 ≥ 퐴(휌), (5)
where P denotes the price paid for the call feature, and 퐴(휌) is the value of this feature to S
under beliefs 휌.
Next, I discuss how beliefs are formed. After screening and detection of a high recovery
loan, B is oﬀering a certain call-premium P to S. The latter is simply chosen such that (i)
a bank which has detected a low recovery credit weakly prefers to stay out of the market,
and (ii) a bank weakly prefers to screen and subsequently make an appropriate contract
choice than to pick the CCDS contract without screening at all.17 B then selects a CCDS
contract if a high loan has been detected, or to stay out of the market in case a low loan has
been identiﬁed. (i) is satisﬁed if 푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 + 푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐴퐿) ≤ 0, while (ii) requires that
푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 + 푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 휇퐴퐻 − (1− 휇)퐴퐿) ≤ 휇
(
푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 + 푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 −퐴퐻)−퐶. As (ii) is
more restricting than (i), the following incentive compatibility constraint (IC), obtained by
simplifying (ii), expresses both conditions:
(푖− 푠(휌))푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴퐿 +
퐶
(1− 휇) ≤ 푃. (6)
To minimize credit risk transfer costs, a bank with a high loan is choosing the smallest call-
17(ii) is necessary because S cannot observe the screening-activity itself.
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premium P* simultaneously satisfying the IR and the IC. If P* still admits a positive expected
proﬁt for B, S updates beliefs to 휌 as follows: ”The underlying loan is of high recovery type
with probability one (휌 = 1, and 푠(휌) = 푠퐻), since B would not oﬀer P* if it had not screened
and detected a high recovery credit.”
Third, even if B is endowed with a mechanism to credibly express loan quality, it may not
be worthwhile to participate in the market. The last step, therefore, is to conﬁrm whether
the CCDS approach increases expected proﬁts compared to the outcome with CDSs:
휇
(
(푖− 푠(휌))푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 푃 ∗ +퐴퐻
)− 퐶. ≥ 0 (7)
(푖−푠(⋅))푉 푓푒푒0,2 corresponds to today’s value of the loan rate payments minus the protection fee
payments up to default or maturity. The left hand side of Inequality (7) shows the expected
proﬁt of a bank choosing to screen at costs C. With probability 휇, a high recovery credit
is detected. B then signals quality by paying P* in exchange for a call right value 퐴퐻 .
With probability (1−휇), screening reveals a low recovery credit. B prefers to stay out of the
market in this case, because misleadingly signaling a high recovery credit by paying P* would
generate an expected loss (see the IC). The right hand side of Inequality (7) represents the
market breakdown, which occurs if only CDSs are available. Plugging the lowest P* satisfying
the IR and the IC into Inequality (7) leads to the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The intermediating bank prefers to screen and use CCDSs to the outcome
with CDSs, if and only if
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ 0. (8)
Whenever (푖−푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴퐿+ 퐶(1−휇) ≤ 퐴퐻 , the Screening Condition (8) reduces to 휇(푖−푠퐻) ≥
퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 as in the First Best.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In contrast to standard credit risk transfer techniques such as CDSs, CCDSs allow to signal
loan quality. As a consequence of the possibility to lower the protection fee, B is induced
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to collect private information on loans if C is not too high. Therefore, underinvestment can
be avoided even though the credit risk is fully transferred to S: By screening and subsequent
intermediation of good loans, proﬁtable market activity is maintained. The Appendix shows
that this result is not aﬀected by market opacity: Even if credit derivative contracts and the
bank’s lending constraint are not publicly observable, the basic mechanism maintains. The
reason is that the price paid at contract initiation contains the signaling costs. Hence, they
are irreversible and can not be silently avoided after the initial contract date.
For a comparison to the First Best, I deﬁne the signaling premium (SP) as the diﬀerence
between the premium P* and the fair value 퐴퐻 of the call feature. B’s expected proﬁt when
using a CCDS depends on this signaling premium. The question is how much above 퐴퐻 the
premium 푃 ∗ needs to be in order to induce S to update beliefs to 휌, i.e., to satisfy the IC.
In the First Best, B maximizes the trade-oﬀ between costs of underinvestment and screening
costs. Using CCDSs, it optimizes the trade-oﬀ with respect to underinvestment, the signaling
premium, and screening costs. If (푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 + 퐴퐿 + 퐶(1−휇) ≤ 퐴퐻 , 푃 ∗ = 퐴퐻 is suﬃcient to
update S’s beliefs. The signaling premium is equal to zero in this case. Facing exactly the
same trade-oﬀ, B also realizes the same outcome as in the First Best. Hence, CCDSs allow to
reach the First Best under certain conditions, as outlined in Table 1 (푆푃 = 0). The expected
proﬁt, however, is smaller than in the First Best whenever a certain signaling premium needs
to be paid, and a more restrictive condition for proﬁtable screening emerges (see 푆푃 > 0 in
Table 1).
3.5 Results for very low, high, and very high loan rates
I ﬁrst explain the case where the loan rate is very low, i.e., 푖 < 푠퐻 . As it is publicly known
that the loan rate is too low to admit any proﬁtable market activity, no loan is granted or
hedged.
Next, consider the very high loan rate case, i.e., 푖 ≥ 푠퐿, in the First Best environment.
Before screening, B relies on public information. It presumes a high credit being detected
with probability 휇 and a low credit with probability (1− 휇). Screening before granting and
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hedging a loan is then expected to yield 푉 푓푒푒0,2
(
푖 − 푠(휇)) − 퐶 because both types of credits
are granted anyway. In contrast, the expected income increases to 푉 푓푒푒0,2
(
푖− 푠(휇)) if B lends
without screening. A credit is, consequently, granted without screening in the First Best.
The same outcome develops with information asymmetry and CDSs: B has no mean to
credibly signal loan quality in a CDS hedge. As a consequence, it omits costly screening. S,
anticipating this behavior, assigns beliefs 휇 to determine the protection fee on oﬀered loans.
B’s expected income, therefore, amounts to 푉 푓푒푒0,2
(
푖 − (휇푠퐻 + (1 − 휇)푠퐿))= 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖 − 푠(휇))
as in the First Best. In the very high loan rate scenario, each loan has a positive NPV and
should be accepted. There is no need to spend C, uncover the exact CDS rate, and think
about acceptance again. Creating an instrument to induce screening such as CCDSs lacks
a beneﬁt, because, keeping overall proﬁtability constant, contractual innovations just cause
a redistribution of wealth between the participants. Hence, no screening takes place in the
pooling equilibrium, all loans are approved, and the corresponding credit risk is transferred
using CDSs.
Finally, the high loan rate case deserves a closer description. A bank generates a positive
NPV by just granting credits without screening, because the loan rate is higher than the
expected CDS rate. Cross-subsidization18 of bad credits by good credits allows a positive
expected proﬁt. However, screening may still be worthwhile for B if C is low enough. The
reason is that spending C, and thereby learning the true recovery rate, allows the bank to
reject bad loans, while good ones can still be granted. In other words, cross-subsidization and
overinvestment are prevented. Following the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to show that
the bank screens a new loan applicant in the First Best as long as (푠퐿 − 푖)(1− 휇) ≥ 퐶/푉 푓푒푒0.2 .
Now, consider the credit risk being transferred via CDS in an environment of high loan
rates and information asymmetry. S demands a protection fee equal to 푠(휇) due to the lack
of a credible quality signal. Since screening does not provide a beneﬁt to B, it just grants
any loan. The resulting overinvestment causes information asymmetry costs given as the
18The term ”cross-subsidization” describes the following: For low recovery credits the loan rate is too low,
for high recovery credits the loan rate is too high. If the expected proﬁt is positive - and higher than in any
screening equilibrium -, the good credits allow the bad ones to be granted without detection. This is possible
although the bad credits decrease the total expected proﬁt. It is just more expensive to screen and reject bad
loans than leaving them in the market.
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diﬀerence of expected proﬁts to the First Best. In contrast, CCDSs decrease information
asymmetry costs by providing the incentives to screen loans. If C is not too large, the
overinvestment problem can be solved even though credit risk is fully transferred to S. The
derivation of the corresponding Proposition 4 is analogous to the one of Proposition 3. The
only diﬀerence is that Inequality (7) needs to be replaced by
휇
(
(푖− 푠(휌))푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 푃 ∗ +퐴퐻
)− 퐶 ≥ (푖− 푠(휇))푉 푓푒푒0,2 , (9)
because the bank’s expected proﬁt with CDSs corresponds to (푖− 푠(휇))푉 푓푒푒0.2 in case of high
loan rates.
Proposition 4. Consider a market characterized by a high loan rate. A pooling equilibrium
with loans being hedged without screening applies, whenever credit risk is transferred via CDSs.
Hence, the intermediating bank prefers to screen and use CCDSs to the outcome with CDSs,
if and only if
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ (푖− 푠(휇))푉
푓푒푒
0.2 . (10)
Whenever (푖 − 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0.2 + 퐴퐿 + 퐶(1−휇) ≤ 퐴퐻 , the Screening Condition (10) reduces to (푠퐿 −
푖)(1− 휇) ≥ 퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 as in the First Best.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equation (10) results from a trade-oﬀ between the costs of overinvestment, the signaling
premium, and screening costs. The outcome is a Second Best solution as shown in Table 2
(푆푃 > 0). Whenever (푖 − 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 + 퐴퐿 + 퐶(1−휇) ≤ 퐴퐻 , the signaling premium is equal to
zero (푆푃 = 0). B then optimizes the trade-oﬀ between overinvestment and screening costs,
yielding the same result as in the First Best. Again, market opacity does not impede the
mechanism.
28
Condition for Expected Overall
screening bank proﬁt welfare
First Best
(1− 휇)(푠퐿 − 푖) ≥ 휇(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 휇(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2
퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 -C -C
CDS No screening (푖− 푠(휇))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖− 푠(휇))푉 푓푒푒0,2
CCDS (푆푃 > 0)
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)− (푖− 푠(휇))푉 푓푒푒0,2 휇(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 as in the
≥ 퐶/(1− 휇) −퐶 − 푆푃 First Best
CCDS (푆푃 = 0)
as in the as in the as in the
First Best First Best First Best
Table 2: 퐴퐻 and 퐴퐿 denote the fair value of the call feature on a high and a low recovery loan,
respectively. C expresses screening costs, 푉 푓푒푒0,2 is the present value of receiving one basis point of
fee payments up to 푇2 as long as there is no default, and SP is the signaling premium. The table
summarizes results of credit risk transfer for high loan rates in four cases: (i) without information
asymmetry (First Best), (ii) with information asymmetry using a CDS (CDS), (iii) with information
asymmetry using a CCDS given a positive signaling premium (CCDS(푆푃 > 0)), (iv) with information
asymmetry using a CCDS without a signaling premium (CCDS(푆푃 = 0)). For each case, the table
outlines the condition for screening taking place (condition for screening), the expected bank proﬁt
given that the condition for screening is satisﬁed (expected bank proﬁt), and the combined expected
proﬁt of the bank and the investor given the condition for screening is satisﬁed (overall welfare).
3.6 Discussion
Propositions 3 and 4 show that by structuring the hedge in a simple way, the basic intermedi-
ation dilemma can be solved: While credit derivatives permit a bank to relax binding lending
constraints, a complete transfer of the underlying credit risk does not necessarily introduce
costly disincentives with respect to screening. The First Best is still attainable with CCDSs.
The spread diﬀerence (푠퐻−푠퐿) can be considered as a measure of information asymmetry.
The term (퐴퐻 −퐴퐿) in Inequalities (8) and (10) is an increasing function of this diﬀerence,
which leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 3.3. Signaling with CCDSs is more preferable to standard credit risk transfer
techniques the higher the information asymmetry.
CCDSs can be important for ﬁnancing over the life-cycle of a ﬁrm. A borrower may
substantially grow and demand more funds after successful initial stage ﬁnancing. A bank has
usually acquired private information on the borrower during ﬁnancing at early stages, which
eases subsequent lending. At some point, the bank is, however, reluctant towards more loan
grants to the same borrower due to concentration risk. A CCDS allows the bank to ”grow”
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with the ﬁrm, because credit risk above a certain constraint can be fully transferred to a
diversiﬁed investor without incurring information asymmetry costs. If continued loan grants
intensify the relationship between the bank and the borrower, and support specialization,
screening costs are reduced. Low screening costs, in turn, facilitate granting new loans.19
CCDSs are, therefore, likely to enforce relationship building, credit portfolio management,
and the rents generated therein.
The relevance of each loan rate scenario must be judged on a case by case basis as
the banking structure, and its impact on loan rates charged by banks appear to diﬀer across
countries and sectors (Saunders and Schumacher (2000)). Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara
(2004) obtain evidence for loan margin reductions in recent years. A trend towards lower
loan rate scenarios stresses the importance of CCDSs as a mean to increase banks’ proﬁts
and the overall welfare.
The high loan rate scenario addresses one of the central reasons for the recent credit
crisis, namely irresponsible lending. Whereas, without securitization, credits are screened and
only high loans are granted, this paper shows that standard credit risk transfer changes the
incentive structure. In particular, a bank’s proﬁt is maximized by granting and transferring
good and bad loans to the market without screening (overinvestment). The model, therefore,
explains concerns of the IMF (2007) expressed in the Global Financial Stability Report about
weakened credit discipline in conjunction with a strong credit volume growth. Relying on
rating agencies alone does not seem to be a promising path to deal with the challenges
of today’s credit market.20 I argue that the problems can instead be addressed by using
appropriate credit risk transfer structures, which reestablish credit discipline, and, ultimately,
solve the overinvestment problem.
For tractability, the model simpliﬁes the pricing of credit risk transfer instruments. The
results are, however, robust with respect to the notion that counterparty risk21, random
19Tirole (2006) states that as it is costly for a borrower to ﬁnd a new lender and for a bank to screen new
borrowers, a natural market reaction to the existence of information asymmetries is to build up relationships
between banks and borrowers.
20According to Tirole (2006), another layer of incentive problems arises with respect to the rating agency’s
behavior. Additionally, Ferreira and Schmidt (2006) argue that the rating of a rating agency is public infor-
mation. It may not reveal the speciﬁc information needed to calculate the fair CDS rate.
21The investor may also default before the maturity of the contracts.
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recovery rates, varying recovery payment conventions, the American feature of the call option,
or a term structure of interest and loan rates can be introduced without aﬀecting the basic
signaling mechanism. The reason is that each of these considerations similarly aﬀects the
prices of credit risk transfer instruments on both high and low recovery loans, while the
signaling mechanism simply depends on the diﬀerence between these prices.
3.7 The optimal contract
It remains to be analyzed whether a CCDS is the optimal security to solve the information
asymmetry problem. A widely discussed alternative signaling mechanism is the partial risk
retention contract. In contrast to CDSs and CCDSs, these contracts induce regulatory costs
if bank capital is costly. The reason is that capital requirements are based on the maximum
loss due to loan defaults in the Basel II jurisdiction.22 In a partial risk retention contract,
a bank retains a fraction 휃 of a loan’s credit risk in order to signal its type. Suppose bank
regulation requires to hold 휆 > 0 regulatory capital per unit of risk retained, and the unitary
cost of capital is 훿 > 0.23 All types of risk retention contracts such as maturity mismatchs
or ﬁrst-to-default structures can be incorporated in this framework.
I assume that speculative banks participate in opaque credit derivative markets, and that
휇 is assigned to the probability of a fractional hedge 휃 being of high type. A bank with a
high loan is then unable to credibly commit ex ante to retain a certain fraction if the costs of
silently hedging the residual risk resulting from adverse beliefs, 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푠(휇)− 푠퐻)휃, are lower
than the regulatory costs of keeping the fractional risk, 휆휃훿, i.e., if
휆훿 ≥ 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푠(휇)− 푠퐻). (11)
22Loan losses are completely covered by CDS and CCDS contracts. Hence, there are no capital requirements.
In the standardized approach, the call needs to be at the discretion of the protection buying bank without
positive incentives (for example a step-up in cost of cover) to call the protection before maturity (see BIS
(2006) page 46 ﬀ). Both conditions are met by the CCDS structure in my model. This treatment is justiﬁed
from an economical point of view. Within risk retention contracts, such as maturity mismatches or ﬁrst-to-
default structures, the hedging costs may increase up to the time the hedge expires as a result of a deteriorating
credit quality of the underlying. In contrast, the protection fee of a CCDS, at worst, remains constant up to
maturity, justifying the full coverage assumption imposed.
23It is assumed that the unitary cost of capital is greater than the cost of deposits, which is normalized to
zero. See, for example, Froot and Stein (1998).
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Hence, partial risk retention contracts do not provide a credible solution to the incentive
problem if regulatory capital requirements 휆 are high. CCDSs are the only viable signaling
mechanism in this case.
The next proposition compares the expected bank proﬁt with a CCDS to the one with
a risk retention contract in the low loan rates scenario, assuming that regulatory costs are
suﬃciently low, i.e., 휆훿 ≤ 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푠(휇)− 푠퐻).
Proposition 5. A bank prefers a CCDS to a risk retention contract if
휆훿 ≥ ((푖− 푠
퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 + 퐶/(1− 휇) +퐴퐿 −퐴퐻)(푠퐿 − 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2
퐴퐻 −퐴퐿 . (12)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Condition (12) shows that CCDSs are optimal if 퐴퐻 − 퐴퐿 is suﬃciently large, or if
regulatory costs are high. Additionally, the term on the right side is directly linked to the
costs of the signal in a CCDS contract, namely to (푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐶/(1−휇)+퐴퐿−퐴퐻 . This
term is zero if CCDSs admit the First Best outcome according to Proposition 3. As 휆훿 > 0
by the deﬁnition of regulatory costs, CCDSs are strictly preferred to risk retention contracts
whenever the former induce the First Best in an environment of asymmetric information.
Moreover, it can be shown that risk retention contracts never allow the First Best due to
regulatory costs. Finally, signaling costs due to regulatory capital in a risk retention contract
are wasteful, whereas the signaling premium of a CCDS in the Second Best directly accrues
to the investor. He obtains a price for the call which more than compensates for the feature’s
economic value. Hence, in contrast to risk retention contracts, the overall welfare with CCDSs
corresponds to the First Best whenever the screening condition is satisﬁed.
The analysis speaks to the current discussion on regulating the credit derivatives market.
It is often argued that high regulatory capital is necessary to support ﬁnancial stability. In
contrast to this view, I show that high regulatory capital can prevent partial risk retention
approaches, which have been extensively used before the recent credit crisis, from credibly
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signaling loan quality. My results suggest relying on properly structured credit risk transfer
contracts such as CCDSs instead of turning to tighter regulatory restrictions.
4 Moral hazard
This section introduces monitoring and shows how moral hazard emerges in the model. It is
beyond the scope of the paper to fully discuss the impact of debt contracts on monitoring
within the bank-borrower relationship. For work in this ﬁeld, see Innes (1990), Jensen and
Meckling (1996), or Myers and Majluf (1984). Instead, I investigate the eﬀect of hedging on
monitoring.
Consider a bank B with the special ability to monitor a borrower F. Lacking a close
relationship to F, the investor S is neither able to monitor nor to observe this activity.24
He can, however, infer the bank’s optimal monitoring-eﬀort choice from the maximization
problem. Coalition between B and F, and simultaneous defaults of S and F are excluded in
the model.
4.1 Analysis
I start by analyzing moral hazard without adverse selection. The structure is as follows: At
푇0, while granting a loan and transferring the credit risk, B ﬁxes a monitoring-eﬀort level e
which is maintained up to 푇2. The eﬀort causes monitoring costs M(e) immediately payable
at 푇0. They are strictly increasing and convex, i.e., 푀
′(푒) > 0, 푀 ′′(푒) > 0. The protection
leg (see the Appendix) is assumed to be strictly decreasing and convex, the fee leg to be
strictly increasing and concave, and the fair CDS rate of a loan to be strictly decreasing and
convex in monitoring eﬀort, i.e., 푠′(푒) < 0, 푠′′(푒) > 0.
A bank’s optimal eﬀort level is determined by the equality of marginal costs 푀 ′(푒) and
marginal beneﬁts of monitoring. An unhedged bank loses the fraction 1−푅 on the nominal
24Without reputation eﬀects and observability, the investor is also not able to inﬂuence the bank’s max-
imization problem by paying for monitoring. In addition, Boot et al. (1993) show that the delegation of
decision-making to the lender is optimal if the information revealed through monitoring is too detailed to
contract upon.
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in case of default, and the spread income 푖 − 푠(⋅) after default. As B bears all beneﬁts and
costs of monitoring if it is not hedged, there is no moral hazard. In contrast, the incentives
to monitor weaken for a CDS-hedged bank because it only loses the spread income in case
of default.25 Most of the marginal beneﬁts of a hedged B’s monitoring eﬀort accrue to S,
since the latter bears the risk of loan default. In this way, credit risk transfer originates
moral hazard. A CCDS-structure provides partial relief for the problem under complete
credit risk transfer. B’s incentives to monitor the hedged position are enhanced, because
monitoring rises the value of the embedded call feature. Hence, the possibility to call the
contract internalizes part of the marginal beneﬁts of monitoring. However, a bank’s optimal
eﬀort level still remains below the one of an unhedged position.
Proposition 6. B’s incentives to monitor a loan hedged via CDS are small. A CCDS-hedge
clearly induces more monitoring-eﬀort, but still less than an unhedged loan position.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From an intuitive point of view, the result follows Innes’ (1990) basic idea.26 Choosing
a CCDS instead of a monotonic CDS decreases a bank’s obligation in ”high” states (with a
low CDS rate), and increases it in ”low” states (with a high CDS rate): In high states, the
bank can call the CCDS at 푇1, resulting in a lower protection fee to be paid from 푇1 to 푇2. In
low states, the additional premium for the call feature has been paid without a beneﬁt at 푇1.
A higher monitoring-eﬀort shifts probability weight to high states, implying that the CCDS
contract is more likely to give the bank the opportunity to call at 푇1. A larger beneﬁt for B
from monitoring-eﬀort is created in this way. In respect thereof, a monotonic CCDS contract
satisﬁes Innes’ (1990) ”maximal high-proﬁt-state payoﬀ” property, given the restriction that
the credit risk of the loan must be fully transferred to an investor.
25The loss of spread income constitutes a risk as long as the face value of the defaulted loan can not be
reinvested immediately at the same return.
26Innes (1990) proves the emergence of debt contracts in the presence of a monotonic contract constraint
and the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). A debt contract provides the best incentives for eﬀort
provision by extracting as much as possible from the entrepreneur under low performance, and by giving him
the full marginal return from eﬀort provision in high-performance states where revenues are above the face
value of the debt.
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4.2 Combination of adverse selection and moral hazard
To reach a plausible solution to the problem at hand, it is necessary to analyze whether
the basic mechanism still maintains if adverse selection and moral hazard are present. As
expected, the outcome is a combination of the previous results: A bank’s maximization
problem can be solved by relying on the pure adverse selection methodology, incorporating
the inﬂuence of moral hazard on CDS rates.
Proposition 7. The ability of CCDSs to induce beneﬁcial screening is stronger if moral
hazard and adverse selection are combined.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The rationale for Proposition 7 develops from the observation that CCDSs align the
monitoring interests of B and S: A CCDS-hedge provides a certiﬁcation of monitoring-eﬀort.
As this certiﬁcation decreases the demanded protection fee, the conditions expressing whether
CCDSs are beneﬁcial are relaxed.
5 Conclusions
This paper explains why callable credit default swaps represent an optimal mechanism to
transfer the credit risk of bank-originated loans. In particular, I model the credit risk trans-
fer process from a bank to an investor. The standard transfer via CDSs causes information
asymmetry costs because the bank can not credibly signal loan quality. I propose to use a
callable credit default swap to address the problem. With this structure, a bank signals loan
quality by expressing its readiness to pay for the implicit call feature. The ability to signal
credit quality induces the bank to screen loans. Moreover, even though a CCDS completely
transfers the loan’s credit risk to an investor, the implicit call feature still encourages a bank
to monitor the borrower. Hence, simple structuring avoids disincentives, and, consequently,
reduces information asymmetry costs. It is further shown that the current capital require-
ments regulation can impede eﬀective partial risk retention solutions. As a consequence,
CCDSs evolve as the optimal credit risk transfer contract in most cases.
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The ﬁndings speak to the debate on the impact of credit derivatives on intermediation.
While the results support arguments on possible drawbacks of credit risk transfer due to
disincentives, the broad implication of my analysis suggests that most of them can be ap-
proached by properly structuring credit derivatives. In particular, Duﬀee and Zhou (2001)
conclude that the value of introducing a market for credit derivatives is ambiguous: Loan
sales are initially used to transfer the risk of borrower default in both periods. One-period
credit derivatives may simply replace loan sales, reducing the ability of banks to share the
risk of borrower default in period two. In contrast, I show how banks can signal loan quality
without incurring deadweight costs in period two, rendering the introduction of credit deriva-
tives beneﬁcial. Furthermore, the wealth destruction eﬀect of a market for credit derivatives
in Morrison (2005) - caused by a loss of the certiﬁcation role of bank debt - can be avoided
if banks do not cease to monitor the borrower. Debt hedged via CCDS indeed maintains its
certiﬁcation value in my model, because the bank keeps monitoring to increase the value of
the call feature.
The model can be extended to include interactions between the bank and the borrower.
For example, hold-up or collusion among these two players are likely to aﬀect the outcome.
It may be in the interests of a hedged bank and the borrower to delay default even though
the recovery rate deteriorates by doing so, which harms the investor. A model incorporating
the strategic game between all players promises further insights to what extent specialization,
competition, and intermediation are aﬀected by the new hedging tools.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Pricing
In this section, I deﬁne the basic valuation concepts for CDSs and options on CDSs. The
fundamental references are Scho¨nbucher (1999b), Scho¨nbucher (2003), and Hull and White
(2002). The pricing model is set up in a ﬁltered probability space (Ω, (Ϝ푇 )(푇≥0),ℙ). Existence
of a spot-martingale measure ℚ ∼ ℙ is implied by the absence of arbitrage. The time of the
credit event is modeled with a stopping time 휏 . I assume independence of default events,
loan rates, and recovery rates. The riskless interest rate is zero.
6.1.1 The forward CDS rate
A CDS option’s underlying is a forward starting credit default swap. A forward starting
credit default swap is a CDS starting its life not immediately at 푇0 but at 푇1. If the reference
entity defaults before 푇1, the contract is worthless and no payments are made. The payoﬀs
of a forward CDS can be split into a fee leg, paid by the protection buyer, and a protection
leg, paid by the protection seller.
6.1.2 The fee leg
The protection buyer pays regular fee payments 푠훿푛1푇푛≤휏 at predetermined dates 푇푛 to the
protection seller. 1푇푛≤휏 is the indicator function that default has not occurred before the
payment date 푇푛. For tractability, I assume that defaults can only occur on one of the
payment dates27, and that the daycount fraction is equal to one. 푉 푓푒푒0.2 denotes the value at
time 푇0 of receiving 1 basis point (bp) of fee payments up to 푇2:
푉 푓푒푒0,2 = 퐸
푄[
푁∑
푛=0
1푇푛≤휏 ∣ Ϝ푇0 ], (13)
27Default on payment dates is a reasonable assumption given that defaults often become public at times
when payments are due.
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The value of the fee leg is, consequently, 푠푉 푓푒푒0,2 . After a default, no fees are paid, i.e., 푉
푓푒푒
휏,2 =
0 for 휏 ≤ 푇 . The forward starting fee leg is calculated in exactly the same way: I just adapt
the summation in Equation (13) to include only the forward starting period. The resulting
푉 푓푒푒1,2 is multiplied by the forward rate 푓1,2 to arrive at the value of the forward starting fee
leg at 푇0: 푓1,2푉
푓푒푒
1,2 .
6.1.3 The protection leg
In case of default during the life of the contract, the protection seller has to pay an amount
1-R to the protection buyer. Thus, the corresponding payment is (1−푅)1푇0≤휏≤푇2 at 휏 . The
value of the protection leg at time 푇0 is
푉 푝푟표푡0,2 = 퐸
푄[(1−푅)1푇0≤휏≤푇2 ∣ Ϝ푇0 ]. (14)
The value of the forward starting protection leg at 푇0 is 푉
푝푟표푡
1,2 , obtained by replacing the
indicator function in Equation (14) by 1푇1≤휏≤푇2 such that only the forward starting period
is incorporated.
I now derive the CDS rate. The spot CDS rate simply equals the two legs. The fair
forward CDS rate, 푓1,2, at time 푇0 of a forward CDS over the interval [푇1, 푇2] is the rate at
which the forward fee leg has the same value as the forward protection leg, i.e.,28
푓1,2 =
푉 푝푟표푡1,2
푉 푓푒푒1,2
. (15)
Markt-to-market values of income streams subject to credit risk can be calculated by multi-
plying with the corresponding fee leg. The value of a ﬁxed spread received from 푇0 to 푇2, for
example, is obtained by multiplying this spread by 푉 푓푒푒0,2 . Suppose a forward CDS over [푇1, 푇2]
has been entered (as protection buyer) before or at 푇0 at a rate x. The markt-to-market value
of this position at time 푇0 is (푓1,2 − 푥)푉 푓푒푒1,2 . The reason for this result is that one can lock
into a fee stream of (푓1,2 − 푥) by selling the forward CDS protection at the current market
rate 푓1,2.
28Note that the fair forward CDS rate is not deﬁned after default.
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6.1.4 The change of numeraire technique
Take the example at the end of the previous paragraph. If, instead, one has just the right
but not the obligation to enter the forward CDS at time 푇0 at the forward CDS rate x, then
the value of this right is29
(푓1,2 − 푥)+푉 푓푒푒1,2 . (16)
Equation (16) corresponds to the payoﬀ of an option on a forward-starting CDS with maturity
푇0. Before deriving an option pricing formula, I need to introduce the change of numeraire
technique.30
For any given spot-martingale-measure Q and numeraire 퐴푇 , one can deﬁne an equivalent
pricing measure 푄퐴 using the Radon-Nikodym density process:31
푑푄퐴
푑푄
∣푇 := 퐴푇
푏푇
푏푇0
퐴푇0
(17)
In our case the bank account is always 1, i.e., 푏푇0 = 푏푇 = 1. Prices in the A-numeraire are
martingales under the new measure 푄퐴.
Unfortunately, a direct application of 푉 푓푒푒 as numeraire in a price system is not possible
because 푉 푓푒푒 can be zero. Thus, a price system in terms of 푉 푓푒푒 is undeﬁned after defaults.32
Assume 퐴¯푇 to be the price process of a defaultable asset with zero recovery. For a given
푇 > 푇0, Scho¨nbucher (2003) deﬁnes a ”promised” payoﬀ 퐴
′
푇 via 퐴
′
푇 1푇<휏 = 퐴¯푇 , which allows
to deﬁne a default-free asset with the price process 퐸푄[
푏푇0퐴
′
푇
푏푇
]. This asset pays 퐴′푇 at 푇 for
sure, i.e., the promised payoﬀ is positive. In this case, it can be shown that 푄퐴¯ is the measure
which is reached when 푄퐴 is conditioned on survival until T.33 The new probability measure
푄퐴¯ attaches zero probability to all events involving a default before T. Scho¨nbucher (2003)
circumvents the practical restrictions of this new interpretation by deﬁning the value of 푋퐴′푇
29The reason is that one can now lock into a forward CDS contract at a rate 푓1,2. The protection seller
obtains a ﬁxed spread (푓1,2 − 푥) over the future time interval [푇1, 푇2]. It is shown in the last section why one
simply needs to multiply a spread over this future period by 푉 푓푒푒1,2 to obtain its value.
30See Scho¨nbucher (2003).
31See, for example, Musiela and Rutkowski (2004).
32While the price system itself can break down if the numeraire is zero, the Radon-Nikodym density still
remains valid as long as 퐴푇0 > 0. It deﬁnes a mathematically admissible Radon-Nikodym density.
33푄퐴 is the measure for a default-free numeraire deﬁned via the Radon-Nikodym density process.
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at T in survival:
퐸푄[
푏푇0
푏푇
1휏>푇푋퐴
′
푇 ∣ Ϝ푡] = 퐴¯푇0퐸푄
퐴¯
[푋 ∣ Ϝ푇0 ] (18)
The right hand side of Equality (18) is obtained by plugging in the Radon-Nikodym
density process with the defaultable asset as numeraire.
6.1.5 Option pricing formula
Armed with the survival-based pricing measure I use the defaultable fee stream for a change
of measure to a survival measure. Equation (18) is applied to value a receiver swaption on
푓1,2 at 푇0 with maturity 푇1 and strike x :
푅푆(푇0) = 1휏>푇0퐸
푄
(푏푇0
푏푇1
(푥− 푓1,2(푇1))+푉 푓푒푒1,2 (푇1)1휏>푇1 ∣Ϝ푇0
)
(19)
= 1휏>푇0푉
푓푒푒
1,2 퐸
푃
푉
푓푒푒
1,2 (
(푥− 푓1,2(푇1))+ ∣ Ϝ푇0
)
(20)
The expectation is taken under the 푃 푉
푓푒푒
1,2 -measure. 푇1 in parenthesis indicates that 푇1 is the
starting date. The key is to understand that 푉 푓푒푒1,2 (푇1)1(휏>푇1) in Equation (19) corresponds
to the price process of a defaultable asset with zero recovery at time 푇1. We can, therefore,
plug in the corresponding Radon-Nikodym density to generate Equation (20). This point is
the furthest one can go without making any modeling assumptions apart from the absence
of arbitrage. For examples of how to model the distribution of the forward CDS rate 푓1,2(푇1)
under the 푃 푉
푓푒푒
-measure, see Scho¨nbucher (2003).
It is important to realize that the underlying credit risk assessment is not necessary to
price the option itself. This assessment has already been done when 푓1,2 was formed.
6.2 Proofs
Proposition 1. For a low loan rate, the bank screens a new loan applicant in the First Best
as long as 휇(푖− 푠퐻) ≥ 퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 .
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Proof. 푉 푓푒푒0,2 is used to convert risky spread-incomes from 푇0 to 푇2 into present values. A bank
selects a strategy by comparing expected proﬁts. When doing so, it anticipates the protection
fee for each strategy on the credit derivatives market. The bank’s expected proﬁt from
screening and subsequent decision about loan granting is 휇푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖− 푠퐻)−퐶. A detected low
credit is not approved, since i<푠퐿. Just rejecting a loan without screening the credit quality
yields zero expected proﬁt, and granting a loan without screening gives 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖 − 푠(휇)) < 0.
Comparing expected proﬁts and rearranging terms yields the condition in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Information asymmetry between the bank B and the investor S impedes
screening activities, if lending constraints are relaxed by transferring the credit risk via CDSs.
The loan market breaks down, resulting in underinvestment.
Proof. The Intuitive Criterion of In-Koo and Kreps (1987) can be informally explained as
follows: Suppose B makes an out-of-equilibrium oﬀer. B does so based on a certain conjecture
about how the investor reacts. The Intuitive Criterion suggests to assign probability one to a
B having a high recovery loan, if and only if given the investor’s most optimistic conjecture,
a high bank ﬁnds it optimal to make this oﬀer and to deviate from the equilibrium, while the
low bank does not.
Selling a risk on the CDS market permits no credible quality signal. Hence, it is easily
checked that the only equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion is a pooling equilibrium
without market activity. The bank uses a CDS to hedge the exposure, and S assumes that
no screening is taking place. The latter only accepts a protection fee equal or higher than
푠(휇), no matter what B claims about the credit’s quality. Spending C in this equilibrium
reduces B’s expected proﬁt: Screening leads to a NPV of Max[0,푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖 − 푠(휇))] − 퐶 ≤
푀푎푥[0, 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푖 − 푠(휇))]. The bank is better oﬀ if it drops screening and stays out of the
market, since spending C does not allow to reduce the protection fee.
A necessary condition for the existence of a pooling equilibrium without market activity is
that B makes negative proﬁts by oﬀering any contract. This condition is satisﬁed because the
loan rate is smaller than 푠(휇). Hence, the expected proﬁt is maximized if B stays out of the
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market. The market breaks down, which causes underinvestment since loans with positive
NPVs are also rejected.
Lemma 3.2. The value of a receiver swaption is increasing in the recovery rate:
∂푅푆
∂푅
> 0. (21)
Proof. a) Changing R in Equation (20) does neither alter 푉 푓푒푒1,2 nor 푉
푓푒푒
0,2 . Consequently, the
Radon-Nikodym density remains unchanged, and I do not need to take a changing survival-
based pricing measure into account. 푓1,2(푇1) =
푉 푝푟표푡1,2 (푇1)
푉 푓푒푒1,2 (푇1)
can be written as
(1−푅)푉 퐹푝푟표푡1,2 (푇1)
푉 푓푒푒1,2 (푇1)
=
(1−푅)푓퐹1,2, where 푉 퐹푝푟표푡 is the value of a claim paying 1 in case of default. Obviously, using
Equation (20), 푅푆(푇0) = 1휏>푇0푉
푓푒푒
1,2 퐸
푃
푉
푓푒푒
1,2 (
(푥− 푓1,2(푇1))+ ∣ Ϝ푇0
)
= 1휏>푇0푉
푓푒푒
1,2 퐸
푃
푉
푓푒푒
1,2 (
(푥−
(1−푅)푓퐹1,2(푇1))+ ∣ Ϝ푇0
)
= 1휏>푇0푉
푓푒푒
1,2
∫ 푥/(1−푅)
0 (푥− (1−푅)푓퐹1,2휑(푓퐹1,2)∂푓퐹1,2, with 휑 expressing
the density of 푓퐹1,2. Now deﬁne F(Z,R) =
∫ 푍
0 (푥−(1−푅)푓퐹1,2휑(푓퐹1,2)∂푓퐹1,2. Then, ∂∂푅퐹 ( 푥(1−푅) , 푅)= ∂∂푍퐹 (푍,푅) ∣푍= 푥1−푅
+ ∂∂푅퐹 =
∫ 푍
0 푓
퐹
1,2휑(푓
퐹
1,2)∂푓
퐹
1,2 > 0, since
∂
∂푍퐹 (푍,푅) ∣푍= 푥1−푅= 0, 푓퐹1,2 > 0 and 휑(푓퐹1,2) > 0. As
1휏>푇0 and 푉
푓푒푒
1,2 are independent of R, it follows immediately that the RS is increasing in
R.
Proposition 3. The intermediating bank prefers to screen and use CCDSs to the outcome
with CDSs, if and only if
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ 0. (22)
Whenever (푖−푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴퐿+ 퐶(1−휇) ≤ 퐴퐻 , the Screening Condition (8) reduces to 휇(푖−푠퐻) ≥
퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 as in the First Best.
Proof. Consider a CCDS-contract that is only callable once at 푇1, and that the true recovery
rate over the remaining time period to maturity 푇2 is publicly available once this point
in time is reached. B tries to maximize expected proﬁts in the set of incentive-compatible,
proﬁtable-type-by-type contracts. Assume that B chooses between as many contractual terms
as there are possible types of loans. According to Salenie´ (2005), the revelation principle then
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implies that one can restrict attention to mechanisms that are both direct (where B reports
his information) and truthful (so that B ﬁnds it optimal to announce the true value of his
information). In other words, the optimal contract induces B to reveal his type. The purpose
of contract choice is to inﬂuence beliefs. To maximize the expected proﬁts of the loan and the
credit derivative contract by signaling quality, a bank detecting a high recovery loan solves
the following program:
푚푎푥
푃
(
푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 + 푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 −퐴퐻)− 퐶
)
(23)
s.t.
푃 ≥ 퐴(휌) (퐼푅) (24)
(푖− 푠(휌))푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴퐿 +
퐶
(1− 휇) ≤ 푃 (퐼퐶) (25)
This set of equations is justiﬁed by the following procedure to obtain a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in pure strategies: The bank chooses the swaption premiumP by anticipating the
resulting protection fee on the credit derivatives market. S signs the credit risk transfer con-
tract, demanding a protection fee dependent on beliefs 휌 consistent with the bank’s strategy.
The contract is set in a way to maintain 휌 = 1.
Equation (23) shows the expected proﬁt of a bank with a high recovery loan. Equation (24)
is the participation constraint (IR) of S if he assumes that the bank oﬀering a CCDS is indeed
of high type with probability 휌. S, at least, demands a premium 퐴(휌) for the call feature. The
incentive compatibility constraint (IC) expresses two conditions: A bank with a low recovery
credit stays out of the market after screening: 푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 + 푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐴퐿) ≤ 0. More
restricting, a bank must also weakly prefer to ”screen and choose an adequate contract” to just
pick the CCDS contract without screening at all:34 푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 −(푃+푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 −휇퐴퐻−(1−휇)퐴퐿) ≤
휇
(
푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 + 푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐴퐻) − 퐶. This condition is necessary because S cannot observe
the screening-activity itself. The lowest premium P satisfying the IC and the IR is labeled
P*.
34The weak monotonic proﬁt assumption allows to skip the IC of a bank with a high recovery loan. See, for
example, Tirole (2006).
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P* guarantees equilibrium beliefs being such that 휌 = 1 for a CCDS oﬀer if and only if
(i) it is proﬁtable to oﬀer P* after detection of a high credit, (ii) it is proﬁtable to screen.
Since (푖푖)⇒ (푖), and the alternative outcome is a market breakdown, this condition looks as
follows:
휇(푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 ∗ + 푠퐻푉 푓푒푒0,2 −퐴퐻))− 퐶 + (1− 휇)0 ≥ 0. (26)
P* induces 푠(휌) = 푠퐻 and 퐴(휌) = 퐴퐻 . The right hand side of Equation (26) corresponds
to the expected proﬁt in a market breakdown. The left hand side expresses the choice
of a CCDS for a high loan, and staying out of the market for a low loan after screening.
Public information implies that - before screening - B assumes to be able to oﬀer a CCDS
contract with probability 휇. If Inequality (26) is satisﬁed for P*, a separating equilibrium
with screening holds: A bank with a high loan chooses a CCDS, and staying out of the market
is the only rational response after the detection of a low recovery credit. The CCDS (i.e., P*
in the IC) is too expensive for a B with a low loan, and oﬀering a plain vanilla CDS entails
a bad signal.35
Rearranging (26) and plugging in 푃 ∗ from the IC yields
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ 0. (27)
The resulting separating equilibrium satisﬁes the Intuitive Criterion. To check uniqueness,
note that a bank with a high recovery loan chooses the minimum swaption premium still
allowing to signal its type. Consequently, the least-cost separating equilibrium must leave a
B with a low loan just indiﬀerent between the two contracts. It is the most eﬃcient separating
perfect Bayesian equilibrium for B, as it entails the lowest signaling premium transferred to
S.
35The reason is that by observing the public known parameters, S infers that screening is optimal. Hence,
- using the Intuitive Criterion - only a bank with a low recovery loan subsequently tries to oﬀer a CDS.
According to (i) and (ii), a bank with a high recovery loan prefers a CCDS. The updated beliefs of S for a
CDS-oﬀer are 휌 = 0, yielding a protection fee 푠퐿 above the loan rate. Naturally, B prefers to stay out of the
market than paying this protection fee in a CDS oﬀer.
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Now, consider the following case: If
(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴퐿 +
퐶
(1− 휇) ≤ 퐴
퐻 , (28)
then the bank with a high recovery loan only needs to pay 퐴퐻 for the call feature in order to
satisfy the IR and the IC. Hence, one concludes that 푃 ∗ = 퐴퐻 . Plugging this premium into
Equation ((26)) to check the conditions for a screening equilibrium, one obtains 휇(푖− 푠퐻) ≥
퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 . There is no diﬀerence to the screening condition in the First Best, and 푃
∗ = 퐴퐻
also induces the First Best expected proﬁts.
Note that a bank may silently transfer the call feature in period 2 by addi- tionally
selling a receiver swaption. It is easily shown why this possibility does not aﬀect the result:
Whenever it is optimal for a high bank to sell a RS, it is also optimal to do so for a low bank.
As long as 휇 < 1, the high bank is, consequently, faced with unfavorable beliefs and obtains
a price below 퐴퐻 if it sells the right to call. Hence, selling a RS would decrease expected
proﬁts. As a result, the IC is not tightened by the possibility of silent credit risk transfer.
Suppose next that it is not publicly known whether the bank’s credit risk constraint is
binding: Speculative banks without lending restrictions may also try to sell receiver swaptions.
Assuming most unfavorable beliefs of the investor, i.e., the bank being speculative with
probability 1, a high B needs to satisfy the following IC:
(푖− 푠(휌))푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴(휇) +
퐶
(1− 휇) ≤ 푃 (퐼퐶) (29)
Inequality (29) expresses that a low bank silently selling a receiver swaption obtains 퐴(휇)
for this right, as investors assume it is a speculative bank.36 The new screening condition is
easily derived as
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴(휇))− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ 0. (30)
The information about whether the lending constraint is binding is not necessary to maintain
36A speculative bank without binding lending constraint will not pay the high premium 푃 ∗. However, the
possibility of a speculative bank selling a RS has the following eﬀect: A low bank can pretend to be speculative
and, hence, sell the RS at a higher price.
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a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Consider a market characterized by a high loan rate. A pooling equilib-
rium with loans being hedged without screening applies, whenever credit risk is transferred via
CDSs. Hence, the intermediating bank prefers to screen and use CCDSs to the outcome with
CDSs, if and only if
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ (푖− 푠(휇))푉
푓푒푒
0.2 . (31)
Whenever (푖 − 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0.2 + 퐴퐿 + 퐶(1−휇) ≤ 퐴퐻 , the Screening Condition (31) reduces to (푠퐿 −
푖)(1− 휇) ≥ 퐶/푉 푓푒푒0,2 as in the First Best.
Proof. The program to maximize takes the following form:
푚푎푥
푃
(
푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 + 푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 −퐴퐻)− 퐶
)
(32)
s.t.
푃 ≥ 퐴(휌) (33)
(푖− 푠(휌))푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴퐿 +
퐶
(1− 휇) ≤ 푃 (34)
The ﬁrst part of the proof corresponds to the one in Proposition 3. The second part is slightly
diﬀerent. Instead of Inequality (7), I need to check if
휇(푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (푃 ∗ + 푠퐻푉 푓푒푒0,2 −퐴퐻))− 퐶 + (1− 휇)0 ≥ 푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (휇푠퐻 + (1− 휇)푠퐿)푉 푓푒푒0,2 , (35)
since the CDS-outcome is a pooling equilibrium with market activity. Just using CDSs is the
better choice for B if Inequality (35) is not satisﬁed. Plugging in 푃 ∗ from Equation ((34))
yields
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ (푖− 푠(휇))푉
푓푒푒
0,2 . (36)
Additionally, one can replace P* by 퐴퐻 in Equation (35) if (푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐴퐿+ 퐶(1−휇) ≤ 퐴퐻 .
Simplifying gives the same screening condition as in the First Best.
Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, privacy of credit derivative
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contracts does not change the results. Additionally, allowing for speculative banks slightly
aﬀects the outcome. In the worst case, i.e., if the investor assumes the bank to sell a RS for
speculative reasons with probability 1, Condition (36) looks as follows:
휇(퐴퐻 −퐴(휇))− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ (푖− 푠(휇))푉
푓푒푒
0,2 (37)
Proposition 5. A bank prefers a CCDS to a risk retention contract if
휆훿 ≥ ((푖− 푠
퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 + 퐶/(1− 휇) +퐴퐿 −퐴퐻)(푠퐿 − 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2
퐴퐻 −퐴퐿 . (38)
Proof. Consider the risk retention contract. A bank detecting a high recovery loan solves the
following program:
푚푎푥
휃
(
푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 휃푠퐻푉 푓푒푒0,2 − (1− 휃)푠(휌)푉 푓푒푒0,2 − 퐶 − 훿휆휃
)
(39)
s.t.
(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 + 퐶(1−휇)
훿휆+ 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푠
퐿 − 푠퐻)
≤ 휃 (40)
The participation constraint is already incorporated in Equation (39), i.e., a competitive
credit derivative market requires a fair premium to the investor. Inequality (40) expresses
the incentive compatibility constraint: A low bank or a bank which does not screen incurs
a loss if it retains 휃. The high bank will choose the smallest possible fraction 휃∗ satisfying
Inequality (40), as retaining risk is costly due to the required regulatory capital.
Finally, the signaling costs of a CCDS must be lower than the signaling costs of a risk
retention contract, i.e., 푃 ∗ −퐴퐻 ≤ 훿휆휃∗, which is expressed in Condition (12).
Proposition 6. B’s incentives to monitor a loan hedged via CDS are small. A CCDS-
hedge clearly induces more monitoring-eﬀort, but still less than an unhedged loan position.
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Proof. For an unhedged, granted loan the situation looks as follows: B earns a risky loan
rate i, and bears the corresponding risk of a default. The ﬁrst part has a value of 푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 at
푇0. The second part is simply the protection leg. It is known that the CDS rate at time 푇0
is the rate at which the fee leg has the same value as the protection leg. I, therefore, express
the latter’s value as 푠퐻,퐿푉 푓푒푒0,2 . The bank’s problem can be treated separately for each loan
type. Hence, the superscript (H,L) is suppressed in what follows. B bears the costs and full
beneﬁts of the monitoring activities. The IR is binding and, hence, directly included. The
optimal monitoring-eﬀort level is derived by solving the following maximization problem:
푚푎푥
푒
(
(푖− 푠(푒))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒)−푀(푒)
)
(41)
Optimization equates B’s marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of eﬀort:
(푖− 푠(푒))푉 ′푓푒푒0,2 (푒)− 푠′(푒)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒) =푀 ′(푒) (42)
The eﬀort level e solving (42) is eﬃcient as it maximizes the lender’s value from monitoring.
It represents the First Best level of eﬀort.
If one considers a position hedged via CDS, the bank maximizes the following expression:
푚푎푥
푒
(
(푖− 푠)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒)−푀(푒)
)
(43)
Maximization yields
(푖− 푠)푉 ′푓푒푒0,2 (푒) =푀 ′(푒). (44)
The eﬀort level 푒ˆ solving (44) is strictly lower than e, because 푠′(푒) < 0, 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒) ≥ 0, and
푀(푒) is convex per assumption. Without reinvestment risk, 푒ˆ is even equal to zero. It remains
to be shown why CCDSs yield an eﬀort level in between e and 푒ˆ. Optimizing
푚푎푥
푒
(
(푖− 푠)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒)− 푃 +퐴(푒)−푀
)
(45)
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yields
(푖− 푠)푉 ′푓푒푒0,2 (푒) +퐴′(푒) =푀 ′(푒). (46)
To show that ∂푅푆(푇0)∂푒 > 0, i.e., 퐴
′(푒) > 0, recall the assumption that eﬀort is maintained
up to 푇2, 푠
′(푒) < 0, 푓 ′1,2(푒) < 0,
∂푉 푝푟표푡1,2
∂푒 < 0, and
∂푉 푓푒푒1,2
∂푒 > 0. Using the Radon-Nikodym
density, the swaption pricing formula (20) can be expressed in terms of the probability mea-
sure Q, which is unaﬀected by a change of e: 1휏>푇0퐸
푄
(
1휏>푇1(푥− 푓1,2(푇1))+푉 푓푒푒1,2 (푇1) ∣ Ϝ푇0
)
.
It remains to be shown that
∂1휏>푇0퐸
푄
(
1휏>푇1 (푥−푓1,2(푇1))+푉
푓푒푒
1,2 (푇1)∣Ϝ푇0
)
∂푒 > 0. The latter ex-
pression can be written as 1휏>푇0
∂
∂푒퐸
푄[푔(푒, 푌 )ℎ(푒, 푌 )1푚푖푛(푘(푒,푌 ),푚(푒,푦))] > 0. 푌 := (푦휖R ∣
1푚푖푛(푘(푒,푌 ),푚(푒,푦))>0). If k and m are continuous and diﬀerentiable functions, and 휀 > 0
but small, deﬁne 푒2 := 푒1 + 휀. As
∂푘
∂푒 > 0 and
∂푚
∂푒 > 0, I have 푘(푒2, 푦1) > 푘(푒1, 푦1)
and 푚(푒2, 푦1) > 푚(푒1, 푦1) ⇒ 푚푖푛(푘(푒2, 푦1),푚(푒2, 푦1)) > 푚푖푛(푘(푒1, 푦1),푚(푒1, 푦1)). Conse-
quently, if 푌푒 = (푎푒, 푏푒) and 푦휖푌푒, one concludes that (푎푒1, 푏푒1) < (푎푒2, 푏푒2) ∀푒. Hence,
1휏>푇0
∂
∂푒퐸
푄[
(
푔(푒, 푌 )ℎ(푒, 푌 )1푚푖푛(푘(푒,푌 ),푚(푒,푦))]= 푙푖푚
ℎ→0
퐸푄[
(
푔(푒+ ℎ, 푌 )ℎ(푒+ ℎ, 푌 )1푦휖(푎푒+ℎ,푏푒+ℎ) −
푔(푒, 푌 )ℎ(푒, 푌 )1푦휖(푎푒,푏푒)
)
1
ℎ ]=퐸
푄[푙푖푚
ℎ→0
1
ℎ(푔(푒+ℎ, 푌 )ℎ(푒+ℎ, 푌 )1푦휖(푎푒+ℎ,푏푒+ℎ)−푔(푒, 푌 )ℎ(푒, 푌 )1푦휖(푎푒,푏푒)
)
],
given that 푔(푒, 푌 )ℎ(푒, 푌 )1푦휖(푎푒,푏푒) is assumed to be evenly integrable.
37 The latter term is
equal to 퐸푄[푙푖푚
ℎ→0
1
ℎ(푔(푒+ℎ, 푌 )ℎ(푒+ℎ, 푌 )1푦휖(푎푒,푏푒)− 푔(푒, 푌 )ℎ(푒, 푌 )1푦휖(푎푒,푏푒)
)
] , using the previ-
ous result (푎푒1, 푏푒1) < (푎푒2, 푏푒2). Rearranging terms gives 퐸
푄[1푦휖(푎푒,푏푒)푙푖푚
ℎ→0
1
ℎ
(
푔(푒+ ℎ, 푌 )ℎ(푒+
ℎ, 푌 ) − 푔(푒, 푌 )ℎ(푒, 푌 ))], which is, by deﬁnition, equal to 퐸푄[1푦휖(푎푒,푏푒)(( ∂∂푒푔(푒, 푌 ))ℎ(푒, 푌 ) +
푔(푒, 푌 )( ∂∂푒ℎ(푒, 푌 ))
)
]. Consequently, the value of the RS is increasing in eﬀort, as each term
within the brackets of the latter equation is greater than zero.
The preceding result leads to a strictly higher optimal monitoring-eﬀort level 푒¯ in ((46))
on a CCDS hedged loan than on a CDS hedged credit. Finally, arbitrage principles imply
that 퐴′(푒) < −푠′(푒)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒): This inequality follows because −푠′(푒)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒) corresponds to
−푉 ′푝푟표푡0,2 (푒), and −푉 ′푝푟표푡0,2 (푒) > −푉 ′푝푟표푡1,2 (푒). By the deﬁnition of conditional claims, 퐴′(푒) must
be smaller or equal to −푉 ′푝푟표푡1,2 (푒). A receiver swaption is only a conditional claim on the
change in the value of the forward protection leg. Consequently, I have a higher monitoring-
eﬀort on an unhedged loan than on a CCDS hedged position.38
37It is suﬃcient to show the existence of a integrable majorable.
38One can certainly attain the same level of monitoring if the bank leverages the CCDS position by buying
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Proposition 7. The ability of CCDSs to induce beneﬁcial screening is stronger if moral
hazard and adverse selection are combined.
Proof. Denote by 푒 the First Best eﬀort level, by 푒¯ the optimal eﬀort level for a CCDS
hedged loan, and by 푒ˆ the one for a CDS hedged credit. As shown in Proposition 6, 푒ˆ can
be assumed to be equal to zero without loss of generality. The credit spread 푠(푒) reﬂects
the protection fee given S supposes the First Best monitoring eﬀort level. Similarly, s(푒¯) and
푠(푒ˆ) are the protection fees payable for a CCDS and a CDS hedge, respectively. According to
Proposition 6, 푠(푒ˆ) > 푠(푒¯) > 푠(푒), as the investor anticipates the bank’s monitoring incentives.
The corresponding monitoring costs are 푀(푒) > 푀(푒ˆ) > 푀(푒ˆ) = 0. In the same way, the
notations 푉 푓푒푒0,2 (⋅) and 퐴(휌, ⋅) indicate that these values are also aﬀected by monitoring.
The case of high interest rates is analyzed ﬁrst: B solves the following program:
푚푎푥
푃
(
푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)− (푃 + 푠(휌, 푒¯)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)−퐴퐻(푒¯))− 퐶 −푀(푒¯)
)
(47)
s.t.
푃 ≥ 퐴(휌, 푒¯) (48)
(푖− 푠(휌, 푒¯))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯) +퐴퐿(푒¯) +
퐶
(1− 휇) −푀(푒¯) ≤ 푃 (49)
The IC, i.e., Inequality (49), is simpliﬁed: I do not account for the fact that 퐴′(푒¯) is diﬀer-
ent for a high, respectively a low loan. In other words, using Equation (46), the monitoring-
eﬀort level is assumed to be the same for a high and a low loan hedged via CCDS at the same
protection fee.
To incorporate moral hazard into the optimal decision of the bank, I rewrite Condition
(35):
휇(푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)− (푃 ∗ + 푠퐻(푒¯)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)−퐴퐻(푒¯))−푀(푒¯))− 퐶 + (1− 휇)0
more RSs than necessary to unwind the position at 푇1. However, in this case the full insurance restriction is
not satisﬁed. As in Innes (1990), there is always underprovision of eﬀort relative to the First Best, where the
bank does not need to hedge.
54
≥ 푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒ˆ)− (휇푠퐻(푒ˆ) + (1− 휇)푠퐿(푒ˆ))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒ˆ)−푀(푒ˆ) (50)
The right hand side of Inequality (50) incorporates the following eﬀects: The optimal
eﬀort level for the CDS-hedge alternative is 푒ˆ < 푒¯ < 푒. Hence, monitoring costs decrease
to 푀(푒ˆ). However, lower eﬀort is anticipated by S which increases the protection fee, and
decreases the valuation of fee streams.
Rearranging Condition (50) and plugging in 푃 ∗ yields
휇(퐴퐻(푒¯)−퐴퐿(푒¯))− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ (푖− 푠(휇, 푒ˆ))푉
푓푒푒
0,2 (푒ˆ)−푀(푒ˆ) = (푖− 푠(휇))푉 푓푒푒0,2 . (51)
Compared to the adverse selection case without the possibility of monitoring, the screening
condition is unchanged. The reason is that the right hand side of Inequality (51) is the same
as in (31), because 푒ˆ = 0. The left hand side also remains unchanged.
If
(푖− 푠(휌, 푒¯))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯) +퐴퐿(푒¯) +
퐶
(1− 휇) −푀(푒¯) ≤ 퐴(휌, 푒¯), (52)
then B only pays 퐴(휌, 푒¯) for the call feature. Plugging this premium into Inequality (50) for
푃 ∗ yields
휇
(
(푖− 푠퐻(푒¯))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)−푀(푒¯)
)− 퐶 ≥ (푖− 푠(휇, 푒ˆ))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒ˆ)−푀(푒ˆ). (53)
Equalities (42) and (46) imply (푖 − 푠퐻(푒¯))푉 ′푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯) − 푠퐻′(푒¯)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯) > 푀 ′(푒¯). Consequently,
(푖− 푠퐻(푒¯))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)−푀(푒¯)−
(
(푖− 푠퐻(0))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (0)−푀(0)
)
= 퐷 > 0, and I can rewrite (54) as
follows:
휇
(
(푖− 푠퐻)푉 푓푒푒0,2 +퐷
)− 퐶 ≥ (푖− 푠(휇)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (54)
Simplifying and rearranging terms to (푠퐿−푖)(1−휇) ≥ (퐶−휇퐷)/푉 푓푒푒0,2 shows that the screening
condition is relaxed compared to Proposition 4.
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In the case of low interest rates, one needs to check whether
휇(푖푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)− (푃 ∗ + 푠퐻(푒¯)푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯)−퐴퐻(푒¯))−푀(푒¯))− 퐶 + (1− 휇)0 ≥ 0. (55)
After replacing 푃 ∗, Inequality (55) yields the following, unchanged screening condition:
휇(퐴퐻(푒¯)−퐴퐿(푒¯))− 퐶
(1− 휇) ≥ 0 (56)
If Inequality (52) is satisﬁed, the following holds: 휇
(
(푖 − 푠퐻(푒¯))푉 푓푒푒0,2 (푒¯) −푀(푒¯)
) ≥ 퐶, or
휇(푖 − 푠퐻) ≥ (퐶 − 휇퐷)/푉 푓푒푒0,2 . The latter condition is relaxed compared to the case without
monitoring in Proposition 3.
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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a structural equilibrium model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, in-
corporating the fact that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in their asset composition. Compared to ﬁrms
which are mainly composed of invested assets, ﬁrms with growth options have larger costs of
debt because they are more volatile and have a higher tendency to default during recession when
marginal utility is high and recovery rates are low. Our model matches stylized facts regarding
credit spreads, default probabilities, leverage, and investment clustering. Importantly, it also
makes predictions about the cross-section of all these features.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the eﬀect of time-varying macroeconomic conditions on credit spreads, ﬁrm
value, and ﬁnancial policy choices of ﬁrms with assets in place and growth options. The central
thesis we develop is that expansion options react quite diﬀerently to the underlying risk in the
economy than invested assets do. First, as growth options are levered claims, they are more volatile
than assets in place. Second, we show that ﬁrms with lots of growth options (“growth ﬁrms”) are
more exposed to business cycle risk, which induces a stronger tendency to default during recession
when recovery rates are low and marginal utilities high. Both eﬀects raise the costs of debt and
induce lower leverage choices of growth ﬁrms compared to those of ﬁrms with mainly invested
assets.
Standard structural models of default face the challenge that they signiﬁcantly underestimate
credit spreads for corporate debt; this is the credit spread puzzle (see, e.g., Elton, Gruber, Agrawal,
and Mann, 2001; Huang and Huang, 2003; Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2009). A related
empirical regularity is that the puzzle is particularly strong for growth ﬁrms. Davydenko and
Strebulaev (2007) show that, after controlling for standard credit risk factors, proxies of growth
options are all positively and signiﬁcantly related to credit spreads. Molina (2005) ﬁnds that ﬁrms
with a higher ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets have lower yield spreads and higher ratings.
Relatedly, ﬁrms with more growth options typically have lower leverage (Smith and Watts, 1992;
Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2009). These cross-sectional features are not addressed
by existing structural models because they consider ﬁrms with only invested assets.
Our model matches these facts. We show that allowing ﬁrms to be heterogeneous with respect to
the importance of growth options in the values of their assets explains the aggregate credit spread
puzzle, not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively. This is achieved while ﬁtting historically
reported asset volatilities and default rates for realistic debt maturities. Moreover, heterogeneity in
the composition of assets can help explain cross-sectional variation of credit spreads and leverage.
Our model is also consistent with observed default clustering, aggregate investment spikes and
busts, and recovery rates. Additionally, we derive cross-sectional predictions for these features.
For our analysis, we develop a structural-equilibrium framework in the spirit of Bhamra, Kuehn,
and Strebulaev (2010a). Thus, we embed a pure structural model of ﬁnancial decisions into a
consumption-based asset pricing model with a representative agent. Our model simultaneously
incorporates both intertemporal macroeconomic risk (building on work by Hackbarth, Miao, and
Morellec, 2006; Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev, 2010b; Chen, 2010), which has been shown to be
important for explaining credit spreads and leverage, as well as expansion options. Macroeconomic
shocks to the growth rate and volatility of earnings and to the growth rate and volatility of consump-
tion arise due to switches between two states of the economy, boom and recession. The changes
in the state of the economy are modeled via a Markov chain, a standard tool to model regime
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switches. The representative agent has the continuous time equivalent of Epstein-Zin-Weil prefer-
ences (Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1990). Therefore, how he prices claims depends on both his
risk aversion and his elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Via the market price of consumption
determined by the agent’s preferences, we are able to link unobservable risk-neutral probabilities
used in the structural model to historical probabilities. With this model, we can, therefore, study
endogenously the eﬀect of macroeconomic risk on credit spreads and optimal ﬁnancing decisions.
We allow ﬁrms to have expansion options. These options are converted into invested assets
when the underlying earnings process exceeds the investment boundary. We pinpoint the isolated
eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s asset composition on credit risk and leverage by assuming, in the main analysis,
that the exercise price of the growth option is ﬁnanced through the sale of some assets in place,
i.e., without additional funds being injected into the company. We also study equity-ﬁnancing later
in the paper. Default occurs when earnings are below the default threshold in a given regime.
Shareholders maximize the value of equity by simultaneously choosing the optimal default and
expansion option exercise policies. The capital structure is determined by trading oﬀ tax beneﬁts
of debt against default costs to maximize the ex-ante value of equity, i.e., the value of the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst result the model yields is that, like in other macroeconomic models, default boundaries
are countercyclical, i.e., shareholders default earlier in recession than in boom. Thus, default is
more likely in recession which, together with counter-cyclical marginal utilities and default costs,
raises the costs of debt for all ﬁrms compared to a benchmark model without business cycle risk.
The central new feature of our model is that the asset composition alone matters signiﬁcantly for
the costs of debt. Two forces lead to the cross-sectional prediction that debt is particularly costly
for ﬁrms with a high portion of expansion options in their assets’ values. First, because options
represent levered claims, ﬁrms with valuable growth options are more sensitive to the underlying
earnings process than ﬁrms which consist of only invested assets. The volatility of the underlying
earnings process would, consequently, underestimate the true default risk of growth ﬁrms. While
the literature discusses this basic idea within equity-ﬁnanced ﬁrms (Berk, Green, and Naik, 1999;
Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 2006), little is known about its impact on debt prices. Our
structural model allows us to jointly analyze a ﬁrm’s expansion policy and ﬁnancial leverage. We
show that the combination of these factors is critical for a full exploration of the quantitative
implications of the riskiness of growth options on credit spreads.
The second driving force is that option values are more sensitive to macroeconomic regime
changes than are assets in place. This higher sensitivity is, to some extent, another consequence
of the idea that options represent levered claims. Importantly, an additional eﬀect derives from
the fact that the optimal exercise boundary of growth options increases in recession and decreases
in boom. Intuitively, it is optimal to defer the exercise of an expansion option when the economy
switches to recession, i.e., to wait for better times. Because the moneyness of growth options is
regime-dependent, and because they represent levered claims, the continuation value of expansion
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options is more exposed to the macroeconomic state than the one of invested assets. Moreover, the
changing moneyness causes expansion options to be less sensitive to the underlying development of
the earnings process in recession than in boom, which reduces the value of the shareholders’ option
to defer default during bad times. Together, these eﬀects amplify the counter-cyclicality of default
thresholds for ﬁrms with a high portion of growth options. As marginal utility is high during bad
times, the higher tendency to default in recession causes larger credit spreads under risk-neutral
pricing for ﬁrms with expansion options than for those with only invested assets.
We then investigate the quantitative performance of the model in explaining empirically ob-
served data. The literature suggests that an average BBB-rated ﬁrm has a 10 year credit spread in
the range of 74− 95 basis points (bps). (This range is obtained by starting from the average bond
yields reported in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Duﬀee (1998), and taking into account
that around 35% of bond yields are due to non-default components). With our main set of param-
eters, a model without business cycle risk produces a mere 29 bps spread for an average ﬁrm. A
standard macroeconomic model with optimal default thresholds in the spirit of Bhamra, Kuehn,
and Strebulaev (2010b) or Chen (2010) implies a spread of 56 bps for average ﬁrms at issue which
consist of only invested assets. Our estimate for the average BBB-rated US ﬁrm’s asset composition
is that total ﬁrm value is about 60% higher than the value of invested assets, which corresponds
(approximately) to a Tobin’s Q of 1.6.1 For such a ﬁrm, we obtain a credit spread of about 66 bps
when using optimal default thresholds, optimal expansion boundaries, and an earnings volatility
such that the average asset volatility matches the one observed for BBB-rated ﬁrms. This spread is
remarkably higher than the 39 bps our model implies for a ﬁrm with only invested assets. Note that
the large diﬀerence arises even though leverage is kept constant; we only vary the characteristics
of the assets themselves.
Empirical studies focus on aggregate data over cross-sections of ﬁrms, rather than on individual
ﬁrm level data. Exploring this insight, Strebulaev (2007) is the ﬁrst to show that it is crucial to
consider the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms when relating the implications of capital structure
models to empirical studies. Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) extend this idea and inves-
tigate how the time-evolution of the cross-sectional distribution aﬀects credit spreads and default
probabilities. Following their approach, we characterize the aggregate dynamics by simulating over
time a cross-section of average leverage ratios and asset composition ratios of individual ﬁrms which
is structurally similar to the empirical distribution of BBB-rated ﬁrms. The average 10 and 20 year
credit spreads of 81 and 103 basis points, respectively, from simulating this “true” cross-section in
our model reﬂect their target credit spreads quite well. To solve the aggregate credit spread puzzle,
a model needs to explain observed costs of debt while still matching historical default losses (given
by the historical default probabilities and recovery rates), and asset volatilities. We consequently
proceed by showing that the model-implied default rates and asset volatilities of BBB-rated ﬁrms
1Market values can be higher than book values also because of oﬀ-balance sheet assets, so there is, of course, a
range for the asset composition of the “typical” ﬁrm.
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are similar to the ones historically reported for realistic debt maturities. Hence, besides generating
cross-sectional predictions for credit spreads, our model is also able to explain the credit spread
puzzle.
The nature of assets, thus, has a powerful impact on costs of debt. Not surprisingly, it also
aﬀects the observed features of leverage. At initiation, we ﬁnd that a ﬁrm with an average growth
option optimally holds about 4−5% lower leverage than one with only invested assets. Additionally,
we obtain pro-cyclical optimal leverage decisions of ﬁrms, in line with Covas and Den Haan (2006)
and Korteweg (2011). The reason is that the default risk is higher in recession than in boom.
The negative relationship between growth options and leverage also maintains when simulating
over time our model-implied cross-section of BBB-rated ﬁrms. In this simulation, however, ﬁrms
deviate from their initially optimal leverage in a way such that the aggregate market leverage of
the whole cross-section becomes counter-cyclical, consistent with Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b).
We derive additional testable predictions when studying the aggregate dynamics of our model
economy. Credit spreads and default rates are counter-cyclical, as reported in the literature. Next,
aggregate investment patterns are strongly pro-cyclical, with investment spikes often occurring
when the regime switches from recession to boom, reﬂecting the ﬁndings in the empirical investment
literature (Barro, 1990; Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power, 1999). Finally, our model makes speciﬁc
cross-sectional predictions. For example, realized recovery rates are lower for growth ﬁrms.
Our paper contributes to several streams of previous research. First, the fact that growth options
are empirically strongly associated with observed leverage has, of course, also prompted other
explanations. The most prominent of these additional explanations, agency, comes in two primary
forms: a shareholder-bondholder conﬂict and a manager-shareholder conﬂict. Appealing to the
former, Smith and Watts (1992) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that debt costs associated
with shareholder-bondholder conﬂicts typically increase with the number of growth options available
to the ﬁrm due to underinvestment (Myers, 1977) and overinvestment by way of asset substitution
(Jensen, 1986; see also Sundaresan and Wang, 2007).2 According to Leland (1998), however,
optimal leverage even increases when ﬁrms can engage in asset substitution. Similarly, Parrino
and Weisbach (1999) conclude that stockholder-bondholder conﬂicts are too limited to explain the
cross-sectional variation in capital structure. Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) show how short-term
debt reduces agency costs. Hackbarth and Mauer (2010) demonstrate that the joint choice of debt
priority structure and capital structure can virtually eliminate the suboptimal investment incentives
of equityholders. Neither of the papers incorporates macroeconomic risk.
As for manager-shareholder conﬂicts, Morellec (2004) shows that agency costs of free cash ﬂow
can explain the low debt levels observed in practice, and the negative relationship between debt
levels and the number of growth options; see also Barclay, Smith, and Morellec (2006). Morellec,
2See Lyandres and Zhdanov (2010) for an explanation for accelerated investment that does not rely on agency.
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Nikolov, and Schu¨rhoﬀ (2009) conclude that even small costs of control challenges are suﬃcient to
explain the low-leverage puzzle. It is still a matter of debate to what extent conﬂicts of interest
between managers and stockholders cause the empirically observed patterns. Graham (2000), for
example, tests a wide set of managerial entrenchment variables and ﬁnds only “weak evidence that
managerial entrenchment permits debt conservatism” (p. 1931). In any case, our model is not
inconsistent with either of these views. It oﬀers a quantitatively important reason for the cross-
sectional variation in leverage and credit spreads that derives solely from the nature of assets of
ﬁrms.3
Second, at the core of our model is the idea from recent literature that macroeconomic (business
cycle) risk matters in powerful ways for the costs of corporate debt and ﬁnancial decisions, because
ﬁrms are more likely to default when doing so is costly (see, e.g., Demchuk and Gibson, 2006;
Almeida and Philippon, 2007; Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev, 2010b; Chen, 2010). What we add
to this literature is the idea that the impact of business cycle risk depends on the asset base of a
ﬁrm.
In contemporaneous and independent work, Chen and Manso (2010) set up a model similar to
ours with expansion options. Their focus, however, is on the debt overhang problem, and not on
explaining the credit spread puzzle or developing cross-sectional predictions – the central tasks of
this paper.
Finally, our structural-equilibrium framework draws on insights from consumption-based asset
pricing models (Lucas, 1978; Bansal and Yaron, 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up our valuation framework. We solve
the model in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our parameter and ﬁrm sample choices, as well as the
optimal default and expansion policies. Section 5 outlines qualitative properties of our model for
the aggregate economy. We turn to the quantitative implications for BBB-rated ﬁrms in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
We build a structural model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, embedded inside a repre-
sentative agent consumption-based asset pricing framework. The structural model is based on a
standard continuous time model of capital structure decisions in the spirit of Mello and Parsons
(1992), as extended by Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) for business cycle ﬂuctuations. Ad-
ditionally, we explicitly model growth opportunities. Following Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev
3An alternative explanation for why low leverage may be optimal in the high-tech sectors is oﬀered in Miao (2005).
In his model, when a sector experiences technological growth, more competitors enter, leading to falling prices and
possibly to a greater probability of default. Yet other explanations appeal to the fact that ﬁrms have the option to
issue additional debt (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2001).
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(2010b) or Chen (2010), embedding the model of capital structure into a consumption-based asset
pricing model allows the valuation of corporate securities using the risk-neutral measure implied
by the preferences of the representative agent.
The economy consists of푁 inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms with assets in place and possibly growth options,
a large number of identical inﬁnitely-lived households, and a government serving as a tax authority.
We assume that there are two diﬀerent macroeconomic states, namely boom (B) and recession (R).
Formally, we deﬁne a time-homogeneous Markov chain 퐼푡≥0 with state space {퐵,푅} and generator
푄 :=
[
−휆퐵 휆퐵
휆푅 −휆푅
]
, where 휆푖 ∈ (0, 1) denotes the rate of leaving state 푖. In the main analysis, we
consider 휆퐵 < 휆푅, as in Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006).
The following properties hold: First, the probability that the chain stays in state 푖 longer than
some time 푡 ≥ 0 is given by 푒−휆푖푡. Second, the probability that the regime shifts from 푖 to 푗 during
an inﬁnitesimal time interval Δ푡 is given by 휆푖Δ푡. Third, the expected duration of regime 푖 is
1
휆푖
,
and the expected fraction of time spent in that regime is
휆푗
휆푖+휆푗
.
Aggregate output 퐶푡 follows a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion:
d퐶푡
퐶푡
= 휃푖d푡+ 휎
퐶
푖 d푊
퐶
푡 , 푖 = 퐵,푅, (1)
where 푊퐶푡 is a Brownian motion independent of the Markov chain, and 휃푖, 휎
퐶
푖 are the regime-
dependent growth-rates and volatilities of the aggregate output. In equilibrium, aggregate con-
sumption equals aggregate output. Hence, the above speciﬁcation gives rise to uncertainty about
the future moments of consumption growth.
To incorporate the impact of the intertemporal distribution of consumption risk on the represen-
tative household’s utility, we assume the continuous-time analog of Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences
(Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1990), which are of stochastic diﬀerential utility type (Duﬃe and
Epstein, 1992a,b). Speciﬁcally, the utility index 푈푡 over a consumption process 퐶푠 solves
푈푡 = 피ℙ
[∫ ∞
푡
휌
1− 훿
퐶1−훿푠 − ((1− 훾)푈푠)
1−훿
1−훾
((1− 훾)푈푠)
1−훿
1−훾 − 1
d푠 ∣ℱ푡
]
, (2)
where 휌 is the rate of time preference, 훾 determines the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for
a timeless gamble, and Ψ := 1훿 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for deterministic
consumption paths.
The stochastic discount factor 푚푡 then follows the dynamics
d푚푡
푚푡
= −푟푖d푡− 휂푖d푊퐶푡 + (푒휅푖 − 1) d푀푡, (3)
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with 푀푡 being the compensated process associated with the Markov chain, and
푟푖 = −휌(1− 훾)
1− 훿
(
훿 − 훾
1− 훾 ℎ
훿−1
푖 − 1
)
+ 훾휃푖 − 1
2
훾 (1 + 훾)
(
휎퐶푖
)2 − 휆푖 (푒휅푖 − 1) (4)
휂푖 = 훾휎
퐶
푖 (5)
휅푖 = (훿 − 훾) log
(
ℎ푗
ℎ푖
)
, (6)
see Chen (2010). ℎ퐵, ℎ푅 solve a non-linear system of equations given in the Appendix A.1, equation
(A-5). 푟푖 are the regime-dependent real risk-free interest rates, 휂푖 the risk prices for systematic
Brownian shocks aﬀecting aggregate output, and 휅푖 is the relative jump size of the discount factor
when the Markov chain leaves state 푖 (and, consequently, 휅푗 =
1
휅푖
).
Credit spreads are based on nominal yields and taxes are collected on nominal earnings. To link
nominal to real values such as the real interest rate introduced in the previous section, we specify
a stochastic price index as
d푃푡
푃푡
= 휋d푡+ 휎푃,퐶d푊퐶푡 + 휎
푃,푖푑d푊푃푡 , (7)
with 푊푃푡 being a Brownian motion describing the idiosyncratic price index shock, independent of
the consumption shock Brownian 푊퐶푡 and the Markov chain. 휋 denotes the expected inﬂation
rate, and 휎푃,퐶 < 0, 휎푃,푖푑 > 0 are the volatilities of the stochastic price index associated with the
consumption shock and the idiosyncratic price index shock, respectively. The nominal interest rate
푟푛푖 is then given by
푟푛푖 = 푟푖 + 휋 − 휎2푃 − 휎푃,퐶휂푖, (8)
with 휎푃 :=
√
(휎푃,퐶)2 + (휎푃,푖푑)
2
being the total volatility of the stochastic price index.
At any point in time, the nominal earnings process of a ﬁrm follows
d푋푡
푋푡
= 휇푖d푡+ 휎
푋,퐶
푖 d푊
퐶
푡 + 휎
푃,푖푑d푊푃푡 + 휎
푋,푖푑d푊푋푡 , 푖 = 퐵,푅, (9)
where 푊푋푡 is a Brownian motion describing an idiosyncratic shock, independent of the aggregate
output shock 푊퐶푡 , the consumption price index shock 푊
푃
푡 , and the Markov chain. 휇푖 are the
regime-dependent drifts, 휎푋,퐶푖 > 0 the ﬁrm-speciﬁc regime-dependent volatilities associated with
the aggregate output process, and 휎푋,푖푑 > 0 the ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility associated with the id-
iosyncratic Brownian shock. As suggested by the literature, we posit that 휎푋,퐶퐵 < 휎
푋,퐶
푅 (Ang and
Bekaert, 2004).
Denote the risk-neutral measure by ℚ. Following Chen (2010), the unlevered asset value is
푉푡 = 푋푡푦푖 for 퐼푡 = 푖, (10)
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with 푦푖 being the price-earnings ratio in state 푖:
푦푖 =
푟푛푗 − 휇˜푗 + 휆˜푗 + 휆˜푖(
푟푛푖 − 휇˜푖 + 휆˜푖
)(
푟푛푗 − 휇˜푗 + 휆˜푗
)
− 휆˜푖휆˜푗
. (11)
In Equation (11), 휇˜푖 are the expected growth rates of the ﬁrm’s nominal earnings under the risk-
neutral measure ℚ
휇˜푖 := 휇푖 − 휎푋,퐶푖
(
휂푖 + 휎
푃,퐶
)− (휎푃,푖푑)2 , (12)
and 휆˜푖 are the risk-neutral transition intensities given by
휆˜푖 = 푒
휅푖휆푖. (13)
As in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b), the price-earnings ratio in the main analysis is
higher in boom, 푦퐵 > 푦푅. Finally, note that the total volatility of the earnings process is
휎˜푖 =
√(
휎푋,퐶푖
)2
+ (휎푃,푖푑)
2
+ (휎푋,푖푑)
2
. (14)
The expansion option of the ﬁrm is modeled as an American call option on the earnings.
Speciﬁcally, at any time 푡¯, the ﬁrm can pay exercise costs 퐾 to achieve additional future earnings
of 푠푋푡 for all 푡 ≥ 푡¯ for some factor 푠 > 0. We assume that if a ﬁrm exercises its expansion option,
the option is converted into assets in place, such that the ﬁrm consists of only invested assets. The
exercise of the growth option is assumed to be irreversible. At default, bondholders recover not
only a fraction of the assets in place, but also a fraction of the option’s value. Thus, the option can
be exercised independently of the considered ﬁrm.
For the ﬁnancing of investment, we present two variants. In the main analysis, we wish to
abstract away from the eﬀect of fund injections by debt- or equityholders to pay the exercise price,
and instead to isolate the eﬀect of growth options in the value of ﬁrms’ assets on corporate securities.
Therefore, we ﬁrst assume that, at exercise, the ﬁrm pays the exercise costs 퐾 of the option by
selling a part of its assets in place.4 In detail, while exercising the option at time 푡¯ entitles the
ﬁrm to total future earnings of (푠 + 1)푋푡 for all 푡 ≥ 푡¯, ﬁnancing the exercise costs requires to
sell a fraction 퐾푋푡¯푦푖¯
of these earnings, where 푖¯ is the realized state of the economy at the time of
exercise. Hence, the total earnings of the ﬁrm at any point in time after exercise correspond to(
(푠+ 1)− 퐾푋푡¯푦푖¯
)
푋푡. Second, we also consider equity ﬁnancing of the exercise costs 퐾.
The critical measure to capture the relative importance of a ﬁrm’s expansion option in the value
of its assets is the asset composition ratio. We deﬁne it as the value of the ﬁrm, divided by the
4Indirect ﬁnancing by selling assets often occurs, e.g., when acquirers divest part of target companies’ assets
following takeovers (Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992). Of course, the model simpliﬁes
in that in reality, ﬁrms have diﬀerent types of assets.
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value of invested assets. Certainly, the value of the ﬁrm does not only contain the value of the
invested assets and the expansion option, but also the value of the tax shield and bankruptcy costs.
Nevertheless, we use this measure because the impact of the tax shield and bankruptcy costs on
the ratio is relatively small, and, importantly, the direct empirical analog of the asset composition
ratio is Tobin’s Q.
Corporate taxes are paid at a constant rate 휏 , and full oﬀsets of corporate losses are allowed. In
our framework, ﬁrms are leveraged because debt allows it to shield part of its income from taxation.
Once debt has been issued, a ﬁrm pays a total coupon 푐 at each moment in time. Following the
standard in the literature, we assume that ﬁrms ﬁnance coupons by injecting funds. At any point
in time, shareholders have the option to default on their debt obligations, as well as the possibility
to exercise an expansion option. Default is triggered when shareholders are no longer willing to
inject additional equity capital to meet net debt service requirements (Leland, 1998). If default
occurs, the ﬁrm is immediately liquidated and bondholders receive the unlevered asset value less
default costs, reﬂecting the ‘absolute priority’ of debt claims. The default costs in regime 푖 are
assumed to be a fraction 1−훼푖 of the unlevered asset value at default, with 훼푖 ∈ (0, 1]. We suppose
that recovery rates are lower in recession, i.e., 훼푅 < 훼퐵 (Frye, 2000). The incentive to issue debt
is limited due to the possibility of costly ﬁnancial distress.
Equityholders face the following decisions: First, once debt has been issued, they select the
default and expansion policies that maximize equity value. Hence, both expansion and default
are chosen endogenously. Second, they determine the optimal capital structure by choosing the
coupon level which maximizes the value of the ﬁrm. The model does not allow restructuring of
debt neither when the option is exercised nor at endogenous restructuring points. The main reason
is that expansion opportunities preclude a scaling feature of the model solution.5
The main text presents the model and its solution for inﬁnite debt maturity. We also solve and
use the case of ﬁnite debt maturity, in which we consider the stationary environment of Leland
(1998): The ﬁrm issues debt with a constant principal 푝 and a constant total coupon 푐 paid at each
moment in time. A fraction 푚 of the total debt is continuously rolled over. In particular, the ﬁrm
continuously retires outstanding debt principal at rate 푚푝 and replaces it with new debt vintages
of identical coupon and principal. Finite maturity debt is, therefore, characterized by the tuple
(푐,푚, 푝). This setup leads to a time-homogenous setting. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that
debt is issued at par.
5The scaling property states that, conditional on the current regime of the economy, the optimal coupon, the
optimal default thresholds, the investment boundaries, as well as the values of debt and equity at restructuring
points are all homogeneous of degree one in earnings. The absence of a scaling property impedes not only closed-
form results, but also the application of numerical solution methods with backward induction. Furthermore, even
formulating an ansatz for the valuation of corporate securities with expansion opportunities and restructuring requires
strong assumptions on the structure of the solution, in particular on the relation between restructuring and exercise
boundaries.
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3. Model solution
The model is solved by backward induction. We start by calculating the value of corporate securities
of a ﬁrm consisting of only invested assets, taking the capital structure, default and expansion
policies as given at this point. Next, the value of the growth option, also for given capital structure
and policies, is derived. We then proceed with the value of corporate securities of a ﬁrm which
consists not only of assets in place, but also holds an expansion option. Finally, we obtain the
expansion and default policies which simultaneously maximize the value of equity, as well as the
capital structure which maximizes the ﬁrm value.
As in Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), we assume that the optimal strategies are of
regime-dependent threshold type in 푋 (for a formal proof in the case of expansion thresholds only,
see Guo and Zhang, 2004). Precisely, suppose that 퐷ˆ푖 and 퐷푖 are the default thresholds in regime
푖 = 퐵,푅 of a ﬁrm with only invested assets, and of a ﬁrm with both invested assets and a growth
option, respectively. 푋푖 denotes the exercise boundary of the growth option in regime 푖 = 퐵,푅. In
what follows, we present the case that 퐷퐵 < 퐷푅, 푋퐵 < 푋푅 and 퐷ˆ퐵 < 퐷ˆ푅, i.e., the boundaries are
lower in boom for both expansion and default (before and after expansion).6 Finally, we presume
that max
{
퐷푅, 퐷ˆ푅
}
< 푋퐵, i.e., we are interested in ﬁrms which exercise their expansion option
with a positive probability, and we exclude the possibility of immediate default after expansion. The
optimal default and expansion policies for relevant parameter regions satisfy the assumed ordering.
3.1. Firms with only invested assets
Let 푑ˆ푖(푋), 푡ˆ푖(푋), 푏ˆ푖(푋) and 푓ˆ푖(푋) denote the value of corporate debt, taxes, bankruptcy cost, and
total ﬁrm value, respectively, in regime 푖 = 퐵,푅. Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) show how
to solve a similar structural model.7 The solution for our case can be found in Appendix A.2.
3.2. The value of the growth option
In order to determine the value of corporate securities of ﬁrms with both assets in place and a
growth option, we now need to calculate the value of a growth option under regime switches.8
6Note that we can assume without loss of generality that 퐷퐵 < 퐷푅 (if not, interchange the names of the regimes).
The case 퐷퐵 < 퐷푅, 퐷ˆ퐵 < 퐷ˆ푅, and 푋퐵 > 푋푅, (i.e., the exercise boundary in recession is lower than the one in
boom) can be solved by analogous techniques. A changing order of the default boundaries after exercising the option,
i.e., the case that 퐷퐵 < 퐷푅 and 퐷ˆ퐵 > 퐷ˆ푅, is not considered. Finally, the case of the presence of only one regime is
presented in Appendix A.3, Case 2.
7Even though they do not consider regime-dependence of volatility, the basic approach remains unchanged.
8We emphasize that the value of the option in the ultimate solution of the model indeed depends on the default
policy of the ﬁrm. Equityholders choose default and expansion policies simultaneously. The resulting interdependence
between the two policies aﬀects the value of the growth option. This eﬀect is not explicit in the presented calculations
due to the backward solution method.
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Denote the value functions of the growth option in regime 퐵 and 푅 by 퐺퐵(푋) and 퐺푅(푋),
respectively. For each regime 푖, the option is exercised immediately whenever 푋 ≥ 푋푖 (option
exercise region); otherwise it is optimal to wait (option continuation region). This structure results
in the following system of ODEs for the value function:
For 0 ≤ 푋 < 푋퐵 :{
푟푛퐵퐺퐵(푋) = 휇˜퐵푋퐺
′
퐵(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2퐺′′퐵(푋) + 휆˜퐵 (퐺푅(푋)−퐺퐵(푋))
푟푛푅퐺푅(푋) = 휇˜푅푋퐺
′
푅(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2퐺′′푅(푋) + 휆˜푅 (퐺퐵(푋)−퐺푅(푋))
(15)
For 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅 :{
퐺퐵(푋) = 푠푋푦퐵 −퐾
푟푛푅퐺푅(푋) = 휇˜푅푋퐺
′
푅(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2퐺′′푅(푋) + 휆˜푅 (푠푋푦퐵 −퐾 −퐺푅(푋))
(16)
For 푋 ≥ 푋푅 : {
퐺퐵(푋) = 푠푋푦퐵 −퐾
퐺푅(푋) = 푠푋푦푅 −퐾
(17)
Whenever the process 푋 is in the option continuation region, which corresponds to system (15)
and the second equation of (16), the required rate of return 푟푛푖 (left-hand side) must be equal to the
realized rate of return (right-hand side). The latter is obtained by Ito’s lemma for regime switches
(see, e.g., Yin, Song, and Zhang, 2004). Here, the last term accounts for a possible jump in the
value of the growth option due to a regime switch. It is calculated as the probability of a regime
shift, 휆˜퐵 or 휆˜푅, times the associated change in the value of the option. The ﬁrst equation of (16)
and the system (17) state the payoﬀ of the option at exercise, since the process is in the option
exercise region in these cases.
The boundary conditions are:
lim
푋↘0
퐺푖 (푋) = 0, 푖 = 퐵,푅 (18)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
퐺푅(푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
퐺푅(푋) (19)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
퐺′푅(푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
퐺′푅(푋) (20)
lim
푋↗푋푅
퐺푅 (푋) = 푠푋푅푦푅 −퐾 (21)
lim
푋↗푋퐵
퐺퐵 (푋) = 푠푋퐵푦퐵 −퐾 (22)
Condition (18) ensures that the option value goes to zero as the earnings approach zero. Conditions
(19) and (20) represent the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of the value function
in recession at the exercise boundary in boom. The remaining conditions (21)-(22) are the value-
matching conditions at the exercise boundaries in boom and recession, respectively. The solution
of this system and its derivation are given in Appendix A.3.
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We remark that similar to the occurrence of default, there are two possible ways of triggering
the exercise of the expansion option: Either when the idiosyncratic shock 푋 reaches the exercise
boundary 푋푖 in a given regime, or when the regime switches from recession to boom and 푋 lies
between 푋퐵 and 푋푅.
The above system of ODEs (15)-(17) subject to its boundary conditions (18)-(22) determines the
value of the growth option for any given pair of exercise boundaries 푋퐵 and 푋푅. In the full model
solution, we will need to derive option values for optimal exercise boundaries of equityholders in
both levered and unlevered ﬁrms. In unlevered ﬁrms, the optimal exercise boundaries are denoted
푋푢푛푙푒푣퐵 and 푋
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 , respectively. These optimal exercise boundaries solve the following additional
boundary conditions:
lim
푋↗푋푢푛푙푒푣푅
퐺′푅 (푋) = 푠푦푅 (23)
lim
푋↗푋푢푛푙푒푣퐵
퐺′퐵 (푋) = 푠푦퐵. (24)
For ease of notation, we denote the unlevered value of the growth option by퐺푢푛푙푒푣푖 , i.e., 퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푖 (푋) =
퐺푖
(
푋
∣∣푋푢푛푙푒푣퐵 , 푋푢푛푙푒푣푅 ). Appendix A.3 discusses the solution.
3.3. Firms with invested assets and expansion options
Using the previous results, we ﬁnally derive the value of corporate securities of a general ﬁrm, as
well as the default and expansion thresholds selected by shareholders.
In each regime, the ﬁrm faces three diﬀerent regions depending on the value of 푋: Below the
default threshold, the ﬁrm is in the default region where it defaults immediately, and debtholders
receive a fraction 훼푖 of the total asset value. The ﬁrm is in the continuation region if 푋 is between
the default threshold and the exercise boundary. Finally, the exercise region is reached if 푋 is
above the exercise boundary. After exercise, the ﬁrm consists of only invested assets, endowed
with the initially determined optimal coupon level. As the default policy is an ex-post policy, the
optimal default thresholds now correspond to the ones of a ﬁrm with only invested assets. That
is, shareholders optimally adapt their default policy upon expansion. Debtholders anticipate this
change.
3.3.1. The valuation of corporate debt
Let 푑푖(푋) denote the value of corporate debt in regime 푖 = 퐵,푅. An investor holding corporate
debt requires an instantaneous return equal to the nominal risk-free rate 푟푛푖 . Again, an application
of Ito’s lemma with regime switches shows that debt satisﬁes the following system of ODEs:
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For 푋 ≤ 퐷퐵 : {
푑퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵
(
푋푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (푋)
)
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
) (25)
For 퐷퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷푅 :{
푟푛퐵푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋) + 휆˜퐵
(
훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
)− 푑퐵 (푋))
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
)
(26)
For 퐷푅 < 푋 < 푋퐵 :{
푟푛퐵푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋) + 휆˜퐵 (푑푅 (푋)− 푑퐵 (푋))
푟푛푅푑푅 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋) + 휆˜푅 (푑퐵 (푋)− 푑푅 (푋))
(27)
For 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅 :⎧⎨⎩ 푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
(푠+ 1)푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
푟푛푅푑푅 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋) + 휆˜푅
(
푑ˆ퐵
(
(푠+ 1)푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
− 푑푅 (푋)
) (28)
And, ﬁnally, for 푋 ≥ 푋푅 : ⎧⎨⎩ 푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
(푠+ 1)푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
푑푅 (푋) = 푑ˆ푅
(
(푠+ 1)푋 − 퐾푦푅
) (29)
In system (25), the ﬁrm is in the default region in both boom and recession. Here, debtholders
receive 훼푖
(
푋푦푖 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푖 (푋)
)
at default. As the default boundary in boom is lower than the one
in recession, system (26) corresponds to the ﬁrm being in the continuation region in boom, and in
the default region in recession. For the continuation region in boom, the left-hand side of the ﬁrst
equation is the rate of return required by investors for holding corporate debt for one unit of time.
The right-hand side is the realized rate of return, computed by Ito’s lemma as the expected change
in the value of debt plus the coupon payment 푐. The last term captures the possible jump in the
value of debt in case of a regime switch, which triggers immediate default. Similarly, equations
(27) describe the case that the ﬁrm is in the continuation region in both boom and recession. The
next system, (28), deals with the case in which the ﬁrm is in the exercise region in boom, and in
the continuation region in recession. After exercising the option, the ﬁrm owns total assets in place
of 푋푦푖 + 푠푋푦푖 −퐾, reﬂecting the notion that the exercise costs of the growth option are ﬁnanced
by selling assets. The value of debt must then be equal to the value of debt of a ﬁrm with only
invested assets, i.e., 푑퐵(푋) = 푑ˆ퐵((푠+ 1)푋 − 퐾푦퐵 ), which is the ﬁrst equation in (28). The second
equation is obtained by the same approach as in (27), where the last term captures the fact that a
regime switch from recession to boom triggers immediate exercise of the expansion option in this
70
case. Finally, equations (29) describe the case that the ﬁrm is in the exercise region in both boom
and recession.
The system for ﬁnite debt maturity can be found in Appendix A.5.
The boundary conditions for debt are as follows:
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑퐵(푋) = lim
푋↗퐷푅
푑퐵(푋) (30)
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑′퐵(푋) = lim
푋↗퐷푅
푑′퐵(푋) (31)
lim
푋↘퐷퐵
푑퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵
(
퐷퐵푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (퐷퐵)
)
(32)
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
퐷푅푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (퐷푅)
)
(33)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
푑푅(푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑푅(푋) (34)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
푑′푅(푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑′푅(푋) (35)
lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
(푠+ 1)푋퐵 − 퐾
푦퐵
)
(36)
lim
푋↗푋푅
푑푅 (푋) = 푑ˆ푅
(
(푠+ 1)푋푅 − 퐾
푦푅
)
(37)
(30) and (31) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for the debt value in boom
at the default boundary in recession. Similarly, (34) and (35) are the corresponding conditions for
the debt value in recession at the option exercise boundary in boom. (32) and (33) are the value-
matching conditions at the default thresholds, and (36) and (37) are the value-matching conditions
at the option exercise boundaries. The default thresholds and option exercise boundaries are chosen
by shareholders, and, hence, we do not have the corresponding smooth-pasting conditions for debt.
The solution of this system is given in closed form in Appendix A.4.1.
3.3.2. The valuation of tax beneﬁts
Let 푡푖(푋) denote the value of tax beneﬁts in regime 푖 = 퐵,푅. Debt coupon payments shield income
from taxation. We assume full loss carry-forwards. Therefore, the value of tax beneﬁts corresponds
to the value of debt with recovery rates equal to zero and a coupon of 푐휏 . In detail, we obtain a
system of equations akin to the system (25)-(29), and boundary conditions similar to (30) - (37).
(32) - (33) translate into
lim
푋↘퐷푖
푡푖 (푋) = 0, 푖 = 퐵,푅, (38)
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reﬂecting the loss of tax beneﬁts at bankruptcy. At the option exercise boundary, we have that
lim
푋↗푋푖
푡푖 (푋) = 푡ˆ푖
(
(푠+ 1)푋푖 − 퐾
푦푖
)
, 푖 = 퐵,푅, (39)
corresponding to the conditions (36) - (37). In words, if the option is exercised, the value of the
tax shield is equal to the one of a ﬁrm with only invested assets.
3.3.3. The valuation of default costs
Let 푏푖(푋) denote the value of default (or bankruptcy) costs in regime 푖 = 퐵,푅. 푏푖(푋) can be
calculated as the value of a debt contract with recovery rates 1−훼퐵 and 1−훼푅, respectively, and
a coupon of zero, as there are no continuous earnings associated with default costs.
The value-matching boundary conditions at default, (32) - (33), then correspond to
lim
푋↘퐷푖
푏푖 (푋) = (1− 훼푖)
(
퐷푖푦푖 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푖 (퐷푖)
)
, 푖 = 퐵,푅, (40)
reﬂecting the fact that the value of default costs at the boundary must be 1 minus the recovery
on the value of assets in place and the growth option. At option exercise, the value-matching
conditions are given by
lim
푋↗푋푖
푏푖 (푋) = 푏ˆ푖
(
(푠+ 1)푋푖 − 퐾
푦푖
)
, 푖 = 퐵,푅. (41)
The intuition is that, at the exercise boundary of the option, default costs must be equal to the
ones of a ﬁrm with only invested assets.
3.3.4. Firm value
Total ﬁrm value 푓푖 in regime 푖 = 퐵,푅 is given by the value of assets in place 푦푖푋, plus the value of
the expansion option 퐺푖 (푋) and the value of tax beneﬁts from debt 푡푖(푋), less the value of default
costs 푏푖(푋), i.e.,
푓푖(푋) = 푦푖푋 +퐺푖(푋) + 푡푖(푋)− 푏푖(푋). (42)
3.3.5. The valuation of equity
The levered ﬁrm value equals the sum of debt and equity values. Hence, the equity value 푒푖(푋),
푖 = 퐵,푅, can be written in a closed form expression as
푒푖(푋) = 푓푖(푋)− 푑푖(푋) = 푦푖푋 +퐺푖(푋) + 푡푖(푋)− 푏푖(푋)− 푑푖(푋). (43)
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3.3.6. Default and expansion policies
Managers select the default and investment policies that maximize the value of equity ex-post.
Denote these policies by 퐷∗푖 and 푋
∗
푖 , respectively. Formally, the default policy which maximizes
the equity value is determined by postulating that the ﬁrst derivative of the equity value has to
be zero at the default boundary in each regime. Simultaneously, optimality of the option exercise
boundaries is achieved by equating the ﬁrst derivative of the equity value at the exercise boundary
with the ﬁrst derivative of the equity value of a ﬁrm with only invested assets after expansion,
evaluated at the corresponding earnings in both regimes. These four optimality conditions are
smooth-pasting conditions for equity at the respective boundaries:⎧⎨⎩
푒′퐵(퐷
∗
퐵) = 0
푒′푅(퐷
∗
푅) = 0
푒′퐵(푋
∗
퐵) = 푒ˆ
′
퐵(푠푋
∗
퐵 − 퐾푦퐵 )
푒′푅(푋
∗
푅) = 푒ˆ
′
푅(푠푋
∗
푅 − 퐾푦푅 ).
(44)
We solve this system numerically.
3.3.7. Capital structure
For each coupon level 푐, debtholders evaluate debt at issuance anticipating the ex-post optimal
default and expansion decisions of shareholders. As debt-issue proceeds accrue to shareholders, the
latter do not only care about the value of equity, but also about the value of debt. Hence, the
optimal capital structure is determined ex-ante by the coupon level 푐∗ which maximizes the value
of equity and debt, i.e., the value of the ﬁrm. Denote by 푓∗푖 (푋) the ﬁrm value given optimal ex-post
default and expansion thresholds as determined by the system (44). The ex-ante optimal coupon
of this ﬁrm solves
푐∗푖 := argmax푐푓
∗
푖 (푋). (45)
As indicated in equation (45), the optimal initial capital structure depends on the current regime.
4. Results
This section summarizes the results of our model. We ﬁrst describe our parameter choice in Section
4.1, and present the ﬁrm sample in Section 4.2. Next, Section 4.3 discusses the properties of the
expansion option. Section 4.4, ﬁnally, analyzes the optimal default policies of individual ﬁrms with
diﬀerent portions of the expansion options’ value in the overall value of assets. Economy-wide
results are discussed in Sections 5 and 6.
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4.1. Choice of parameters
Table 1 summarizes our parameter choice. Panel A shows the ﬁrm characteristics which are selected
to roughly reﬂect a typical BBB-rated S&P 500 ﬁrm.9 We start with an initial value of the
idiosyncratic earnings 푋 of 10. While this value is arbitrary, neither credit spreads nor optimal
leverage ratios depend on this choice. As is standard in the literature, we set the tax advantage of
debt to 휏 = 0.15 (Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec, 2006). Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b)
estimate growth rates and systematic volatilities of nominal earnings in a two regime model. Their
estimates are similar to those obtained by other authors who jointly estimate consumption and
dividends with a state-dependent drift and volatility (Bonomo and Garcia, 1996). Hence, we choose
the same growth rates and systematic volatilities of nominal earnings. The real earnings growth
rates (휇푖) and volatilities (휎
푋,퐶
푖 ) correspond to their nominal counterparts net of inﬂation. Note
that the relation 휎푋,퐶퐵 = 0.0869 < 0.1369 = 휎
푋,퐶
푅 captures the observation in Ang and Bekaert
(2004) that asset volatilities are lower in boom than in recession.
Following Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007), we assume that recovery rates fall during
recession. They report that recovery in a distressed state of the industry is lower than the recovery
in a healthy state of the industry by up to 20 cents on a dollar. The reason can be ﬁnancial
constraints that industry peers of defaulted ﬁrms face as proposed by the ﬁre-sales or the industry-
equilibrium theory of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), or time-varying market frictions such as adverse
selection. We choose recovery rates as 훼퐵 = 0.7 and 훼푅 = 0.5, respectively, which matches the 20
cents on a dollar diﬀerence in Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007), and is close to the standard
of 0.6 used in the literature (Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec, 2006; Chen, 2010). Our qualitative
results are insensitive to the choice of 훼푖 as long as 훼퐵 > 훼푅.
Panel B shows the parameters we use to capture growth options. We select an exercise price
of 퐾 = 310. The choice of a relatively high 퐾 is motivated by our intention to investigate ﬁrms
which do not exercise their expansion option immediately. The scale parameter 푠 for a typical ﬁrm
is calibrated such that the asset composition ratio at initiation given optimal ﬁnancing equals the
average Tobin’s Q of 1.6 in our sample of BBB-rated ﬁrms. In particular, 푠 is set to 푠 = 1.89 for
ﬁrms initiated in boom, and to 푠 = 2.05 for ﬁrms initiated in recession. To analyze growth ﬁrms
with a larger (smaller) portion of option values in the overall value of their assets, we will later use
higher (lower) scale parameters at initiation.
Panel C, ﬁnally, lists the variables describing the underlying economy. The regime-switching
intensities (휆푖), the consumption growth rates (휃푖), and the consumption growth volatilities 휎
퐶
푖 are
estimated in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b). We take the same values for comparability.
In the described economy, the expected duration of regime B (R) corresponds to 3.68 (2.03) years,
and the average fraction of time spent in regime B (R) is 0.64 (0.36). The inﬂation parameters are
9Our qualitative results do not depend on the ratings of ﬁrms.
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estimated using the price index for personal consumption expenditures from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis from 1947 to 2005. We obtain an expected inﬂation rate (휋) of 0.0342, a volatility of the
price index of 0.0137, and a correlation between the price index and real non-durables plus service
consumption expenditures of −0.2575. These parameters imply a systematic price index volatility
of 휎푃,퐶 = −0.0035 and an idiosyncratic price index volatility of 휎푃,푖푑 = 0.0132.
The annualized rate of time preference, 휌, is 0.015, the relative risk aversion, 훾, is equal to 10
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, Ψ, is set to 1.5. This parameter choice is commonly
used in the literature (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Chen, 2010).
Our calibration implies that real interest rates are 푟퐵 = 0.0416 and 푟푅 = 0.0227 in the baseline
speciﬁcation. The relative decline in the value of invested assets following a shift from boom to
recession is equal to 12.61%, which is similar to the one assumed in Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec
(2006).
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
4.2. Firm Sample
Balance sheet and ratings data are collected over the period from 1995 to 2008 from Compustat.
We use data for BBB-rated ﬁrms. We calculate the quasi-market leverage of a ﬁrm as the ratio of
book debt to the sum of book debt and market value of equity. Tobin’s Q is deﬁned as total assets
plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total assets.10 We delete
ﬁnancial and utility ﬁrms from the sample. For each ﬁrm, we calculate the average of the leverage
ratios and Tobin’s Qs over the observation period. Next, we cut extreme values of both average
leverage and Tobin’s Q at 1% to avoid that our results are driven by outliers. Our sample then
consists of 717 distinct ﬁrms. Figure 1 plots the resulting data points. For the entire cross-section
of BBB-rated ﬁrms, the mean leverage is 41.83%, and the mean Tobin’s Q (asset composition ratio)
is 1.59.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
10In these deﬁnitions, we follow, e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2002), Fama and French (2002) and Daines, Gow, and
Larcker (2010). Book debt is total assets (item 6, 퐴푇 ) minus book equity. Book equity is total assets minus total
liabilities (item 181, 퐿푇 ) minus preferred stock (item 10, 푃푆푇퐾퐿, replaced by item 56 when missing, 푃푆푇퐾푅푉 )
plus deferred taxes (item 35, 푇푋퐷퐼푇퐶) plus convertible debt (item 79, 퐷퐶푉 푇 ). The market value of equity is given
by the closing price (item 24, 푃푅퐶퐶 퐹 ) times the number of common shares outstanding (item 25, 퐶푆퐻푂).
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4.3. Properties of the expansion option
To understand the implications of our model for credit spreads, it is instructive to ﬁrst consider
some properties of the expansion option.
Figure 2 depicts the equity value maximizing exercise policy of the expansion option in a typical
ﬁrm initiated in boom. Recall that the expansion policy is simultaneously determined with the
default policy.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
The area above the dashed line is the exercise region in recession, and the area below the dashed
line represents the continuation region. In boom, the regions are deﬁned analogously with respect
to the solid line. The graph is drawn for optimal leverage. Exercising the option at time 푡¯ entitles
the ﬁrm to total future earnings of (푠 + 1)푋푡 for all 푡 ≥ 푡¯. As expected, the endogenous exercise
boundaries decrease with 푠. For example, consider initiation in boom: With a scale parameter of
푠 = 1.89 (which induces an asset composition ratio of 1.6 at initiation), the corresponding optimal
option exercise boundaries are 푋∗퐵 = 18.14 and 푋
∗
푅 = 19.14. Setting 푠 to 2.73 creates a growth ﬁrm
with an asset composition ratio of 2.2, and optimal option exercise boundaries of 푋∗퐵 = 12.87 and
푋∗푅 = 13.55, respectively. Importantly, Figure 2 also shows that the expansion option is exercised
at lower levels of the idiosyncratic earnings 푋 in boom than in recession. Intuitively, the main
reason is that the value of the real option of waiting is higher in recession due to the potential
switch to boom with a higher valuation of earnings.11 The same qualitative option value properties
also hold at non-optimal leverage levels.
Figure 3 plots the value of the expansion option as a function of the earnings 푋, using jointly
optimal expansion and default policies.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Obviously, the option’s value is aﬀected by the current regime. When the asset value jumps due
to a regime switch, so does the value of the option. Critically, relative value changes of expansion
options are higher than relative value changes of assets in place when the regime switches. The
reasons are that options represent levered claims, and that the endogenous exercise boundary is
higher in recession than in boom, as shown in Figure 2.12
11The regime dependent volatilities and default thresholds also aﬀect optimal exercise boundaries in boom and
recession. We ﬁnd that the valuation of earnings is the dominating eﬀect for reasonable parameter values.
12Relative value changes are determined in Appendix A.3. In untabulated results, we conﬁrm numerically that the
relative value changes are indeed higher for expansion options than for the underlying assets in place for plausible
parameter values.
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Additionally, Figure 3 shows that both option value functions are convex, but the value function
in boom is steeper than the one in recession. Therefore, the expansion option’s value is less
sensitive to the underlying earnings in recession than in boom. Intuitively, the exercise boundary
increases and the earnings’ drift decreases in recession which drives options out-of-the money. As a
consequence, an expansion option represents a less levered claim in bad times. While in recession
the volatility of 푋 is higher, the sensitivity of a growth option’s value to changes in the earnings
is lower. As discussed in the next section, this lower sensitivity attenuates the increase in the
equityholder’s default option due to a higher volatility of 푋 during recession.
4.4. Optimal Default Policy
This section explains how the optimal default policy is aﬀected by the presence of growth options in
the value of ﬁrms’ assets. In order to keep the intuition tractable, we do not comment on the (minor)
impact of the exercise boundaries on default thresholds, which arises due to the simultaneous
optimization of the expansion and default policy.
For all ﬁrms – those with and those without an expansion option – the optimal default policy
is determined by recognizing that, at any point, shareholders can either make coupon payments
and retain their claim together with the option to default, or forfeit the ﬁrm in exchange for the
waiver of debt obligations. When the economy shifts from boom to recession, the present value of
future earnings declines mainly because ﬁrm earnings have a lower drift, and because they become
both more volatile and more correlated with the market. This present value decline reduces the
continuation value (the expected value from keeping the ﬁrm alive) for equityholders, inducing
them to default earlier (at higher earnings levels) in recession. We will refer to this eﬀect as
the value eﬀect. On the other hand, a high earnings volatility in recession makes the option to
default more valuable, which defers default in bad times. This is the volatility eﬀect. As in the
models for invested assets of Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) and Chen (2010), the value
eﬀect usually dominates the volatility eﬀect, generating higher default thresholds in recession, i.e.,
leading to counter-cyclical default thresholds. Counter-cyclical default thresholds together with a
high volatility in bad times imply counter-cyclical default probabilities, consistent with empirical
evidence (Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). Additionally, default losses are
empirically reported to be higher in recession because many ﬁrms experience poor performances
during such times. Combined with higher marginal utilities in bad times, these mechanisms raise
the present value of expected default losses for bondholders which leads to higher credit spreads
and lower optimal leverage ratios than in standard contingent claim models.
Figure 4 draws the equity value maximizing default policy of levered ﬁrms initiated in boom.
The graph shows default thresholds for a range of asset composition ratios. Leverage is held
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constant at 41.83%.13 The solid line represents the default threshold in boom, and the dashed
line the one in recession. For a ﬁrm with only invested assets the optimal default thresholds
correspond to 퐷∗퐵 = 2.25 and 퐷
∗
푅 = 2.46, for an average ﬁrm with an asset composition ratio of
1.6 to 퐷∗퐵 = 2.81 and 퐷
∗
푅 = 3.19, and for a growth ﬁrm with an asset composition ratio of 2.2 to
퐷∗퐵 = 2.98 and 퐷
∗
푅 = 3.41. In the no-default region above the line corresponding to a given regime,
the continuation value for equityholders exceeds the default value and it is optimal for shareholders
to keep injecting funds into the ﬁrm.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Two points from Figure 4 are particularly noteworthy. First, the optimal default thresholds
increase as the asset composition ratio increases, inducing a higher default probability. This ﬁnding
evolves from the observation that growth options represent levered claims which are relatively
more sensitive than invested assets to a given decrease in 푋. Second, while all ﬁrms are more
likely to default in recession than in boom, the increasing distance between 퐷∗퐵 and 퐷
∗
푅 for larger
asset composition ratios indicates that the counter-cyclicality of default boundaries is particularly
pronounced for growth ﬁrms. The reason is that due to the higher relative value change of growth
options upon a regime switch, the value eﬀect is stronger for a ﬁrm with a high asset composition
ratio. Additionally, because options represent less levered claims in recession than in boom, the
increase in the equityholders’ default option - due to the higher volatility of 푋 when the regime
switches to recession - is attenuated for growth ﬁrms. In other words, the volatility eﬀect, which
tends to decrease the distance between the default thresholds, is weaker for ﬁrms with larger
expansion options.
5. Aggregate dynamics of leverage, asset composition, investment
and defaults
In order to validate our structural-equilibrium framework with intertemporal macroeconomic risk
and investment, we analyze the dynamic properties of our model-implied economy. In this section,
we qualitatively compare the aggregate predictions for the entire economy to empirically reported
capital structure, investment, and default patterns. In Section 6, we quantitatively explain observed
credit spreads and leverage ratios of the subset of BBB-ﬁrms.
13When the scale parameter is changed but the coupon is left constant, default thresholds are not directly compa-
rable. The reason is that the total asset value increases with 푠 for every 푋. Taking constant leverage assures that
the considered coupon changes consistently with the increase in the total asset value when we alter 푠.
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5.1. Simulation
We generate a dynamic economy of average ﬁrms implied by our model. We consider 1,000 identical
ﬁrms with inﬁnite debt maturity. Initially, each ﬁrm’s earnings are 푋 = 10, and the option scale
parameter is assumed to be 푠 = 1.89 if the ﬁrm’s initial regime is boom, and 푠 = 2.05 otherwise.
These choices of 푠 imply an asset composition ratio of 1.6 in both states at initiation, given optimal
leverage. Firms receive the same macroeconomic and inﬂation shocks, but experience diﬀerent
idiosyncratic shocks. Each ﬁrm observes its current earnings as well as the current regime on a
monthly basis and behaves optimally: If the current earnings are below the corresponding regime-
dependent default threshold, the ﬁrm defaults immediately; if the current earnings are above the
corresponding regime-depending option exercise boundary, the ﬁrm exercises its expansion option;
otherwise, the ﬁrm takes no action.
In our model, ﬁrms have a growth option which can only be exercised once. To maintain a
balanced sample of ﬁrms, and to avoid that the average asset composition ratio is systematically
trending towards the one of a ﬁrm with only invested assets when we simulate the economy over
time, we exogenously introduce new ﬁrms. In particular, we substitute each defaulted or exercised
ﬁrm by a new ﬁrm whose growth option is still intact. New ﬁrms have initial earnings of 푋 = 10,
and an option scale parameter 푠 according to the current regime as described above.
To ensure convergence to the long-run steady state, we ﬁrst simulate the economy for 100 years.
The starting period for the reported results is the ﬁnal period of the ﬁrst 100 years of simulation.
Next, we simulate the model for 200 years and present the aggregate dynamics.
5.2. Results
We start by discussing the cyclicality of leverage. Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) generate
counter-cyclical optimal leverage ratios in their macroeconomic model. As in our framework, the
optimal coupon rate of debt initiated in boom exceeds the one in recession. At the same time, the
value of assets is greater in boom. The second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst, generating the counter-
cyclicality in optimal leverage. We additionally incorporate the empirical fact that asset volatility
is regime-dependent. Because the latter decreases in boom and increases in recession, our optimal
coupon rate varies more than in Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) when the regime changes.
With this extension, the change in the value of optimal debt dominates the change in the value
of assets, generating pro-cyclical optimal leverage ratios for realistic parameter values, in line with
Covas and Den Haan (2006) and Korteweg (2011). Figure 5 plots the simulated market leverage
in the economy. Shaded areas represent recessions. Even though our optimal initial leverage ratios
are pro-cyclical, the simulated time series shows that actual aggregated market leverage is counter-
cyclical. The reason is that when ﬁrms are stuck with the debt issued at initiation, the equity
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value declines more than the debt value during recessions which tends to increase leverage in bad
times. This prediction conforms to Korajczyk and Levy (2003) who show that unconstrained ﬁrms’
leverage ratios vary counter-cyclically.
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
Figure 6 shows the time series of the aggregate asset composition ratio in the simulated economy.
As expansion options are more sensitive to the underlying stochastic processes than invested assets,
the ratio behaves pro-cyclically, as reported in the literature.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
We investigate aggregate default rates in Figure 7. Simulated default rates are counter-cyclical,
consistent with the empirical fact that most defaults occur during economic recessions. Additionally,
the graph shows several spikes in default rates that occur right at the time when the economy enters
into a recession, consistent with the empirical evidence in Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) and Das,
Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) (see, e.g., around years 50 and 90). Recall that defaults can
occur because either the idiosyncratic earnings reach the default threshold in a given regime, or
due to a change of the macroeconomic regime from boom to recession. The clustered default waves
occur due to an increase in ﬁrms’ default thresholds upon such a regime change. All ﬁrms between
the two thresholds default simultaneously when the regime switches to recession, even though their
earnings do not exhibit instantaneous regime-induced changes. After such waves of default, the
default frequency tends to remain high during recessions.
As a reﬁnement of this general result, we expect that the tendency to default during recession
should be particularly pronounced for ﬁrms with high expansion options. This prediction is sug-
gested by the fact that the degree of counter-cyclicality of default thresholds is positively related to
the initial asset composition ratio. We investigate the propensity to default during recession in a
dynamic, simulation-based setting by counting default rates of two separate aggregate economies.
The ﬁrst one is designed as above, consisting of ﬁrms with both assets in place and growth op-
tions, such that the asset composition ratio at initiation is 1.6. The second setting consists of
ﬁrms with only invested assets. To construct a number of cross-sectional distributions of ﬁrms, we
ﬁrst simulate 20 dynamic economies for 10 years. Using each economy obtained at the end of the
ﬁrst 10 years, the default rates in both regimes are observed for 50 subsequent simulations of the
following 20 years, resulting in a total of 1,000 simulations. The average percentage of defaults
which occurs during recession is then calculated.14 We ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst economy, on average,
14The distance to default in the aggregate economy of ﬁrms with only invested assets is trending over time. The
reason is that ﬁrms which default are replaced, but there are no option exercises after which well performing ﬁrms
could be replaced. Consequently, we do not compare absolute default rates of the two economies, but rather the
fraction of defaults occurring in each regime.
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75.41%, 76.79%, and 77.66% of total defaults of ﬁrms with assets in place and growth opportuni-
ties occur during recession over 5, 10, and 20 years, respectively. In the economy where ﬁrms only
have invested assets, the corresponding numbers are considerably smaller at 66.40%, 71.66%, and
73.71%, respectively.
This ﬁnding is also related to the observation that, on average, growth ﬁrms have lower recovery
rates than value ﬁrms (Cantor and Varma, 2005). The standard argument oﬀered by Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) is that growth ﬁrms as potential buyers of growth assets have little cash relative to
the value of assets. Hence, they are likely to be themselves credit constrained when other growth
ﬁrms sell their assets upon default, which lowers recovery rates. Our model delivers an alternative
explanation: We show that growth options in the value of ﬁrms’ assets create a propensity to
default during recession, when recovery rates are low.
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
A signiﬁcant literature suggests that business cycle shocks common to all ﬁrms play a crucial
role in explaining aggregate investment. In particular, there is evidence that aggregate investment
is characterized by both episodes of very intense investment activity and periods of very low in-
vestment activity (Doms and Dunne, 1998; Oivind and Schiantarelli, 2003). Moreover, aggregate
investment and the probability of investment spikes are strongly pro-cyclical (Barro, 1990; Cooper,
Haltiwanger, and Power, 1999). Our model reﬂects these features. First, when the regime switches
from recession to boom, ﬁrms in the region between the two investment boundaries exercise their
expansion option simultaneously by investing 퐾. Figure 8 shows that investment spikes often occur
upon such regime switches (see for example around year 35, or year 60). After these spikes, simu-
lated investment rates tend to remain high during boom due to the positive drift of the earnings.
Hence, we observe pro-cyclical investment spikes followed by higher investment activity during
booms. At the other end, investment activity often dries out when the economy switches from
boom to recession, because the optimal exercise boundary jumps up and the expected earnings’
drift turns negative. Our model also predicts that observed investment waves should be mainly
driven by ﬁrms with high expansion options.
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE
Finally, we plot simulated average credit spreads in Figure 9. Credit spreads are calculated as
(푐/푑푖(푋))−(푐/푅퐹 ), where 푅퐹 is the value of a risk free bond with an identical coupon.15 Consistent
with the empirical literature (Fama and French, 1989), we ﬁnd counter-cyclical credit spreads.
15푅퐹 is given by
푅퐹 =
푐
(
푟푛푗 + 휆˜푖 + 휆˜푗
)
푟푛푖 푟
푛
푗 + 푟
푛
푗 휆˜푖 + 푟
푛
푖 휆˜푗
. (46)
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When the economy stays in boom, credit spreads tend to decline as distances-to-default increase
due to the positive expected drift of the earnings and the lower default threshold. Conversely, in
recession, credit spreads rise as distances-to-default tend to decline and the volatility increases.
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE
6. Quantitative implications and empirical predictions
In this section, we discuss the quantitative implications and empirical predictions of our model.
The attention is restricted to BBB-rated ﬁrms since it has been argued that the pricing of very high-
grade investment ﬁrms is dominated by factors other than credit risk such as liquidity risk or a tax
component (Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis, 2005; De Jong and Joost, 2006). We start by determining
target observed average credit spreads. Duﬀee (1998) estimates an average yield spread in the
industrial sector between BBB-rated bonds and Treasury yields of 198, 148, and 149 bps for bonds
with a mean maturity of 21 years (long), 8.9 years (medium), and 4.7 years (short), respectively.
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) report somewhat lower spreads of 143 bps for bonds with 15−30
years (long), 115 bps for 7−15 years (medium), and 115 bps for 1−7 years maturity, respectively.16
From these spreads, we subtract 35.5% to reﬂect the results in Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
and Han and Zhou (2011) who ﬁnd non-default components in BBB bond yields of 29% and 42%,
respectively. We arrive at a plausible target range of around 92 to 128 bps for long maturities,
74 to 95 bps for medium maturities, and 74 to 96 bps for short maturities.17 Panel A in Table 2
tabulates these target credit spread ranges. In Panel B, we also report empirical default rates of
BBB-rated debt over 5, 10, and 20 years from Moody’s (2010).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
We discuss the implications of our model for credit spreads and leverage along two dimensions.
First, we follow the traditional way of investigating a typical individual ﬁrm. Second, we implement
an approach similar to the one proposed by Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) where credit
spreads and leverage ratios are calculated as cross-sectional averages based on a simulation of the
empirical distribution of BBB-rated individual ﬁrms.
16The estimates of short and medium maturities in Huang and Huang (2003) are higher because of the embedded
call options in the corporate bond sample and the inclusion of two recessions with high spreads.
17We recalculate target ranges by subtracting the absolute non-default component for BBB ﬁrms of 61.8 bps
reported in Han and Zhou (2011), or by subtracting the 29% reported in Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) for an
earlier sample period. Our model’s performance does not depend on the exact deﬁnition of targets.
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6.1. Credit spreads
6.1.1. Typical ﬁrm with endogenous default boundary
Credit spreads for various models on newly issued corporate debt are calculated in Table 3 for 5
(short), 10 (medium), and 20 (long) years maturity.18 We follow the standard approach in structural
models by calibrating the idiosyncratic earnings volatility such that the total asset volatility is
approximately 25% in each model, the average asset volatility of ﬁrms with outstanding rated
corporate debt (Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008). Additionally, we ﬁx leverage at the average ratio
of 41.83% in our BBB-ﬁrm sample.
Importantly, the default boundaries and expansion thresholds are assumed to be chosen op-
timally by equityholders, as we are interested in whether our model can generate both realistic
prices of corporate claims and realistic endogenous default and expansion rates. Specifying default
boundaries exogenously such that a model’s actual default probabilities match the data (as done in
Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009) or Huang and Huang (2003)) would not only substan-
tially dilute the value of the option to default, but would also distort the value of the expansion
option because the latter depends on the default policy.
It is well-known that structural models of default typically generate credit spreads which are
too low compared to their empirical counterpart. To illustrate this point, we ﬁrst analyze the model
without business cycle risk in Panel A of Table 3. The expected drifts and systematic volatilities
of earnings and consumption are set equal to their unconditional means. Panel A shows credit
spreads for diﬀerent maturities of the standard structural model of Leland (1998). The empirical
target credit spreads in Table 2 are about 5 times larger for the short maturity, and about 3 times
larger for the medium and long term than those predicted by the structural model.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) and Chen (2010) derive structural multi-regime models
for typical ﬁrms which consist of only invested assets. We closely replicate their approach for an
average ﬁrm within a two-regime model. To match the asset volatility of 25%, the idiosyncratic
earnings volatility is set to 휎푋,푖푑 = 0.21. Panel B reports unconditional credit spreads, calculated
as a weighted average of the state-dependent credit spreads, where the weights correspond to the
long-run distribution of the Markov chain. For comparability to our setting with expansion options,
the results without debt restructuring are presented. While the credit spreads for typical ﬁrms of
35, 56, and 78 bps for 5, 10, and 20 years maturity, respectively, are clearly higher than in the one
regime case, they are still considerably below their targets.19
18For the value of a ﬁnite maturity risk-free bond see Appendix A.5, formula (A-117).
19Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) use higher recovery rates, lower leverage and do not model the impact
of principal repayments on default thresholds, which results in marginally lower credit spreads in their static case.
83
Next, we investigate our model with expansion options for a typical BBB-rated ﬁrm. Note
that for a given idiosyncratic earnings volatility, ﬁrms with diﬀerent asset composition ratios have
diﬀerent total asset volatilities due the inherent leverage of their expansion option. Moreover, a
ﬁrm’s asset volatility is not constant over time, as its option’s moneyness changes when 푋 moves
towards or away from the exercise boundary. To obtain the average volatility for a certain rating
class, the standard approach in the literature is to average the calculated asset volatilities over all
ﬁrms with the same rating (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Duan, 1994; Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008).
We calibrate the idiosyncratic volatility 휎푋,푖푑 to the empirically reported average asset volatility
of 0.25: Given an idiosyncratic volatility 휎푋,푖푑, we simulate model-implied samples of BBB-rated
ﬁrms over 10 years, and calculate the resulting average asset volatility. (Details on the simulation
can be found in Appendix A.6.1.) The calibration yields 휎푋,푖푑 = 0.168 which ensures that the
average asset volatility of our simulated BBB-rated ﬁrms with expansion options corresponds to
its empirical counterpart.20
Panel C of Table 3 shows the resulting credit spreads for typical ﬁrms. Several aspects are
noteworthy about these results. Our model increases the unconditional credit spreads of an average
ﬁrm for 5, 10, and 20 years from 18 bps to 44 bps (+144%), from 29 bps to 66 bps (+128%), and
from 41 bps to 81 bps (+98%), respectively, compared to the one regime model in Panel A. To
understand this large eﬀect, recall ﬁrst that macroeconomic models generate larger credit spreads
than one regime models because recessions are times of high marginal utility, so that default losses
that occur during these times will aﬀect investors more. An important economic implication is
that the average duration of bad times in the risk-neutral world is longer than in the actual world.
Since the representative agent uses risk-neutral and not actual probabilities to account for risk
and to compute prices, credit spreads are larger and the agent behaves more conservatively than
historical default losses imply. Second, if ﬁrms have a higher tendency to default in recession,
this discrepancy will increase due to the higher risk premium. Our model shows that because
of the strong sensitivity of option values to regime switches, and because they are less sensitive
to the underlying earnings during recession, the counter-cyclicality of default thresholds is more
pronounced for ﬁrms with larger growth options. The resulting stronger counter-cyclicality of the
default probability of growth ﬁrms thus drives up their credit spreads. As can be seen in row 2
of Panel C, the credit spreads for an average ﬁrm, consisting of both invested assets and growth
options, are 44 bps, 66 bps, and 81 bps for debt maturities of 5, 10, and 20 years, respectively.
Chen (2010) obtains larger 10 year credit spreads in a model with 9 states and a dynamic capital structure, but uses
higher leverage, and a cash ﬂow volatility which induces a much higher asset volatility than empirically observed.
20We also repeat this exercise with diﬀerent speciﬁcations, such as alternative simulation length and debt maturity.
The resulting idiosyncratic volatilities are fairly insensitive to these variations. An alternative approach is to calibrate
the idiosyncratic volatility to the cumulative default probability of BBB-rated ﬁrms (Chen, 2010). This procedure,
however, usually leads to asset volatilities which are higher than the ones empirically observed.
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This is, respectively, 26%, 18%, and 5% higher than the credit spreads of an average ﬁrm in the
standard macroeconomic model with only invested assets.21
Besides the fact that they generate too low credit spreads, another problem of existing structural
models is that the implied term structure of credit spreads at initiation is much steeper than its
empirical counterpart for a typical ﬁrm. The reason is that the implied spreads are particularly
low at the short end. Most existing studies in the macroeconomic model literature use the default
thresholds of inﬁnite maturity debt (that is, debt without principal repayments) to numerically
calculate the risk-neutral default probability for each maturity. As the credit risk literature identiﬁes
ﬁrms’ debt maturity as an important determinant of credit risk (Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli,
2010; He and Xiong, 2011), we endogenously derive optimal default thresholds also for less than
inﬁnite debt maturity following the approach of Leland (1998). Due to the continuous principal
repayments, these thresholds are considerably higher for short maturities than for inﬁnite debt,
resulting in larger credit spreads at the short end. The resulting term structure of credit spreads
for an average ﬁrm in Panel A, B, and C is consequently ﬂatter and, hence, closer to the shape
observed in target spreads than when using default thresholds of inﬁnite maturity debt.22
The rows in Panel C of Table 3 identify the cross-sectional relationship between the asset
composition ratio and credit risk. To tease out the eﬀect of growth options on credit spreads, we
vary the asset composition ratio by altering 푠. As raising 푠 increases the value of the expansion
option, we simultaneously adapt the coupon to maintain a constant leverage of 41.83%.23 This
exercise shows that the asset base of the ﬁrm is an important driver of credit risk, implying a
positive relationship between the portion of growth options in the value of a ﬁrm’s assets and the
costs of debt. In particular, altering the asset composition ratio of a ﬁrm from 1 to 2.2 increases
credit spreads by about 55% to 95%, depending on the debt maturity. This eﬀect is remarkable
given that we solely vary the assets’ characteristics. It arises for two reasons in our model. First,
because options are levered, and due to the endogenous investment boundary, expansion options are
more sensitive to the underlying uncertainty, and, hence, more volatile. This higher volatility drives
up the default probability of growth ﬁrms. Second, a higher portion of the expansion option’s value
in the overall asset value of a ﬁrm induces a higher counter-cyclicality of the default probability,
21We cannot directly compare the results for invested assets in Panel C to the ones for average ﬁrms in Panel B,
even though the latter consist of only invested assets. The reason is that in our model, the idiosyncratic volatility is
calibrated such that the asset volatility of the entire sample of BBB-rated ﬁrms matches 0.25, whereas in Panel B,
휎푋,푖푑 is chosen such that ﬁrms with only invested assets have an asset volatility of 0.25.
22We use default boundaries for the appropriate debt maturities in both Panels B and C in order to highlight the
pure eﬀect of expansion options on credit spreads.
23Alternatively, changing both 푠 and 퐾 to alter the asset composition qualitatively retains the aggregate and
cross-sectional predictions. Holding 푠 constant while only varying 퐾 implies large decreases in the option exercise
boundaries for relatively small increases of the asset composition ratio. In the extreme, a ﬁrm with a very low 퐾 will
exercise its expansion option almost immediately; in essence, credit spreads then virtually mirror those of a ﬁrm with
only invested assets, diluting the model’s cross-sectional predictions. Note also that any variation in 퐾 changes the
costs of investment. By only varying 푠, we instead avoid that our results are driven by diﬀerent sizes of the expected
ﬁnancing in case of equity-ﬁnanced investment costs.
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which raises expected default costs. The higher default probability and larger default costs both
increase the costs of debt for growth ﬁrms.
Note that while ﬁrms with growth options generally have a higher credit spread than ﬁrms with
only invested assets (ceteris paribus), credit risk is concave in the asset composition ratio. This
concavity occurs because ﬁrms with a larger asset composition ratio are closer to their exercise
boundary, where credit spreads also reﬂect that the asset volatility and the counter-cyclicality of
the default thresholds will decrease when a ﬁrm exercises its expansion option.
Our predictions are qualitatively consistent with empirical ﬁndings. For example, Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007) ﬁnd that market-to-book asset values, the ratio of research and development
expenses to total investment expenditure, and one minus the ratio of net property, plant, and
equipment to total assets are all signiﬁcantly and positively related to credit spreads (Table VI
on p. 2652). Similarly, Molina (2005) documents that ﬁrms with a higher ratio of ﬁxed assets to
total assets have lower bond yield spreads and higher ratings (Table II on p. 1438). This evidence
implies that, empirically, even after controlling for most factors relevant to credit risk in standard
structural models, credit spreads are higher for growth ﬁrms. Hence, while an average ﬁrm with
valuable growth options exhibits, for example, a diﬀerent tax advantage of debt or payout ratio than
a ﬁrm which only consists of invested assets, simple variation of such input parameters would not
explain these ﬁndings. What is needed to address the aggregate puzzle and the mentioned cross-
sectional evidence is a model which generates higher explained credit risk than standard models
for a given level of input parameters. Our model delivers this result.
6.1.2. True cross-section
The previous section calculates credit spreads of a typical individual ﬁrm which is consistent with
the historically observed average input parameters of ﬁrms in the same rating class of which the
individual ﬁrm is representative.
In this section, inspired by the work of Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b), we employ
a simulation approach to capture the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribution of leverage and
asset compositions of BBB-rated ﬁrms. The central insight of this approach is that BBB-rated ﬁrms
are very diﬀerent with respect to their ﬁrm characteristics such as the asset composition ratio and
leverage, and that credit spreads and default rates are highly non-linear in these characteristics.
Moreover, the previous section considers credit spreads solely at debt issuance points, when the
principal corresponds to the market value of debt. The majority of empirically reported spreads
are, however, based on observations made at times when debt is not being issued. To capture the
impact of these issues, it is important to calculate credit spreads and default rates for a simulated
sample of ﬁrms which matches the observed empirical distribution, i.e., the true observed cross-
section of BBB-rated companies. The resulting average of simulated credit spreads can then be
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compared to the empirical average credit spread. Simultaneously, the approach allows us to verify
whether the default probabilities implied by our model correspond to the reported historical default
probabilities of BBB-rated ﬁrms.
To obtain the implications of the true cross-section of BBB-rated ﬁrms, we start by generating
a distribution of ﬁrms implied by the model. In particular, we set up a grid of optimally leveraged
ﬁrms with scale parameters 푠 from 0 up to the largest possible value such that the option is not
exercised immediately. The step size is 0.05, and 50 identical ﬁrms are considered for each value of
the option scale parameter. Earnings paths of all ﬁrms are then simulated forward over 10 years,
resulting in a model-implied economy populated by more than 3000 ﬁrms. This economy has a
broad range of leverage ratios and asset composition ratios.
In a second step, we match our historical distribution of BBB-rated ﬁrms with its model-
implied counterpart. For each observation in the average empirical cross-section, we select the ﬁrm
in our model-implied economy with the minimum distance regarding the percentage deviation from
the target average market leverage and asset composition ratio. The matching is generally very
accurate. Considering a debt maturity of 10 years yields an average Euclidean distance of 0.0648,
with the 85%-quantile being 0.0865.24 That is, on average, only 15% of the ﬁrms are matched
with the root of the sum of the squared percentage deviations being larger than 8.65%.25 Note
that while our initial model-implied economy potentially contains ﬁrms with diﬀerent ratings, the
described matching procedure allows us to construct a cross-sectional distribution of model-implied
ﬁrms which closely reﬂects its empirical BBB-rated counterpart.
Next, earnings paths of the 717 matched BBB-model-ﬁrms are simulated forward for 20 years
on a monthly basis. This simulation is repeated 50 times.
The outcome of both the matching and the forward simulation of the matched sample also
depends on the particular realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks and the states of the economy in
the ﬁrst simulation step. Hence, to explore the distributional properties of our results, the entire
procedure is conducted 20 times, which results in a total of 1, 000 simulations. Details on the
simulation are given in Appendix A.6.2.
Panel D of Table 3 summarizes the results. The average credit spreads, calculated during 5
years after the matching, are 60 bps for 5 years, 81 bps for 10 years, and 103 bps for 20 years.26
24Other debt maturities yield virtually identical results for the matching accuracy.
25The market leverage is matched with an average distance of 0.0248. The average percentage distance of the asset
composition ratio of 0.0549 is larger. This number is driven by a few ﬁrms with unusually high asset composition
ratios. As they would optimally exercise their expansion option immediately in our model, these ﬁrms are matched
with model ﬁrms with a somewhat lower asset composition ratio. We expect a minor impact of this limitation on our
results, because ﬁrms with unusually high asset composition ratios also have very low leverages, and, hence, are not
driving our average credit spreads.
26We follow Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b) in measuring average credit spreads over a 5 year period.
During longer periods, many ﬁrms could deviate substantially from the initial average distribution, and would,
therefore, not be BBB-rated anymore.
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Hence, our model closely matches the historical levels reported in Table 2 for 10 and 20 years. 5
year credit spreads are somewhat lower than their target. We also measure the cyclicality of credit
spreads. Average 10 year credit spreads, for example, are 58 basis points during boom, and 112
during recession. As expected, they are strongly counter-cyclical.
Importantly, average credit spreads for the simulated true cross-section are considerably higher
than the ones of a typical ﬁrm at initiation. There are two reasons for this result. First, some
ﬁrms will be near default, and credit spreads are convex in the distance to default. Second, the
market value of debt corresponds to the principal at initiation. In practice, however, ﬁrms are not
at initiation most of the time. The actual market value of debt will, therefore, often underestimate
the burden from the principal repayments, and especially so for ﬁrms approaching their default
boundary. The reason is that the market value can hardly go beyond the principal as it is bounded
above by the value of riskless debt, but can easily reach values below the principal when earnings
deteriorate. Our simulation of the true cross-section captures these asymmetric deviations over
time, resulting in higher average credit spreads than those of ﬁrms observed at initiation. Compared
to Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b), the additional credit spreads generated from simulating
the true cross-section are lower, because we do not incorporate debt restructuring.
To verify whether our model generates default rates corresponding to the empirically reported
default frequencies for realistic debt maturities, we also count cumulative default rates in the
simulated true cross-section. The model-implied average and median cumulative default rates over
several years are reported in each Panel of Table 4. Panel A presents default rates over 5, 10, and 20
years from simulations with ﬁrms issuing inﬁnite maturity debt. Panels B, C, and D show default
rates from simulations with ﬁrms issuing ﬁnite maturity debt. Due to the principal repayments,
default thresholds of ﬁrms with ﬁnite maturity debt are considerably higher than those of ﬁrms with
inﬁnite maturity debt. Note that simulated credit spreads are consistent with a range of realized
ex-post default rates, as observed default rates vary depending on a particular realization of good
and bad states. Therefore, we also report the 25% and 75% percentiles of the distribution.
Empirically, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (2000) report a mean maturity of IPO bonds of
12 years, Guedes and Opler (1996) document an average maturity of 12.2 years for seasoned debt
oﬀers, and Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) measure a mean time to maturity of BBB-bonds in
the industrial sector of 9.51 years. Panel C of Table 4 shows that when assuming that ﬁrms have a
debt maturity of 10 years, our model-implied median default rates over 5, 10, and 20 years are very
close to the historical default probabilities observed from 1920 to 2009 reported in Table 2. Hence,
for a realistic debt maturity, our median economy is consistent with historical default frequencies
of BBB-rated ﬁrms. The average default rates are somewhat larger than their targets due to a few
realizations with long sojourn times in recession, resulting in high default rates.27 Panels A and
27The standard deviation of the sojourn times generated by Markov chains is quite large. In our model, long
sojourn times in recession cause high default rates for some sample paths. As default rates are non-linear in the
distance to default, long sojourn times in boom do not counterbalance these high rates.
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D show that while the generated rates tend to be too low in Panel A, but too large in Panel D,
historical default frequencies still fall within the 25% to 75% range of model-implied median default
rates for most years.
The large diﬀerence between Panel A and D in both average and median default rates illustrates
that debt maturities and the associated default thresholds have an important eﬀect on model-
implied default rates. It is, therefore, important to incorporate a realistic debt maturity when
calibrating models with endogenous default thresholds.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
In sum, our results demonstrate that the average credit spreads implied by our model for the
true cross-section are simultaneously consistent with historically observed average asset volatilities,
and, especially for typical debt maturities, with default rates reported for BBB-rated ﬁrms.
6.2. Leverage
This section analyzes the features of leverage ratios resulting from our model. We ﬁrst investigate
how growth options aﬀect the initial choice of optimal leverage in our model. At initiation, a ﬁrm
consisting of only invested assets has an optimal leverage which is between 4 and 5 percentage
points higher than the one of a typical ﬁrm with an asset composition ratio of 1.6 for all debt
maturities.28 The reason is that a higher asset composition ratio increases the default probability,
particularly so in recessions where default losses are larger and harder to bear. Due to the resulting
higher costs of debt, ﬁrms with growth options optimally select lower initial leverage.
As argued by Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010a), however, it can be misleading to make
quantitative statements simply based on optimal leverage at issue. Hence, we investigate the
leverage ratios of our cross-section of BBB-rated ﬁrms simulated over 5 years after matching. For
the main analysis, the debt maturity is assumed to be 10 years.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Panel A in Table 5 shows that the average leverage is 40.89%, which is, naturally, close to the
average of 41.83% of our BBB-rated ﬁrm sample used for the matching. (The average leverage is
40.57%, 40.93%, and 41.45% for 5 years, 20 years, and inﬁnite debt maturity, respectively.)
28The diﬀerence depends on the initial regime and the debt maturity. For example, with inﬁnite debt maturity, the
diﬀerence in optimal initial leverage between a ﬁrm with only invested assets and a ﬁrm with an asset composition
ratio of 1.6 is 4% if the ﬁrms are initiated in boom. (The optimal leverage ratios in this case are 45.4% and 41.4%,
respectively.) For ﬁrms initiated in recession, the diﬀerence is 4.4% (= 44.2% minus 39.8%).
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In Panel B, we compare leverage ratios in boom and recession. While optimal leverage is pro-
cyclical at initiation, it is counter-cyclical over time for the cross-section of BBB-rated ﬁrms. In
particular, the average leverage is 36.94% in boom, and 46.20% in recession. The reason is that the
market value of equity is more sensitive to regime switches than the market value of debt, making
leverage counter-cyclical. This mechanism dominates the optimally pro-cyclical leverage choice at
initiation for our typical ﬁrms. The result mirrors the property we previously established for the
aggregate economy, and conﬁrms that it holds also when matching to real empirical samples.
Finally, Panel C investigates the relationship between growth options and market leverage.
Regressing the average leverage of each ﬁrm on its average asset composition ratio in our empirical
BBB-rated ﬁrm sample yields a coeﬃcient of −0.165. We conduct the same regressions with the
averages of asset composition ratios and leverage ratios from each of the 1000 simulations of the
true cross-section. The average coeﬃcient from this regression is −0.184, close to its empirical
counterpart. Hence, the observed magnitude of the negative relationship between growth options
and market leverage is preserved during the simulation.
Our qualitative ﬁnding for the cross-sectional relationship between growth options and leverage
is widely accepted (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984; Barclay, Smith, and Morellec, 2006; Johnson,
2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Consistent with the literature, the coeﬃcient is robustly negative.
Moreover, its quantitative size, implied by the 25% and 75% quantiles, is comparable to the one
in empirical studies. Fama and French (2002), for example, obtain a coeﬃcient of −0.096 in their
regression of market leverage on a similar ratio of asset composition after controlling for standard
controls, and Johnson (2003) ﬁnds that increasing the asset composition ratio by one decreases
leverage by around 7.8 percentage points in a pooled regression.
6.3. Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the results to variations in the critical input parameters.
Additionally, we also show how our predictions are aﬀected if we assume that the expansion is
ﬁnanced by issuing equity instead of selling assets.
To analyze the impact of preferences on our results, we show 10 year credit spreads and the
simulated average leverage for 훾 = 7.5 in the second column of Table 6, a value which is also
sometimes used in the literature (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Chen, 2010). All other parameters are
kept constant at their baseline levels from Table 1. The debt maturity is assumed to be 10 years.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Lower risk aversion induces a smaller demand for precautionary savings, which increases the
real risk-free rate. At the same time, it raises the risk-neutral earnings drift, because the risk prices
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for systematic Brownian shocks (휂푖) decrease. Both mechanisms reduce the default probability,
leading to the lower credit spreads and slightly lower leverage.
In column 3 of Table 6, we investigate the impact of the exercise costs on credit spreads and
leverage. As we are mainly interested in ﬁrms with intact expansion options, we present the
results for 퐾 equal to 350, i.e., a higher 퐾 than in the baseline case. (Lowering 퐾 induces many
growth ﬁrms to exercise their expansion option almost immediately.) Generally, credit spreads
and the average leverage are very similar to the ones of our baseline speciﬁcation. For large
asset composition ratios, such as with 2.2, credit spreads at initiation slightly increase because
a higher 퐾 induces a larger distance to the optimal exercise boundary compared to the baseline
speciﬁcation. This increase in credit spreads from the larger distance arises because close to the
exercise boundary, credit spreads reﬂect the fact that the ﬁrm will imminently be converted into a
ﬁrm with only invested assets, and, hence, with lower credit risk.
Finally, we also analyze in Column 4 of Table 6 the case where the exercise price of the expan-
sion option (퐾) is ﬁnanced by issuing additional equity instead of selling assets. Appendix A.7.1
presents the resulting system of ODEs for corporate debt. New equity decreases the leverage after
exercise and, hence, lowers credit risk. As ﬁrms with a high asset composition ratio are close to
the endogenous exercise boundary where new equity-ﬁnancing occurs, credit spreads are strongly
reduced for typical growth ﬁrms compared to the benchmark model. In the simulation of the true
cross-section, however, the eﬀect is small because most ﬁrms have a large distance to the exercise
boundary.29 Additionally, Panel B shows that the average leverage is only marginally aﬀected.
The result for typical growth ﬁrms in column 4 shows that close to ﬁrms’ exercise boundaries,
credit spreads are driven by the expected new ﬁnancing upon investment, and do not primarily
reﬂect the nature of assets. This insight validates our focus on asset-ﬁnancing rather than on
equity-ﬁnancing of growth option exercises to analyze the isolated impact of the asset composition
on credit risk and corporate policy choices.
We conclude that while alternative speciﬁcations and settings can have an impact on the quan-
titative results, our qualitative aggregate and cross-sectional predictions are robust.
7. Conclusion
It is now well-accepted that macroeconomic risk is central for understanding credit risk and capital
structure choices. Speciﬁcally, defaults are more likely in recession, when they are particularly
costly and harder to bear. This counter-cyclicality increases the costs of debt for all ﬁrms. But to
explain the cross-sectional variation in apparently excessive costs of debt, we need variation inside
29In fact, those ﬁrms which contribute the most to the average credit spread, i.e., distressed ﬁrms, are particularly
far away from the exercise boundary.
91
the ﬁrm. This paper formalizes the role of one particularly important aspect of this heterogeneity,
the asset composition of ﬁrms. It is not surprising that in principle the asset composition can
be important for optimal capital structure. After all, economists have devoted much eﬀort to
understanding the diﬀerence between value and growth ﬁrms in terms of their ﬁnancial structure,
starting with Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986). Little was known, however, about the quantitative
importance of this factor and its relation with macroeconomic risk.
The present structural equilibrium model allows us to jointly analyze a ﬁrm’s expansion pol-
icy and ﬁnancial leverage in the presence of macroeconomic risk. We demonstrate that, in fact,
incorporating the combination of these factors goes a long way towards explaining average credit
spread levels, and the cross-sectional variation in both costs of debt and leverage without the need
to appeal to factors such as agency costs. Our model implies that companies with a high portion
of expansion options tend to be riskier in general, and, at the same time, particularly sensitive to
macroeconomic risk. They are not only more volatile (because growth options represent levered
claims), but also have a higher propensity to default in bad times than ﬁrms with a low portion of
expansion options. Thus, the default probability and its counter-cyclicality are higher the greater
the ratio of expansion options to total assets. Together with higher marginal utility of the repre-
sentative agent in recession, this relation (exacerbated by costly liquidation in recession) implies
higher costs of debt and more important endogenous shadow costs of leverage for ﬁrms with growth
options than for those with only invested assets. Thus, our ﬁndings explain why the credit spread
puzzle is empirically more pronounced for growth ﬁrms, and why growth ﬁrms hold less debt even
after controlling for standard determinants of credit risk. Moreover, because the economy is made
up of a cross-sectional mix of ﬁrms, the model accounts, in quantitatively fairly accurate ways, for
the average credit spread puzzle.
We have studied one type of (arguably important) real options of ﬁrms, namely, growth options.
However, ﬁrms have a wide and varying range of options, including abandonment and shut-down
options. A model incorporating these options could, therefore, yield further cross-sectional predic-
tions.
While recent research has made important progress in enhancing our understanding of average
credit risk, the cross-section of credit risk has not received suﬃcient attention. Analyzing it empir-
ically is, fortunately, quite feasible. Liquid credit default swap quotes are now widely available on
a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis, allowing researchers to investigate speciﬁc relationships between ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics such as growth options and credit spreads. Our paper also provides a theoretical
basis that can guide empirical research in this direction.
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Figure 1. This scatterplot shows the average leverage and Tobin’s Q for each observed BBB-rated
ﬁrm over the period from 1995 to 2008.
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Figure 2. The solid line shows the optimal exercise boundary in boom for a range of scale param-
eters 푠. The dashed line represents the corresponding exercise boundary in recession. The graph is
drawn for optimal leverage with inﬁnite debt maturity. The baseline parameter speciﬁcation from
Table 1 is used.
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Figure 3. The solid line represents the value of the expansion option in boom for a range of
starting earnings between 0 and 10. The dashed line shows the corresponding values of the same
option in recession. The graph is drawn for optimal leverage with inﬁnite debt maturity. The
baseline parameter speciﬁcation from Table 1 is used.
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Figure 4. The solid line represents the default threshold in boom for a range of asset composition
ratios. The dashed line shows the default threshold in recession. The graph is drawn for constant
leverage (41.83%) at each point. Debt maturity is assumed to be inﬁnite. The baseline parameter
speciﬁcation from Table 1 is used, with 푠 being varied to generate the desired asset composition
ratio.
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Figure 5. The solid line represents the aggregate market leverage of the simulated economy. The
shaded areas represent times of recession. Standard parameters from Table 1 are used. Debt
maturity is assumed to be inﬁnite.
Figure 6. The solid line represents the aggregate asset composition ratio of the simulated economy.
The shaded areas represent times of recession. Standard parameters from Table 1 are used. Debt
maturity is assumed to be inﬁnite.
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Figure 7. The solid line represents the percentage of ﬁrms which default during a given month in
the simulated economy. The shaded areas represent times of recession. Standard parameters from
Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is assumed to be inﬁnite.
Figure 8. The solid line represents the percentage of ﬁrms which exercise their expansion options
during a given month in the simulated economy. The shaded areas represent times of recession.
Standard parameters from Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is assumed to be inﬁnite.
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Figure 9. The solid line represents the average credit spread of the simulated economy. The shaded
areas represent times of recession. Standard parameters from Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is
assumed to be inﬁnite.
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9. Tables
Table 1
Baseline Parameter Choice
This table describes our baseline scenario. Panel A contains the calibrated parameters of a typical BBB-rated S&P
500 ﬁrm. Panels B and C show our parameter choice for the expansion option and our workhorse macro economy,
respectively. The asset composition ratio (ACR) is the value of the ﬁrm, divided by the value of the invested assets.
Parameter Boom Recession
Panel A. Firm Characteristics
Initial Value of Idiosyncratic Earnings (X) 10 10
Tax Advantage of Debt (휏) 0.15 0.15
Real Earnings Growth Rate (휇푖) 0.044 −0.0743
Systematic Earnings Volatility (휎푋,퐶푖 ) 0.0869 0.1369
Recovery Rate (훼푖) 0.7 0.5
Panel B. Expansion Option Parameters of a Typical Firm (ACR=1.6)
Exercise Price (퐾) 310 310
Scale Parameter if Initiated in Boom (푠) 1.89
Scale parameter if Initiated in Recession (푠) 2.05
Panel C. Economy
Regime Switching Intensity (휆) 0.2718 0.4928
Consumption Growth Rate (휃푖) 0.042 0.0141
Consumption Growth Volatility (휎퐶푖 ) 0.0094 0.0114
Expected Inﬂation Rate (휋) 0.0342 0.0342
Systematic Price Index Volatility (휎푃,퐶) −0.0035 −0.0035
Idiosyncratic Price Index Volatility (휎푃,푖푑) 0.0132 0.0132
Rate of time preference (휌) 0.015 0.015
Relative Risk Aversion (훾) 10 10
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (Ψ) 1.5 1.5
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Table 2
Target Credit Spreads and Default Probabilities
This table lists our target credit spreads and default probabilities. Panel A reports target average credit spreads
for various debt maturities. They are calculated as the BBB-rated bond minus treasury yields of Davydenko and
Strebulaev (2007) and Duﬀee (1998), net of a 35.5% non-default component. Credit spreads are quoted in basis
points. Panel B reports average cumulative issuer-weighted default rates in percent for BBB-debt over 5, 10, and 20
years for US ﬁrms (Moody’s, 2010).
Panel A: Target Credit Spreads (in basis points)
Debt Maturity Short Medium Long
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) 74 74 92
Duﬀee (1998) 96 95 128
Panel B: Historical BBB Default Probabilities (in percent)
Years 5 10 20
1920-2009 3.136 7.213 13.684
1970-2009 1.926 4.851 12.327
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Table 3
Implications for Credit Spreads
This table demonstrates the implications of our model for credit spreads of BBB-rated ﬁrms. The asset composition
ratio (ACR) is deﬁned as ﬁrm value, divided by the value of the invested assets. Parameters are taken from Table 1,
and the leverage is set equal to 41.83%. In the one regime model, parameters are chosen to match their unconditional
mean. The standard two regime model is adapted from Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b). Credit spreads
for various debt maturities are calculated as the coupon divided by the debt value, minus the yield on an otherwise
identical riskfree bond. They are quoted in basis points. Credit spreads of typical ﬁrms in Panels B and C are
obtained by weighting the credit spreads in boom and recession by the average expected times spent in each regime,
respectively. Panel D contains the average credit spreads of our simulated true cross-section of BBB-rated ﬁrms.
Debt Maturity (Years) 5 10 20
Panel A: One Regime Model
Average Firm 18 29 41
Panel B: Standard Two Regime Model
With Only Invested Assets
Average Firm 35 56 78
Panel C: Two Regime Model
With Expansion Option
Invested Assets (ACR=1) 24 39 55
Average Firm (ACR=1.6) 44 66 81
Growth Firm (ACR=2.2) 47 70 85
Panel D: Two Regime Model
With True Cross-Section
Average Credit Spread 60 81 103
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Table 4
Implications for Default Rates
This table shows the simulated cumulative default rates in percent of our true cross-section of BBB-rated ﬁrms.
Panels A to D vary the underlying debt maturity used to calculate the default thresholds in our model.
Years 5 10 20
Panel A: Inﬁnite Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 2.51 6.94 13.48
Median Default Rates 0.98 3.35 9.21
25% Quantile of Default Rates 0.35 1.26 3.63
75% Quantile of Default Rates 2.65 8.79 18.69
Panel B: 20 Years Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 4.51 10.58 18.61
Median Default Rates 1.95 5.44 13.11
25% Quantile of Default Rates 0.70 2.09 5.44
75% Quantile of Default Rates 5.30 13.95 26.08
Panel C: 10 Years Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 5.85 12.38 20.54
Median Default Rates 2.65 6.83 14.37
25% Quantile of Default Rates 0.98 2.93 6.83
75% Quantile of Default Rates 6.83 16.88 30.40
Panel D: 5 Years Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 8.64 16.91 25.96
Median Default Rates 4.74 11.92 20.36
25% Quantile of Default Rates 1.81 5.02 10.18
75% Quantile of Default Rates 11.02 24.13 38.49
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Table 5
Implications for Leverage
This table demonstrates the implications of our model for the leverage features of the true cross-section of BBB-rated
ﬁrms. Leverage ratios (given in percent) are calculated as the market value of debt divided by the market value of
the ﬁrm. The asset composition ratio (ACR) is deﬁned as ﬁrm value, divided by the value of the invested assets.
Parameters are taken from Table 1. The debt maturity is assumed to be 10 years.
Panel A: Unconditional Leverage
Average Leverage 40.89
Panel B: Conditional Leverage
Regime Boom Recession
Average Leverage 36.94 46.20
Median Leverage 34.36 44.19
25% Quantile 22.49 29.88
75% Quantile 48.51 60.39
Panel C: Regression of Leverage on ACR
Average Coeﬃcient -0.184
Median Coeﬃcient -0.184
25% Quantile -0.268
75% Quantile -0.096
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Table 6
Credit Spreads and Leverage for Alternative Speciﬁcations
This table shows 10 year credit spreads and simulated average leverage ratios of BBB-rated ﬁrms for alternative
speciﬁcations of our basic model. The asset composition ratio (ACR) is deﬁned as ﬁrm value, divided by the value
of the invested assets. Credit spreads are calculated as the coupon divided by the debt value, minus the yield on an
otherwise identical riskfree bond. They are quoted in basis points. The altered parameter is indicated in the ﬁrst
line, all other parameters are taken from Table 1. Credit spreads in the ﬁrst 3 lines of Panel A for typical ﬁrms at
issue are obtained by weighting the credit spreads in boom and recession by the expected times spent in each regime,
respectively. The leverage is set equal to 41.83% to generate the credit spreads of typical ﬁrms. The last row in Panel
A contains average credit spreads of our simulated true cross-section of BBB-rated ﬁrms. Panel B shows simulated
average leverage ratios for BBB-rated ﬁrms. The debt maturity is assumed to be 10 years.
Speciﬁcation 훾 = 7.5 퐾 = 350 Equity Financing
Panel A: 10 Year Credit Spreads
Invested Assets (ACR=1) 33 39 39
Average Firm (ACR=1.6) 53 67 65
Growth Firm (ACR=2.2) 56 72 58
True Cross-Section 70 83 80
Panel B: Unconditional Leverage
Average Leverage 41.10 41.22 41.14
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A. Appendix
The full Appendix can be made available on a website upon publication.
A.1. The stochastic discount factor
Case 1: The general case with 2 regimes. Solving the associated Bellman equation (see Chen, 2010),
it can be shown that the stochastic discount factor 푚푡 follows the dynamics
d푚푡
푚푡
= −푟푖d푡− 휂푖d푊퐶푡 + (푒휅푖 − 1) d푀 푖푡 , (A-1)
with 푀푡 being the compensated process associated with the Markov chain, and
푟푖 = −휌 (1− 훾)
1− 훿
(
훿 − 훾
1− 훾 ℎ
훿−1
푖 − 1
)
+ 훾휃푖 − 1
2
훾 (1 + 훾)
(
휎퐶푖
)2 − 휆푖 (푒휅푖 − 1) (A-2)
휂푖 = 훾휎
퐶
푖 (A-3)
휅푖 = (훿 − 훾) log
(
ℎ푗
ℎ푖
)
, (A-4)
and ℎ퐵 , ℎ푅 solve
0 = 휌
1− 훾
1− 훿 ℎ
훿−훾
푖 +
(
(1− 훾) 휃푖 − 1
2
훾 (1− 훾) (휎퐶푖 )2 − 휌1− 훾1− 훿
)
ℎ1−훾푖 + 휆푖
(
ℎ1−훾푗 − ℎ1−훾푖
)
. (A-5)
Case 2: Only 1 regime. In order to disentangle the eﬀect of business cycle risk, we also consider the
case of the presence of only one economic regime. We omit regime indeces. The dynamics of the stochastic
discount factor then read
d푚푡
푚푡
= −푟d푡− 휂d푊퐶푡 . (A-6)
The real interest rate 푟 and the risk price 휂 are given by
푟 = −휌 (1− 훾)
1− 훿
(
훿 − 훾
1− 훾 ℎ
훿−1 − 1
)
+ 훾휃 − 1
2
훾 (1 + 훾)
(
휎퐶
)2
, (A-7)
휂 = 훾휎퐶 , (A-8)
with
ℎ =

− 휌
(1− 훿) 휃 − 12훾 (1− 훿) (휎퐶)2 − 휌
) 1
1−훿
. (A-9)
As before, the nominal interest rate is calculated as
푟푛 = 푟 + 휋 − 휎2푃 − 휎푃,퐶휂, (A-10)
and the expected growth rate is given by
휇˜ = 휇− 휎푋,퐶 (휂 + 휎푃,퐶)− (휎푃,푖푑)2 . (A-11)
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The price-earnings ratio simpliﬁes to
푦 =
1
푟푛 − 휇˜ , (A-12)
and the total earnings volatility is
휎˜ =
√
(휎푋,퐶)
2
+ (휎푃,푖푑)
2
+ (휎푋,푖푑)
2
. (A-13)
A.2. Firms with only invested assets
A.2.1. The valuation of corporate debt
Case V1: 퐷ˆ퐵 < 퐷ˆ푅.
30 We use the notation ‘ˆ’ to indicate that a parameter or function refers to a ﬁrm
with only invested assets (e.g. the default boundaries 퐷ˆ푖). An investor holding corporate debt requires an
instantaneous return equal to the risk-free rate 푟푛푖 . Once the ﬁrm defaults, debtholders receive a fraction 훼푖
of the asset value 푋푦푖. The required rate of return on debt must be equal to the realized rate of return plus
the proceeds of debt. Therefore, an application of Ito’s lemma with regime switches shows that debt satisﬁes
the following system of ODEs:
For 0 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ퐵 : {
푑ˆ퐵(푋) = 훼퐵푋푦퐵
푑ˆ푅(푋) = 훼푅푋푦푅.
(A-14)
For 퐷ˆ퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ푅 :{
푟푛퐵 푑ˆ퐵(푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑ˆ
′
퐵(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑ˆ′′퐵(푋) + 휆˜퐵
(
훼푅푋푦푅 − 푑ˆ퐵(푋)
)
푑ˆ푅(푋) = 훼푅푋푦푅.
(A-15)
For 푋 > 퐷ˆ푅 : ⎧⎨⎩ 푟
푛
퐵 푑ˆ퐵(푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑ˆ
′
퐵(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑ˆ′′퐵(푋) + 휆˜퐵
(
푑ˆ푅(푋)− 푑ˆ퐵(푋)
)
푟푛푅푑ˆ푅(푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑ˆ
′
푅(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑ˆ′′푅(푋) + 휆˜푅
(
푑ˆ퐵(푋)− 푑ˆ푅(푋)
)
.
(A-16)
The functional form of the solution is
푑ˆ푖(푋) =
⎧⎨⎩
훼푖푋푦푖 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ푖 푖 = 퐵,푅
퐶ˆ1푋
훽퐵1 + 퐶ˆ2푋
훽퐵2 + 퐶3푋 + 퐶4 퐷ˆ퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ푅, 푖 = 퐵
퐴ˆ푖1푋
훾1 + 퐴ˆ푖2푋
훾2 +퐴푖5 푋 > 퐷ˆ푅, 푖 = 퐵,푅,
(A-17)
where 퐴ˆ퐵1, 퐴ˆ퐵2, 퐴ˆ푅1, 퐴ˆ푅2, 퐴5, 퐶ˆ1, 퐶ˆ2, 퐶3, 퐶4, 훾1, 훾2, 훽
퐵
1 , and 훽
퐵
2 are real-valued parameters to be deter-
mined. We ﬁrst consider the region 푋 > 퐷ˆ푅, and use the standard approach of plugging in the functional
30The solution of the case 퐷ˆ퐵 > 퐷ˆ푅 can be found by the according change in notation.
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form 푑ˆ푖(푋) = 퐴ˆ푖1푋
훾1 + 퐴ˆ푖2푋
훾2 +퐴푖5 into both equations of (A-16). Comparing coeﬃcients and solving the
resulting 2-dimensional system of equations for 퐴푖5, we ﬁnd that
퐴푖5 =
푐
(
푟푛푗 + 휆˜푖 + 휆˜푗
)
푟푛푖 푟
푛
푗 + 푟
푛
푗 휆˜푖 + 푟
푛
푖 휆˜푗
. (A-18)
Next, 퐴ˆ푅푘 is always a multiple of 퐴ˆ퐵푘, 푘 = 1, 2, with the factor 푙푘 :=
1
휆˜퐵
(푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵 − 휇˜퐵훾푘− 12 휎˜2퐵훾푘(훾푘− 1)),
i.e., 퐴퐵푘 = 푙푘퐴푅푘.
Using these results and comparing coeﬃcients again, we ﬁnd that 훾1 and 훾2 correspond to the negative
roots of the quartic equation(
휇˜푅훾 +
1
2
휎˜2푅훾(훾 − 1)− 휆˜푅 − 푟푛푅
)(
휇˜퐵훾 +
1
2
휎˜2퐵훾(훾 − 1)− 휆˜퐵 − 푟푛퐵
)
= 휆˜푅휆˜퐵 , (A-19)
with the reason for taking the negative roots being the no-bubbles condition for debt stated below. By
arguments of Guo (2001), this quartic equation always has four distinct real roots, two of them being
negative, and two of them positive.
Next, we consider the region 퐷ˆ퐵 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ푅, i.e., the realized state of the Markov chain is boom (if not,
the solution is already known by the second equation of system (A-15)). Again, plugging in the functional
form 푑퐵(푋) = 퐶ˆ1푋
훽퐵1 + 퐶ˆ2푋
훽퐵2 + 퐶3푋 + 퐶4 into the ﬁrst equation of (A-15), we ﬁnd by comparison of
coeﬃcients that
훽퐵1,2 =
1
2
− 휇˜퐵
휎˜2퐵
±
√√√⎷(1
2
− 휇˜퐵
휎˜2퐵
)2
+
2
(
푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵
)
휎˜2퐵
퐶3 =
휆˜퐵훼푅푦푅
푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵 − 휇˜퐵
(A-20)
퐶4 =
푐
푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵
,
for 푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵 − 휇˜퐵 ∕= 0. The unknown parameters are now 퐴ˆ퐵1, 퐴ˆ퐵2, 퐶ˆ1 and 퐶ˆ2. The boundary conditions
read
lim
푋→∞
푑ˆ푖 (푋)
푋
< ∞, 푖 = 퐵,푅 (A-21)
lim
푋↘퐷ˆ푅
푑ˆ퐵(푋) = lim
푋↗퐷ˆ푅
푑ˆ퐵(푋) (A-22)
lim
푋↘퐷ˆ푅
푑ˆ′퐵(푋) = lim
푋↗퐷ˆ푅
푑ˆ′퐵(푋) (A-23)
lim
푋↘퐷ˆ퐵
푑ˆ퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵퐷퐵푦퐵 (A-24)
lim
푋↘퐷ˆ퐵
푑ˆ푅 (푋) = 훼푅퐷푅푦푅. (A-25)
Condition (A-21) is the no-bubbles condition used above in determining the appropriate roots of equation
(A-19). The default thresholds 퐷ˆ푅 and 퐷ˆ퐵 are chosen by the equityholders, and are taken as given by the
debtholders. The boundary conditions are, hence, the value-matching conditions (A-22), (A-24), and (A-25),
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and the smooth-pasting condition at the higher default threshold 퐷ˆ퐵 for the debt function in recession 푑ˆ푅(⋅),
equation (A-23). As the default thresholds are not related to an optimality concept from the point of view
of the debtholders, there are no smooth-pasting conditions at default to consider.
We plug in the functional form (A-17) into conditions (A-22)-(A-25), and obtain a four-dimensional
linear system in the four unknowns 퐴ˆ퐵1, 퐴ˆ퐵2, 퐶ˆ1 and 퐶ˆ2 :
퐴ˆ퐵1퐷ˆ
훾1
푅 + 퐴ˆ퐵2퐷ˆ
훾2
푅 +퐴5 = 퐶ˆ1퐷ˆ
훽퐵1
푅 + 퐶ˆ2퐷ˆ
훽퐵2
푅 + 퐶3퐷ˆ푅 + 퐶4
퐴ˆ퐵1훾1퐷ˆ
훾1
푅 + 퐴ˆ퐵2훾2퐷ˆ
훾2
푅 = 퐶ˆ1훽
퐵
1 퐷ˆ
훽퐵1
푅 + 퐶ˆ2훽
퐵
2 퐷ˆ
훽퐵2
푅 + 퐶3퐷ˆ푅
훼퐵퐷ˆ퐵푦퐵 = 퐶ˆ1퐷ˆ
훽퐵1
푅 + 퐶ˆ2퐷ˆ
훽퐵2
푅 + 퐶3퐷ˆ푅 + 퐶4
푙1퐴ˆ퐵1퐷ˆ
훾1
푅 + 푙2퐴ˆ퐵2퐷ˆ
훾2
푅 +퐴5 = 훼푅퐷ˆ푅푦푅.
(A-26)
We deﬁne the matrices
푀ˆ :=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐷ˆ훾1푅 퐷ˆ
훾2
푅 −퐷ˆ훽
퐵
1
푅 −퐷ˆ훽
퐵
2
푅
훾1퐷ˆ
훾1
푅 훾2퐷ˆ
훾2
푅 −훽퐵1 퐷ˆ훽
퐵
1
푅 −훽퐵2 퐷ˆ훽
퐵
2
푅
0 0 퐷ˆ
훽퐵1
푅 퐷ˆ
훽퐵2
푅
푙1퐷ˆ
훾1
푅 푙2퐷ˆ
훾2
푅 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
푏ˆ :=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐶3퐷ˆ푅 + 퐶4 −퐴퐵5
퐶3퐷ˆ푅
훼퐵퐷ˆ퐵푦퐵 − 퐶3퐷ˆ푅 − 퐶4
훼푅퐷ˆ푅푦푅 −퐴푅5
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
such that 푀ˆ
[
퐴ˆ퐵1 퐴ˆ퐵2 퐶ˆ1 퐶ˆ2
]푇
= 푏ˆ. Hence the solution of the unknowns left is given by
[
퐴ˆ퐵1 퐴ˆ퐵2 퐶ˆ1 퐶ˆ2
]푇
= 푀ˆ−1푏ˆ. (A-27)
Case 2: Only 1 regime. Omitting the regime-index, we deﬁne all parameters and functions as in Case V1,
and let 퐷ˆ1 be the default threshold. Note that for ℙ = ℚ a.e. and 푦 = 1, this case corresponds to the model
of Leland (1994). Equations (A-10)-(A-13) provide all the parameters needed in the setup and solution of
the model in the 1-regime case. Using that the required return must be equal to the expected realized return
plus the proceeds from debt, we ﬁnd the following system to solve:
푟푛푑ˆ(푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푋푑ˆ′(푋) + 휎˜
2
2 푋
2푑ˆ′′(푋) 푋 > 퐷ˆ
푑ˆ(푋) = 훼푋푦 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ. (A-28)
The boundary conditions are the no bubbles condition, as well as value-matching at default:
lim
푋→∞
푑ˆ(푋)
푋
< ∞
lim
푋↘퐷ˆ
푑ˆ (푋) = 훼푦퐷ˆ. (A-29)
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The functional form of the solution is
푑ˆ(푋) =
{
훼푦푋 푋 < 퐷ˆ
퐵ˆ푋훽2 + 푐푟 푋 ≥ 퐷ˆ,
(A-30)
where 퐵ˆ and 훽2 are real-valued parameters. It is straightforward to show that
훽2 =
1
2
− 휇˜
휎˜2
−
√(
1
2
− 휇˜
휎˜2
)2
+
2푟푛
휎˜2
(A-31)
퐵ˆ =
(
훼푦퐷ˆ − 푐
푟푛
)
퐷ˆ−훽2 . (A-32)
A.2.2. The valuation of tax beneﬁts
The value of tax beneﬁts 푡ˆ푖(푋) corresponds to the value of debt with recovery rates equal to zero, and a
coupon of 푐휏 (and analogously for Case 2).
A.2.3. The valuation of default costs
As there are no continuous earnings associated with default costs, value function of default costs 푏ˆ푖(푋) can
be calculated as the value of a debt contract with recovery rates 1 − 훼퐵 and 1 − 훼푅, respectively, and a
coupon of zero. Case 2 can be treated analogously.
A.2.4. Firm value
Total ﬁrm value 푓ˆ푖 in regime 푖 = 퐵,푅 corresponds to the value of assets 푦푖푋, plus the value of tax beneﬁts
from debt 푡ˆ푖(푋), less the value of potential default costs 푏ˆ푖(푋), i.e.,
푓ˆ푖(푋) = 푋푦푖 + 푡ˆ푖(푋)− 푏ˆ푖(푋).
Analogously, for Case 2, we have
푓ˆ(푋) = 푋푦 + 푡ˆ(푋)− 푏ˆ(푋).
A.2.5. The valuation of equity
The levered ﬁrm value equals the sum of debt and equity values. Hence, equity value 푒ˆ푖(푋), 푖 = 퐵,푅, may
be written as
푒ˆ푖(푋) = 푓ˆ푖(푋)− 푑ˆ푖(푋) = 푋푦푖 + 푡ˆ푖(푋)− 푏ˆ푖(푋)− 푑ˆ푖(푋), (A-33)
or, for the Case 2,
푒ˆ(푋) = 푓ˆ(푋)− 푑ˆ(푋) = 푋푦 + 푡ˆ(푋)− 푏ˆ(푋)− 푑ˆ(푋). (A-34)
This is the closed-form expression for equity.
114
A.2.6. Default policy
Once debt has been issued, managers select the ex-post default policy that maximizes the value of equity.
Formally, the default policy is determined by postulating that the derivative of the equity value has to be
zero at the according default boundary. It is straightforward to calculate the ﬁrst derivative of equity in
closed form, using the derivative of the functional forms of the value of debt, default costs, and tax shield.
The system to solve is for Case V1: {
푒ˆ′퐵(퐷ˆ
∗
퐵) = 0
푒ˆ′푅(퐷ˆ
∗
푅) = 0.
(A-35)
We solve this problem numerically. For Case 2, the system is
푒ˆ′(퐷∗) = 0, (A-36)
which is solvable in closed form.
Note that for a given coupon, all value functions can be calculated by following the approach up to
system (A-35) or system (A-36), depending on the case. This fact will be used later for the calculation of
the value of corporate securities of a ﬁrm consisting of both assets in place and an expansion option.
A.2.7. Capital structure
Denote by 푓ˆ∗푖 (푋) the ﬁrm value of a ﬁrm with only invested assets, given optimal ex-post default thresholds.
The ex-ante optimal coupon of a ﬁrm solves
in Case V1
푐ˆ∗ := argmax푐ˆ푓ˆ
∗
푖 (푋), (A-37)
and in Case 2
푐ˆ∗ := argmax푐ˆ푓ˆ
∗(푋). (A-38)
A.3. The value of the growth option
Case G1: 푋푅 > 푋퐵. Recall that the system to solve is:
For 0 ≤ 푋 < 푋퐵 :{
푟푛퐵퐺퐵(푋) = 휇˜퐵푋퐺
′
퐵(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2퐺′′퐵(푋) + 휆˜퐵 (퐺푅(푋)−퐺퐵(푋))
푟푛푅퐺푅(푋) = 휇˜푅푋퐺
′
푅(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2퐺′′푅(푋) + 휆˜푅 (퐺퐵(푋)−퐺푅(푋))
(A-39)
For 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅 :{
퐺퐵(푋) = 푠푋푦퐵 −퐾
푟푛푅퐺푅(푋) = 휇˜푅푋퐺
′
푅(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2퐺′′푅(푋) + 휆˜푅 (푠푋푦퐵 −퐾 −퐺푅(푋))
(A-40)
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For 푋 ≥ 푋푅 : {
퐺퐵(푋) = 푠푋푦퐵 −퐾
퐺푅(푋) = 푠푋푦푅 −퐾,
(A-41)
subject to the boundary conditions:
lim
푋↘0
퐺푖 (푋) = 0, 푖 = 퐵,푅 (A-42)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
퐺푅(푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
퐺푅(푋) (A-43)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
퐺′푅(푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
퐺′푅(푋) (A-44)
lim
푋↗푋푅
퐺푅 (푋) = 푠푋푅푦푅 −퐾 (A-45)
lim
푋↗푋퐵
퐺퐵 (푋) = 푠푋퐵푦퐵 −퐾 (A-46)
The functional form of the solution is given by
퐺푖(푋) =
⎧⎨⎩
퐴¯푖3푋
훾3 + 퐴¯푖4푋
훾4 푋 < 푋퐵 , 푖 = 퐵,푅
퐶¯1푋
훽푅1 + 퐶¯2푋
훽푅2 + 퐶¯3푋 + 퐶¯4 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅, 푖 = 푅
푠푋푦푖 −퐾 푋 ≥ 푋푖 푖 = 퐵,푅,
(A-47)
where 퐴¯퐵3, 퐴¯퐵4, 퐴¯푅1, 퐴¯푅2, 퐶¯1, 퐶¯2, 퐶¯3, 퐶¯4, 훾3, 훾4, 훽
푅
1 , and 훽
푅
2 are real-valued parameters to be determined.
The notation¯ indicates that a parameter refers to the value of the growth option (and only to the value of
the growth option). We ﬁrst consider the region 푋 < 푋퐵 , and use the standard approach of plugging in the
functional form 퐺푖(푋) = 퐴¯푖3푋
훾3 + 퐴¯푖4푋
훾4 into both equations of (A-39). Comparison of coeﬃcients yields
that 퐴¯푅푘 is always a multiple of 퐴¯퐵푘, 푘 = 3, 4, with the factor 푙¯푘 :=
1
휆˜퐵
(푟푛퐵+휆˜퐵−휇˜퐵훾푘− 12 휎˜2퐵훾푘(훾푘−1)), i.e.,
퐴¯퐵푘 = 푙¯푘퐴¯푅푘. Note that even though the factor 푙¯푘 is of similar structure as the one found in the calculation
of the value of debt of a ﬁrm with only invested assets, their values diﬀer due to the diﬀerent roots 훾푖 in the
formulae. Using this relationship and comparing coeﬃcients again, we ﬁnd that 훾3 and 훾4 correspond to the
positive roots of the quartic equation(
휇˜푅훾 +
1
2
휎˜2푅훾(훾 − 1)− 휆˜푅 − 푟푛푅
)(
휇˜퐵훾 +
1
2
휎˜2퐵훾(훾 − 1)− 휆˜퐵 − 푟푛퐵
)
= 휆˜푅휆˜퐵 . (A-48)
The reason for taking the positive roots being that the option value has to approach zero as the earnings
approaches zero.
Next, we consider the region 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅. Note that in the case of interest the Markov chain is
in recession (otherwise, the solution is already known). Again, plugging in the functional form 퐺푅(푋) =
퐶¯1푋
훽1 + 퐶¯2푋
훽2 + 퐶¯3푋 + 퐶¯4 into the second equation of (A-40), we ﬁnd by comparison of coeﬃcients that
훽푅1,2 =
1
2
− 휇˜푅
휎˜2푅
±
√√√⎷(1
2
− 휇˜푅
휎˜2푅
)2
+
2
(
푟푛푅 + 휆˜푅
)
휎˜2푅
퐶¯3 =
푠휆˜푅푦퐵
푟푛푅 − 휇˜푅 + 휆˜푅
(A-49)
퐶¯4 = − 퐾휆˜푅
푟푛푅 + 휆˜푅
.
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It is left to solve for the unknown parameters 퐴¯퐵3, 퐴¯퐵4, 퐶¯1 and 퐶¯2. Plugging in the functional form (A-47)
into conditions (A-43)-(A-46) yields
퐶¯1푋
훽푅1
퐵 + 퐶¯2푋
훽푅2
퐵 + 퐶¯3푋퐵 + 퐶¯4 = 푙¯1퐴¯퐵3푋
훾3
퐵 + 푙¯2퐴¯퐵4푋
훾4
퐵 (A-50)
퐶¯1훽
푅
1 푋
훽푅1
퐵 + 퐶¯2훽
푅
2 푋
훽푅2
퐵 + 퐶¯3푋퐵 = 푙¯1퐴¯퐵3훾3푋
훾3
퐵 + 푙¯2훾4퐴¯퐵4푋
훾4
퐵 (A-51)
퐶¯1푋
훽푅1
푅 + 퐶¯2푋
훽푅2
푅 + 퐶¯3푋푅 + 퐶¯4 = 푠푦푅푋푅 −퐾 (A-52)
퐴¯퐵3푋
훾3
퐵 + 퐴¯퐵4푋
훾4
퐵 = 푠푦퐵푋퐵 −퐾 (A-53)
This four-dimensional system is linear in its four unknowns 퐴¯퐵3, 퐴¯퐵4, 퐶¯1 and 퐶¯2. We deﬁne the matrices
푀¯ :=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
푙¯1푋
훾3
퐵 푙¯2푋
훾4
퐵 −푋훽
푅
1
퐵 −푋훽
푅
2
퐵
푙¯1훾3푋
훾3
퐵 푙¯2훾4푋
훾4
퐵 −훽푅1 푋훽
푅
1
퐵 −훽푅2 푋훽
푅
2
퐵
0 0 푋
훽푅1
푅 푋
훽푅2
푅
푋훾3퐵 푋
훾4
퐵 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
푏¯ :=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐶¯3푋퐵 + 퐶¯4
퐶¯3푋퐵
−퐶¯3푋푅 − 퐶¯4 + 푠푦푅푋푅 −퐾
푠푦퐵푋퐵 −퐾
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
such that 푀¯
[
퐴¯퐵3 퐴¯퐵4 퐶¯1 퐶¯2
]푇
= 푏¯. Hence the solution to the remaining unknowns is given by
[
퐴¯퐵3 퐴¯퐵4 퐶¯1 퐶¯2
]푇
= 푀¯−1푏¯. (A-54)
Note that the relative price change sensitivity is
퐺′푖 (푋)
퐺푖 (푋)
=
⎧⎨⎩
훾3퐴¯푖3푋
훾3−1+퐴¯푖4훾4푋훾4−1
퐴¯푖3푋훾3+퐴¯푖4푋훾4
푋 < 푋퐵 , 푖 = 퐵,푅
퐶¯1훽1푋
훽1−1+퐶¯2훽2푋훽2−1+퐶¯3
퐶¯1푋훽1+퐶¯2푋훽2+퐶¯3푋+퐶¯4
푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅, 푖 = 푅
푠푦푖
푠푦푖푋−퐾 푋 ≥ 푋푖 푖 = 퐵,푅.
(A-55)
Finally, consider the unlevered value of the growth option, whose optimal exercise boundaries are deter-
mined by the additional boundary conditions (23)-(24):
lim
푋↗푋푢푛푙푒푣푅
퐺′푅 (푋) = 푠푦푅 (A-56)
lim
푋↗푋푢푛푙푒푣퐵
퐺′퐵 (푋) = 푠푦퐵 . (A-57)
The calculations are the same up to system (A-49). System (A-50)-(A-53) is augmented by the two equations
corresponding to the additional boundary conditions:
퐶¯푢푛푙푒푣1 훽
푅
1
(
푋푢푛푙푒푣푅
)훽푅1 −1 + 퐶¯푢푛푙푒푣2 훽푅2 (푋푢푛푙푒푣푅 )훽푅2 −1 + 퐶¯3 = 푠푦푅 (A-58)
퐴¯푢푛푙푒푣퐵3 훾3
(
푋푢푛푙푒푣퐵
)훾3−1
+ 퐴¯푢푛푙푒푣퐵4 훾4
(
푋푢푛푙푒푣퐵
)훾4−1
= 푠푦퐵 . (A-59)
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The full system is six-dimensional with the six unknowns 퐴¯푢푛푙푒푣퐵3 , 퐴¯
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵4 , 퐶¯
푢푛푙푒푣
1 , 퐶¯
푢푛푙푒푣
2 푋
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 , and 푋
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 ,
linear in the ﬁrst four unknowns, and non-linear in the last two unknowns. It is solved numerically, using
relation (A-54) for any given pair of exercise boundaries in the numerical solution algorithm.
Case 2: Only 1 regime. Denote the investment boundary by 푋1. We ﬁnd that the system to solve is
given by:
푟퐺 (푋) = 휇˜푋퐺′ (푋) + 휎˜
2
2 푋
2퐺′′ (푋) 푋 < 푋1
퐺 (푋) = 푠푋푦 −퐾 푋 ≥ 푋1
(A-60)
The boundary conditions are given by a value matching condition and the fact that he option must become
worthless as the asset value approaches zero:
lim
푋↗푋1
퐺 (푋) = 푠푦푋1 −퐾 (A-61)
lim
푋↘0
퐺 (푋) = 0 (A-62)
The functional form of the solution is
퐺 (푋) =
{
퐴¯푋훽1 푋 < 푋1
푠푋푦 −퐾 푋 ≥ 푋1,
(A-63)
where 퐴¯ and 훽1 are real-valued parameters to be determined. It is then straightforward to show that
훽1 =
1
2
− 휇˜
휎˜2
+
√(
1
2
− 휇˜
휎˜2
)2
+
2푟
휎˜2
(A-64)
퐴¯ = (푠푦푋1 −퐾)푋−훽11 , (A-65)
which is the solution for the option. The relative price change sensitivity of the option is
퐺′ (푋)
퐺 (푋)
=
{
훽1
푋 푋 < 푋1
푠푦
푠푦푋−퐾 푋 ≥ 푋1.
(A-66)
A.4. Firms with invested assets and expansion options
A.4.1. The valuation of corporate debt
Case A1: 퐷퐵 < 퐷푅, 퐷ˆ퐵 < 퐷ˆ푅, and 푋푅 > 푋퐵 . This case constitutes the one presented in the main text.
For brevity of notation, deﬁne 푠¯ := 푠+ 1. Recall that the system to solve is:
For 0 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷퐵 : {
푑퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵
(
푋푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (푋)
)
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
) (A-67)
For 퐷퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷푅 :{
푟푛퐵푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋) + 휆˜퐵
(
훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
)− 푑퐵 (푋))
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
) (A-68)
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For 퐷푅 < 푋 < 푋퐵 :{
푟푛퐵푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋) + 휆˜퐵 (푑푅 (푋)− 푑퐵 (푋))
푟푛푅푑푅 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋) + 휆˜푅 (푑퐵 (푋)− 푑푅 (푋))
(A-69)
For 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅 :⎧⎨⎩ 푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
푟푑푅 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋) + 휆˜푅
(
푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
− 푑푅 (푋)
) (A-70)
For 푋 ≥ 푋푅 : ⎧⎨⎩ 푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
푑푅 (푋) = 푑ˆ푅
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦푅
)
.
(A-71)
The system is subject to the following boundary conditions:
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑퐵 (푋) = lim
푋↗퐷푅
푑퐵 (푋)
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑′퐵 (푋) = lim
푋↗퐷푅
푑′퐵 (푋)
lim
푋↘퐷퐵
푑퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵
(
퐷퐵푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (퐷퐵)
)
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
퐷푅푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (퐷푅)
)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
푑푅 (푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑푅 (푋) (A-72)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
푑′푅 (푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑′푅 (푋)
lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋퐵 − 퐾
푦퐵
)
lim
푋↗푋푅
푑푅 (푋푅) = 푑ˆ푅
(
푠¯푋푅 − 퐾
푦푅
)
.
In order to solve this system, we start with the functional form of the solution:
푑푖 (푋) =
⎧⎨⎩
훼푖
(
푋푦푖 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푖 (푋)
)
푋 ≤ 퐷푖 푖 = 퐵,푅,
퐶1푋
훽퐵1 + 퐶2푋
훽퐵2 + 퐶3푋 + 퐶4
+퐶5푋
훾3 + 퐶6푋
훾4
퐷퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷푅, 푖 = 퐵
퐴푖1푋
훾1 +퐴푖2푋
훾2
+퐴푖3푋
훾3 +퐴푖4푋
훾4 +퐴5
퐷푅 < 푋 ≤ 푋퐵 , 푖 = 퐵,푅
퐵1푋
훽푅1 +퐵2푋
훽푅2 + 푍 (푋) 푋퐵 < 푋 ≤ 푋푅, 푖 = 푅
푑ˆ푖
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦푖
)
푋 > 푋푖, 푖 = 퐵,푅,
(A-73)
where 퐴퐵1, 퐴퐵2, 퐴푅1, 퐴푅2, 퐶1, 퐶2, 퐶3, 퐶4, 퐶5, 퐶6, 퐵1, 퐵2, 훽
퐵
1 , 훽
퐵
2 , 훽
푅
1 , 훽
푅
2 , 훾3, and 훾4 are real-valued parame-
ters to be determined (or to be conﬁrmed). The function 푍(푋) as stated in the sixth line of (A-73) is of
closed form. It will be given explicitly in the following calculations.
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We ﬁrst consider the region 푋퐵 ≥ 푋 > 퐷푅. Using the standard approach of plugging in the functional
form 푑푖(푋) = 퐴푖1푋
훾1+퐴푖2푋
훾2+퐴푖3푋
훾3+퐴푖4푋
훾4+퐴푖5 into both equations of (A-69), comparing coeﬃcients,
and solving, we conﬁrm that
퐴푖5 =
푐
(
푟푛푗 + 휆˜푖 + 휆˜푗
)
푟푛푖 푟
푛
푗 + 푟
푛
푗 휆˜푖 + 푟
푛
푖 휆˜푗
, (A-74)
and we ﬁnd again that 퐴푅푘 is always a multiple of 퐴퐵푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 4, with the factor 푙푘 :=
1
휆˜퐵
(푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵 −
휇˜퐵훾푘 − 12 휎˜2퐵훾푘(훾푘 − 1)), i.e., 퐴퐵푘 = 푙푘퐴푅푘. Using this relationship and comparing coeﬃcients, we ﬁnd that
훾1, 훾2, 훾3, and 훾4 correspond to the roots of the quartic equation (A-19), which is:(
휇˜푅훾 +
1
2
휎˜2푅훾(훾 − 1)− 휆˜푅 − 푟푛푅
)(
휇˜퐵훾 +
1
2
휎˜2퐵훾(훾 − 1)− 휆˜퐵 − 푟푛퐵
)
= 휆˜푅휆˜퐵 . (A-75)
Recall that by arguments of Guo (2001), we know that this quartic equation always has four distinct real
roots, two of them being negative, and two positive. The value of debt in both regimes will be subject to
boundary conditions from both below (default) and above (exercise of expansion option). In order to meet
all boundary conditions, we need four terms with the according factors 퐴푖푘 as well as exponents 훾푘, which
requires usage of all four roots of (A-75). The no-bubbles condition is already implemented in the value
function of a ﬁrm with only invested assets 푑ˆ푖, and, hence, does not need to be imposed again. The unknown
parameters left for this region are 퐴퐵푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 4.
Next, we consider the region 퐷퐵 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷푅, i.e., the realized state of the Markov chain is boom (in
recession, the solution is already known by the second equation of system (A-68)). Plugging in the functional
form 푑퐵(푋) = 퐶1푋
훽퐵1 +퐶2푋
훽퐵2 +퐶3푋 +퐶4 +퐶5푋
훾3 +퐶6푋
훾4 into the second equation of (A-68), we ﬁnd
by comparison of coeﬃcients that
훽퐵1,2 =
1
2
− 휇˜퐵
휎˜2퐵
±
√√√⎷(1
2
− 휇˜퐵
휎˜2퐵
)2
+
2
(
푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵
)
휎˜2퐵
(A-76)
퐶3 =
휆˜퐵훼푅푦푅
푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵 − 휇˜퐵
(A-77)
퐶4 =
푐
푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵
(A-78)
퐶5 =
휆˜퐵훼푅 푙¯1퐴¯
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵3
푟푛퐵 − 휇˜퐵훾3 − 12 휎˜2퐵훾3 (훾3 − 1) + 휆˜퐵
(A-79)
퐶6 =
휆˜퐵훼푅 푙¯2퐴¯
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵4
푟푛퐵 − 휇˜퐵훾4 − 12 휎˜2퐵훾4 (훾4 − 1) + 휆˜퐵
. (A-80)
We require again that 푟푛퐵 + 휆˜퐵 − 휇˜퐵 ∕= 0. Note that the denominators of 퐶5 and 퐶6 are diﬀerent from zero
as long as the Markov chain 퐼 is recurrent, i.e., if 휆˜푖 > 0, 푖 = 퐵,푅 (see equation (A-75)). The parameters
훽퐵1,2, 퐶3, and 퐶4 are the same as for a ﬁrm with only invested assets, cf. Appendix A.2, equations (A-20). 퐶5
and 퐶6 are inﬂuenced by the parameters in the solution of the growth option, 푙¯1, 푙¯2, 퐴¯
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵3 , and 퐴¯
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵4 (see
Appendix A.3). The two additional terms of the solution for this region, 퐶5푋
훾3 and 퐶6푋
훾4 , reﬂect the fact
that the ﬁrm does not only consist of assets in place, but also of the growth option. As debtholders get also
a fraction of the growth option’s value at regime-switching induced default, the value of the option directly
inﬂuences the solution in this region. This inﬂuence explains the occurrence of the growth option parameters
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in 퐶5 and 퐶6, as well as the use of the same exponents as in the calculation of the value of the option, 훾3
and 훾4. Note that the approach and the intuition regarding the exponents 훾3 and 훾4 for this region are
completely diﬀerent than for the previously discussed region 푋퐵 ≥ 푋 > 퐷푅, where these exponents occur
only due to the valuation of debt itself, independent of the growth option, and must be calculated as a part
of the solution. The unknown parameters left for this region are 퐶1 and 퐶2.
Finally, consider the region 푋퐵 < 푋 ≤ 푋푅 for 푖 = 푅. The corresponding diﬀerential equation is (see
(A-70)):
푟푛푅푑푅(푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅(푋) +
1
2
휎˜2푅푋
2푑′′푅(푋) + 휆˜푅푑ˆ퐵(푠¯푋 −
퐾
푦퐵
). (A-81)
In order to solve this inhomogeneous diﬀerential equation, we use a standard approach by ﬁrst ﬁnding a
fundamental system of solutions of the homogenous diﬀerential equation, and then calculating the solution
of the inhomogeneous equation as the sum of the solutions of the homogenous equation and a particular
solution of the nonhomogeneous equation. A reference for this approach is Polyanin and Zaitsev (2003),
pages 21-23.31
(A-81) is equivalent to
푋2푑′′푅(푋) +
2휇˜푅
휎˜2푅
푋푑′푅(푋)−
2
(
푟푛푅 + 휆˜푅
)
휎˜2푅
푑푅(푋) = − 2푐
휎˜2푅
− 2휆˜푅
휎˜2푅
푑ˆ퐵(푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
). (A-82)
Therefore, the according homogenous diﬀerential equation is
푋2푑′′푅(푋) +
2휇˜푅
휎˜2푅
푋푑′푅(푋)−
2
(
푟푛푅 + 휆˜푅
)
휎˜2푅
푑푅(푋) = 0. (A-83)
A fundamental system of solutions is given by {푧1, 푧2} , with
푧1 := 푋
훽푅1 ,
푧2 := 푋
훽푅2 ,
and
훽푅1,2 =
1
2
− 휇˜푅
휎˜2푅
±
√√√⎷(1
2
− 휇˜푅
휎˜2푅
)2
+
2
(
푟푛푅 + 휆˜푅
)
휎˜2푅
. (A-84)
These solutions can be calculated by plugging the functional form into the homogenous ODE (A-83), and
solving for 훽푅1,2.
31Technically, the above explained two-step procedure for the solution of the ODE is required due to the assumption
that the exercise of the option is ﬁnanced by selling a part of the assets in place, resulting in the fact that the function
푑ˆ in the ODE is not evaluated at 푋, but at 푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
. Under the alternative assumption that the exercise of the
option is equity-ﬁnanced, the function 푑ˆ is evaluated at a multiple of 푋 instead. In this case, we can exploit the
additive nature of the ODE, and calculate the solution as a weighted sum of solutions, including the value function
of debt of a ﬁrm with only invested assets. The functional form for the region 푋퐵 < 푋 ≤ 푋푅 is then comparable to
the one for the region 퐷퐵 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷푅.
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For notational convenience, we now deﬁne 푓2 := 푋
2, 푓1 :=
2휇˜푅
휎˜2푅
푋, 푓0 := − 2(푟
푛
푅+휆˜푅)
휎˜2푅
, and
푔 (푋) := − 2푐
휎˜2푅
− 2휆˜푅
휎˜2푅
푑ˆ퐵(푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
). (A-85)
These notations allow to write the ODE (A-82) as:
푓2푑
′′
푅(푋) + 푓1푑
′
푅(푋) + 푓0푑푅(푋) = 푔(푋). (A-86)
The general solution of this inhomogeneous ODE is given by
푑푅 (푋) = 퐵1푧1 +퐵2푧2 + 푧2
∫
푧1
푔
푓2
d푋
푊︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:퐼1(푋)
−푧1
∫
푧2
푔
푓2
d푋
푊︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:퐼2(푋)
, (A-87)
where 푊 = 푧1푧
′
2− 푧2푧′1 is the Wronskian determinant, and 퐵1 and 퐵2 are coeﬃcients (see e.g. Polyanin and
Zaitsev (2003), page 22, (7)). The ﬁrst two terms are a linear combination of the solutions of the homogenous
ODE, and the last two terms are a particular solution of the inhomogeneous ODE.
We start by calculating the Wronskian determinant
푊 = 푧1푧
′
2 − 푧2푧′1
= 훽푅2 푋
훽푅1 푋훽
푅
2 −1 − 훽푅1 푋훽
푅
1 −1푋훽
푅
2
=
(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
푋훽
푅
1 +훽
푅
2 −1. (A-88)
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The integral 퐼1 (푋) is, hence:
퐼1 (푋) =
∫
푧1
푔
푓2
d푋
푊
=
∫
푋훽
푅
1 푋−2
1
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
푋1−훽
푅
1 −훽푅2 푔(푋)d푋
=
1
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
∫
푥−1−훽
푅
2 푔(푋)d푋 (A-89)
=
1
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
∫
푥−1−훽
푅
2

− 2푐
휎˜2푅
− 2휆˜푅
휎˜2푅
푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
))
d푋
=
1
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
∫
푥−1−훽
푅
2
(
− 2푐
휎˜2푅
−2휆˜푅
휎˜2푅
{
퐴ˆ퐵1
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
)훾1
+ 퐴ˆ퐵2
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
)훾2
+
푐
푟
})
d푋
= − 2휆˜푅퐴ˆ퐵1(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
휎˜2푅
∫
푋−1−훽
푅
2
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
)훾1
d푋︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:퐼11(푋)
− 2휆˜푅퐴ˆ퐵2(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
휎˜2푅
∫
푋−1−훽
푅
2
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾
푦퐵
)훾2
d푋︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:퐼12(푋)
(A-90)
+
2푐
(
휆˜푅 + 푟
푛
푅
)
(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
푟푛푅훽
푅
2 휎˜
2
푅
푋−훽
푅
2 .
We use the deﬁnition of the function 푔 (푋), see (A-85), and the solution of the debt value of a ﬁrm with only
invested assets 푑ˆ푅 (⋅), see Appendix A.2, (A-17).
The integrals 퐼11(푋) and 퐼12(푋) can be evaluated immediately with standard computer algebra packages.
Alternatively, using the integral representation of Gauss’ hypergeometric function 2퐹1 (⋅, ⋅, ⋅; ⋅) , we can write
the closed-form solution of the integrals as
퐼11(푋) =
1
훾1 − 훽푅2
푠¯훾1푋훾1−훽
푅
2
2퐹1
(
−훾1, 훽푅2 − 훾1, 훽푅2 − 훾1 + 1;−
퐾
푠¯푋푦퐵
)
, (A-91)
퐼12(푋) =
1
훾2 − 훽푅2
푠¯훾2푋훾2−훽
푅
2
2퐹1
(
−훾2, 훽푅2 − 훾2, 훽푅2 − 훾2 + 1;−
퐾
푠¯푋푦퐵
)
. (A-92)
Plugging the solutions (A-91) and (A-92) back into the expression for the integral 퐼1, (A-90) yields
퐼1 (푋) = − 2휆˜푅퐴ˆ퐵1(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
휎˜2푅
1
훾1 − 훽푅2
푠¯훾1푋훾1−훽
푅
2
2퐹1
(
−훾1, 훽푅2 − 훾1, 훽푅2 − 훾1 + 1;−
퐾
푠¯푋푦퐵
)
− 2휆˜푅퐴ˆ퐵2(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
휎˜2푅
1
훾2 − 훽푅2
푠¯훾2푋훾2−훽
푅
2
2퐹1
(
−훾2, 훽푅2 − 훾2, 훽푅2 − 훾2 + 1;−
퐾
푠¯푋푦퐵
)
(A-93)
+
2푐
(
휆˜푅 + 푟
)
(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
푟훽푅2 휎˜
2
푅
푋−훽
푅
2 .
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Similarly, we ﬁnd for the second integral 퐼2(푋):
퐼2 (푋) = − 2휆˜푅퐴ˆ퐵1(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
휎˜2푅
1
훾1 − 훽푅1
푠¯훾1푋훾1−훽
푅
1
2퐹1
(
−훾1, 훽푅1 − 훾1, 훽푅2 − 훾1 + 1;−
퐾
푠¯푋푦퐵
)
− 2휆˜푅퐴ˆ퐵2(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
휎˜2푅
1
훾2 − 훽푅1
푠¯훾2푋훾2−훽
푅
1
2퐹1
(
−훾2, 훽푅1 − 훾2, 훽푅2 − 훾2 + 1;−
퐾
푠¯푋푦퐵
)
(A-94)
+
2푐
(
휆˜푅 + 푟
)
(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
)
푟훽푅1 휎˜
2
푅
푋−훽
푅
1 .
Plugging (A-93) and (A-94) into (A-87), we ﬁnally obtain the solution
푑푅 (푋) = 퐵1푋
훽푅1 +퐵2푋
훽푅2 + 푍(푋), (A-95)
with
푍(푋) =
2
훽1훽2휎˜2푅
푐
푟
(
휆˜푅 + 푟
)
+
∑
푖,푘=1,2
2(−1)푖+1푠¯훾푘퐴ˆ퐵푘
휎˜2푅
(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
) (
훾푘 − 훽푅푖
)푋훾푘2퐹1(−훾푘, 훽푅푖 , 훽푅푖 − 훾푘 + 1;− 퐾푠¯푋푦퐵
)
, (A-96)
for some parameters 퐵1 and 퐵2 determined by the boundary conditions.
In order to treat the boundary conditions, we also need the ﬁrst derivative of 푍:
푍 ′(푋) =
d
d푋
푍(푋)
=
d
d푋
(
푋훽
푅
2 퐼1 (푋)−푋훽푅2 퐼2 (푋)
)
= 훽푅2 푋
훽푅2 퐼1 (푋) +
1
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
푋훽
푅
2 푋−1−훽
푅
1 푔 (푋)
−훽푅1 푋훽
푅
1 퐼2 (푋)− 1
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
푋훽
푅
1 푋−1−훽
푅
1 푔 (푋)
= 훽푅2 푋
훽푅2 퐼1 (푋)− 훽푅1 푋훽
푅
1 퐼2 (푋)
=
∑
푖,푘=1,2
2(−1)푖+1푠¯훾푘퐴ˆ퐵푘훽푅푖
휎˜2푅
(
훽푅2 − 훽푅1
) (
훾푘 − 훽푅푖
)푋훾푘2퐹1(−훾푘, 훽푅푖 , 훽푅푖 − 훾푘 + 1;− 퐾푠¯푋푦퐵
)
. (A-97)
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To solve for the unknown parameters 퐴퐵1, 퐴퐵2, 퐴퐵3, 퐴퐵4, 퐶1, 퐶2, 퐵1 and 퐵2, we plug the functional form
(A-73) into the system of boundary conditions (A-72):
4∑
푘=1
퐴퐵푘퐷
훾푘
푅 +퐴5 = 퐶1퐷
훽퐵1
푅 + 퐶2퐷
훽퐵2
푅 + 퐶3푋 + 퐶4 + 퐶5푋
훾3 + 퐶6푋
훾4
4∑
푘=1
퐴퐵푘훾푘퐷
훾푘
푅 = 퐶1훽
퐵
1 퐷
훽퐵1
푅 + 퐶2훽
퐵
2 퐷
훽퐵2
푅 + 퐶3푋 + 퐶5훾3푋
훾3 + 퐶6훾4푋
훾4
훼퐵
(
퐷퐵푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (퐷퐵)
)
= 퐶1퐷
훽퐵1
퐵 + 퐶2퐷
훽퐵2
퐵 + 퐶3퐷퐵 + 퐶4 + 퐶5퐷
훾3
퐵 + 퐶6퐷
훾4
퐵
4∑
푘=1
푙푘퐴퐵푘퐷
훾푘
푅 +퐴5 = 훼푅
(
퐷푅푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (퐷푅)
)
4∑
푘=1
푙푘퐴퐵푘푋
훾푘
퐵 +퐴5 = 퐵1푋
훽푅1
퐵 +퐵2푋
훽푅2
퐵 + 푍(푋퐵) (A-98)
4∑
푘=1
푙푘퐴퐵푘훾푘푋
훾푘
퐵 = 퐵1훽
푅
1 푋
훽푅1
퐵 +퐵2훽
푅
2 푋
훽푅2
퐵 +푋퐵푍
′(푋퐵)
4∑
푘=1
퐴퐵푘푋
훾푘
퐵 +퐴5 = 푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋퐵 − 퐾
푦퐵
)
퐵1푋
훽푅1
푅 +퐵2푋
훽푅2
푅 + 푍(푋푅) = 푑ˆ푅
(
푠¯푋푅 − 퐾
푦푅
)
.
Using matrix notation, we can write
푀 :=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
퐷훾1푅 퐷
훾2
푅 퐷
훾3
푅 퐷
훾4
푅 −퐷훽
퐵
1
푅 −퐷훽
퐵
2
푅 0 0
훾1퐷
훾1
푅 훾2퐷
훾2
푅 훾3퐷
훾3
푅 훾4퐷
훾4
푅 −훽퐵1 퐷훽
퐵
1
푅 −훽퐵2 퐷훽
퐵
2
푅 0 0
0 0 0 0 퐷
훽퐵1
퐵 퐷
훽퐵2
퐵 0 0
푙1퐷
훾1
푅 푙2퐷
훾2
푅 푙3퐷
훾3
푅 푙4퐷
훾4
푅 0 0 0 0
푙1푋
훾1
퐵 푙2푋
훾2
퐵 푙3푋
훾3
퐵 푙4푋
훾4
퐵 0 0 −푋훽
푅
1
퐵 −푋훽
푅
2
퐵
푙1훾1푋
훾1
퐵 푙2훾2푋
훾2
퐵 푙3훾3푋
훾3
퐵 푙4훾4푋
훾4
퐵 0 0 −훽푅1 푋훽
푅
1
퐵 −훽푅2 푋훽
푅
2
퐵
푋훾1퐵 푋
훾2
퐵 푋
훾3
퐵 푋
훾4
퐵 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 푋
훽푅1
푅 푋
훽푅2
푅
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
푏 :=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−퐴퐵5 + 퐶3퐷푅 + 퐶4 + 퐶5퐷훾1푅 + 퐶6퐷훾2푅
퐶3퐷푅 + 훾1퐶5퐷
훾1
푅 + 퐶6훾2퐷
훾2
푅
−퐶3퐷퐵 − 퐶4 − 퐶5퐷훾3퐵 − 퐶6퐷훾4퐵 + 훼퐵
(
퐷퐵푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (퐷퐵)
)
−퐴푅5 + 훼푅
(
퐷푅푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (퐷푅)
)
−퐴푅5 + 푍 (푋퐵)
푋퐵푍
′ (푋퐵)
−퐴퐵5 + 푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋퐵 − 퐾푦퐵
)
−푍 (푋푅) + 푑ˆ푅
(
푠¯푋푅 − 퐾푦푅
)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Thus, the solution to the remaining unknowns is given by[
퐴퐵1 퐴퐵2 퐴퐵3 퐴퐵4 퐶1 퐶2 퐵1 퐵2
]푇
=푀−1푏. (A-99)
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Case 2: Only 1 regime. Denote the default boundary by 퐷1, and recall that 푋1 is the ﬁrm’s investment
boundary, while 퐷ˆ1 denotes the default boundary of a ﬁrm with only invested assets. Postulating that in
the continuation region the required return must be equal to the expected realized return plus the proceeds
from debt, we ﬁnd that the system to solve is:
푑 (푋) = 훼
(
푦푋 +퐺푢푛푙푒푣 (푋)
)
푋 ≤ 퐷1
푟푑 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푋푑′(푋) + 휎˜
2
2 푋
2푑′′(푋) 퐷1 < 푋 < 푋1
푑 (푋) = 푑ˆ
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦
)
푋 ≥ 푋1.
(A-100)
The ﬁrst and second equations are analogous to the two regime case. In the third equation, we postulate
that above the exercise boundary 푋 the debt value of the ﬁrm must be equal to the one of a ﬁrm with
only invested assets. As in the two regime case, the conversion of the growth option into assets in place is
arranged such that the total value of the ﬁrm’s assets remains unchanged at the exercise of the option. The
boundary conditions are the value-matching conditions at default and exercise:
lim
푋↘퐷1
푑 (푋) = 훼
(
푦퐷1 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣 (퐷1)
)
(A-101)
lim
푋↗푋1
푑 (푋) = 푑ˆ
(
푠¯푋1 − 퐾
푦
)
. (A-102)
Note that for 푋 > 푋1 the value of debt is equal to the one of a ﬁrm with only invested assets. As the latter
is calculated using a no-bubbles condition, we do not have to postulate this condition for the function 푑(푋)
again.
The functional form of the solution is
푑(푋) =
⎧⎨⎩
훼
(
푦푋 +퐺푢푛푙푒푣 (푋)
)
푋 ≤ 퐷1
퐵3푋
훽1 +퐵4푋
훽2 +퐴5 퐷1 < 푋 < 푋1
푑ˆ
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦
)
푋 ≥ 푋1,
(A-103)
where 퐵3, 퐵4, 퐴5, 훽1, and 훽2 are real-valued parameters to be determined (or to be conﬁrmed). The only
region left to solve for is 퐷1 < 푋 < 푋1. By plugging the functional form (A-103) into the diﬀerential
equation (A-100) and comparing coeﬃcients, we ﬁnd that
훽1,2 =
1
2
− 휇˜
휎˜2
−
√(
1
2
− 휇˜
휎˜2
)2
+
2푟
휎˜2
(A-104)
퐴5 =
푐
푟
. (A-105)
Finally, 퐵3 and 퐵4 are determined by the two-dimensional linear system deﬁned by the above boundary
conditions:
퐵3퐷
훽1
1 +퐵4퐷
훽2
1 +
푐
푟
= 훼
(
푦퐷1 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣 (퐷1)
)
(A-106)
퐵3푋
훽1
1 +퐵4푋
훽2
1 +
푐
푟
= 푑ˆ
(
푠¯푋1 − 퐾
푦
)
. (A-107)
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Using matrix notation, and
푀1 :=
[
퐷훽11 퐷
훽2
1
푋훽11 푋
훽2
1
]
,
푏1 :=
[
훼
(
푦퐷1 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣 (퐷1)
)− 푐푟
푑ˆ
(
푠¯푋1 − 퐾푦
)
− 푐푟
]
,
we ﬁnd that[
퐵3 퐵4
]푇
= 푀−11 푏1 (A-108)
=
1
퐷훽11 푋
훽2
1 −퐷훽21 푋훽11
[
푋훽21 −퐷훽21
−푋훽11 퐷훽11
][
훼
(
푦퐷1 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣 (퐷1)
)− 푐푟
푑ˆ
(
푠¯푋1 − 퐾푦
)
− 푐푟
]
, (A-109)
which completes the calculation of the solution.
A.4.2. The valuation of tax beneﬁts
For Case 1, see the main text. Analogously, the value of tax beneﬁts 푡(푋) in Case 2 can be calculated as
the value of debt with a recovery rate of zero and a coupon equal to 푐휏.
A.4.3. The valuation of default costs
Case 1 can be found in the main text. Analogously, the value of default costs 푏(푋) in Case 2 corresponds to
the value of debt with a recovery rate of 1− 훼 and a coupon of zero.
A.4.4. Firm value
The main text states the ﬁrm value in Case 1. Analogously, for Case 2, the ﬁrm value 푓(푋) is
푓(푋) = 푋푦 +퐺(푋) + 푡(푋)− 푏(푋). (A-110)
A.4.5. The valuation of equity
Case 1 is given in the main text. For Case 2, the value of equity 푒(푋) is given by
푒(푋) = 푓(푋)− 푑(푋) = 푋푦 +퐺(푋) + 푡(푋)− 푏(푋)− 푑(푋). (A-111)
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A.4.6. Default policy
Following similar arguments as in Case 1 (main text), the optimal default and investment policies in Case
2, 퐷∗ and 푋∗, are determined by the conditions{
푒′ (퐷∗) = 0
푒′ (푋∗) = 푒ˆ′
(
푠푋∗ − 퐾푦
) (A-112)
A.4.7. Capital structure
Analogously to Case 1 in the main text, denote, for Case 2, by 푓∗(푋) the ﬁrm value given ex-post optimal
default and expansion thresholds as determined by the system (A-112). The optimal coupon of this ﬁrm
then solves
푐∗ := argmax푐푓
∗(푋). (A-113)
A.5. The Value of Finite Maturity Debt
We only present the case of the presence of two regimes. The setup and solution for the case of one regime
can be derived analogously.
A.5.1. Firms with invested assets only
Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) present the solution of a similar model for ﬁrms with only invested
assets. We consider the standard case that the default boundary in boom is lower than the one in recession,
i.e., 퐷ˆ퐵 < 퐷ˆ푅. Given debt characteristics (푐,푚, 푝), the ODE for the value of debt writes:
For 0 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ퐵 : {
푑ˆ퐵(푋) = 훼퐵푋푦퐵
푑ˆ푅(푋) = 훼푅푋푦푅.
(A-114)
For 퐷ˆ퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷ˆ푅 :{
(푟푛퐵 +푚) 푑ˆ퐵(푋) = 푐+푚푝+ 휇˜퐵푋푑ˆ
′
퐵(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑ˆ′′퐵(푋) + 휆˜퐵
(
훼푅푋푦푅 − 푑ˆ퐵(푋)
)
푑ˆ푅(푋) = 훼푅푋푦푅.
(A-115)
For 푋 > 퐷ˆ푅 :⎧⎨⎩ (푟
푛
퐵 +푚) 푑ˆ퐵(푋) = 푐+푚푝+ 휇˜퐵푋푑ˆ
′
퐵(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑ˆ′′퐵(푋) + 휆˜퐵
(
푑ˆ푅(푋)− 푑ˆ퐵(푋)
)
(푟푛푅 +푚) 푑ˆ푅(푋) = 푐+푚푝+ 휇˜푅푋푑ˆ
′
푅(푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑ˆ′′푅(푋) + 휆˜푅
(
푑ˆ퐵(푋)− 푑ˆ푅(푋)
)
.
(A-116)
The boundary conditions are the same as in the inﬁnite maturity case, see (A-21)-(A-25). The solution can
be found analogously.
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Note that for ﬁnite maturities, the value of the risk free bond with a given coupon can be calculated as
푅퐹 =
(푐+푚푝)
(
푟푛푗 +푚+ 휆˜푖 + 휆˜푗
)
(푟푛푖 +푚)
(
푟푛푗 +푚
)
+
(
푟푛푗 +푚
)
휆˜푖 + (푟푛푖 +푚) 휆˜푗
. (A-117)
A.5.2. Firms with invested assets and expansion options
In our framework, debt characteristics (푐,푚, 푝) are chosen at initiation and are then constant over time.
This setting allows us to calculate the solution for ﬁrms with both invested assets and growth options in
closed-form, even for ﬁnite maturity debt. The standard case with 퐷퐵 < 퐷푅, 퐷ˆ퐵 < 퐷ˆ푅, and 푋푅 > 푋퐵 is
presented. For given debt characteristics (푐,푚, 푝) , the value of ﬁnite maturity corporate debt satisﬁes the
following ODE:
For 0 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷퐵 : {
푑퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵
(
푋푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (푋)
)
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
) (A-118)
For 퐷퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷푅 :⎧⎨⎩
(푟푛퐵 +푚) 푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+푚푝+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋)
+휆˜퐵
(
훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
)− 푑퐵 (푋))
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
) (A-119)
For 퐷푅 < 푋 < 푋퐵 :{
(푟푛퐵 +푚) 푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+푚푝+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋) + 휆˜퐵 (푑푅 (푋)− 푑퐵 (푋))
(푟푛푅 +푚) 푑푅 (푋) = 푐+푚푝+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋) + 휆˜푅 (푑퐵 (푋)− 푑푅 (푋))
(A-120)
For 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅 :⎧⎨⎩
푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
(푟푛푅 +푚) 푑푅 (푋) = 푐+푚푝+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋)
+휆˜푅
(
푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
− 푑푅 (푋)
) (A-121)
For 푋 ≥ 푋푅 : ⎧⎨⎩ 푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦퐵
)
푑푅 (푋) = 푑ˆ푅
(
푠¯푋 − 퐾푦푅
)
.
(A-122)
Here, 푑ˆ푖 (⋅) denotes the value of debt with the same principal, coupon, and debt maturity of a ﬁrm with
only invested assets, see Appendix A.5.1. The boundary conditions are the same as in the case of inﬁnite
maturity debt, see (A-72)-(A-99).
The solution can be derived analogously to the case of inﬁnite maturity debt. Technically, for given debt
characteristics (푐,푚, 푝) , the value of ﬁnite maturity debt corresponds to the value of inﬁnite maturity debt
with a coupon 푐+푚푝 and nominal interest rates of 푟푛푖 +푚.
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The assumption that debt is issued at par requires that
푝 = 푑푖(푋), (A-123)
where 푖 denotes the regime at initiation. This equation is solved numerically.
A.6. Details on the simulations
A.6.1. Calibration of the idiosyncratic volatility
We calibrate the ﬁrm-level idiosyncratic volatility of our BBB sample to the empirically observed total asset
volatility of 0.25. The procedure starts by simulating a model-implied economy for 10 years (pre-matching
simulation). Next, we match the model-implied distribution after 10 years with the empirical cross-section
of BBB-rated ﬁrms, and ﬁnally simulate the obtained matched sample for another 10 years (post-matching
simulation). The average asset volatility of the post-matching simulation is then calculated. The details of
this procedure are as follows.
We consider inﬁnite maturity debt in the pre-matching simulation for all debt maturities in the post-
matching simulation. We do so to abstract away from the impact of diﬀerent initial principals on the results,
allowing us to analyze the pure eﬀect of debt maturities on credit spreads in the post-matching simulation.
Additionally, starting with inﬁnite maturity debt yields initial leverage ratios (principals) close to the ones
empirically reported.32 The model-implied economy is generated as follows. Starting with a value ﬁrm
(푠 = 0), we generate a range of ﬁrms by increasing the option scale parameter 푠 by steps of 0.05, up to
the largest possible value of 푠 such that the option is not exercised immediately. At initiation, the capital
structure is chosen optimally for all ﬁrms. For each option scale parameter 푠, 50 ﬁrms are considered,
resulting in an initial sample of more than 3,000 ﬁrms. During the 10-year pre-matching simulation, ﬁrms
default and expand optimally. Defaulted ﬁrms are not replaced, and exercised ﬁrms continue as ﬁrms with
only invested assets. At the end of the pre-matching simulation, we calculate the model-implied leverage
and asset composition ratio for each ﬁrm, using the assumed debt maturity and the corresponding optimal
boundaries. We obtain a model-implied distribution of ﬁrms covering a broad range of both asset composition
ratios and leverage ratios.
In the second step, we match our average historical distribution of BBB-rated ﬁrms with its model-
implied counterpart. For each observation in the average historical distribution, we select the ﬁrm in our
model-implied economy at the ﬁnal period of the pre-matching simulation which exhibits the minimum
distance regarding the percentage deviation from the target market leverage and asset composition ratio.
That is, the empirical observation of a ﬁrm with leverage 푙푒푣푒푚푝 and asset composition ratio 푎푐푟푒푚푝 is
matched with the model-implied ﬁrm with leverage 푙푒푣푚푖 and asset composition ratio 푎푐푟푚푖 if - given the
set of all model-implied ﬁrms - it minimizes the Euclidean distance√(
푙푒푣푒푚푝 − 푙푒푣푚푖
푙푒푣푒푚푝
)2
+
(
푎푐푟푒푚푝 − 푎푐푟푚푖
푎푐푟푒푚푝
)2
. (A-124)
32A robustness analysis conﬁrms that starting with ﬁnite maturity debt in the pre-matching simulation yields
slightly lower credit spreads in the post-matching simulation, as the initial principals are smaller.
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The ﬁnal step conducts a post-matching simulation with the obtained sample of model implied BBB-ﬁrms
over 10 years. For each simulation, we obtain the realized asset volatility for each ﬁrm, and calculate the
resulting average asset volatility over ﬁrms. When measuring and averaging asset volatilities, we incorporate
the entire initially matched BBB-sample, including the evolution of the assets of ﬁrms which default during
the 10-year post-matching simulation. This approach avoids a weighting bias when averaging over simulations
towards ﬁrms with lower leverage and asset volatility which have a smaller tendency to default during the
post-matching simulation.
The pre-matching simulation and the subsequent matching is conducted 20 times. The initial regime
is chosen according to the stationary distribution of the states, i.e., the pre-matching simulation starts in
boom 100 휆푅휆퐵+휆푅% of the total number of simulations. This approach also guarantees convergence to the
steady-state distribution of regimes at the time of matching. For each matched sample of ﬁrms, the post-
matching simulation is run 50 times. These numbers result in a total of 1,000 simulations. The procedure is
conducted for diﬀerent post-matching debt maturities.
A.6.2. Simulation of the true cross-section
To ensure consistency, the simulation of the true cross-section is done analogously to the one performed to
calibrate the idiosyncratic volatility: We ﬁrst simulate a model-implied distribution of ﬁrms for 10 years (pre-
matching simulation), and then match the model-implied distribution with the average empirical cross-section
(for details, see above). The ﬁnal step consists of simulating the matched sample for 20 years (post-matching
simulation). We assume that ﬁrms default and exercise optimally. Defaulted ﬁrms are immediately deleted,
whereas exercised ﬁrms are maintained in the sample, and continue as ﬁrms with only invested assets. Credit
spreads and leverage ratios are measured during 5 years after the matching: For each ﬁrm in the sample,
we calculate the actual credit spread and leverage every month, and then report the average over all ﬁrms
and all simulations. Default rates are observed for 5, 10, and 20 years. In order to incorporate the impact
of the realized regimes at initiation and at the time of matching, we present quantiles of post-matching
average rates. As in the calibration of the volatility, the initial state is chosen according to the stationary
distribution. The pre-matching simulation is run 20 times, and the post-matching simulation is conducted
50 times, resulting in a total of 1,000 simulations.
A.7. Robustness tests
A.7.1. Financing the exercise of the growth option by issuing additional equity
We consider the case that the exercise price 휆 of the growth option is ﬁnanced by issuing additional equity.
The corresponding system of ODEs for corporate debt is:
For 0 ≤ 푋 ≤ 퐷퐵 : {
푑퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵
(
푋푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (푋)
)
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
) (A-125)
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For 퐷퐵 < 푋 ≤ 퐷푅 :{
푟푛퐵푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋) + 휆˜퐵
(
훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
)− 푑퐵 (푋))
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
푋푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (푋)
) (A-126)
For 퐷푅 < 푋 < 푋퐵 :{
푟푛퐵푑퐵 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜퐵푋푑
′
퐵 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
퐵푋
2푑′′퐵 (푋) + 휆˜퐵 (푑푅 (푋)− 푑퐵 (푋))
푟푛푅푑푅 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋) + 휆˜푅 (푑퐵 (푋)− 푑푅 (푋))
(A-127)
For 푋퐵 ≤ 푋 < 푋푅 :{
푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵 (푠¯푋)
푟푛푅푑푅 (푋) = 푐+ 휇˜푅푋푑
′
푅 (푋) +
1
2 휎˜
2
푅푋
2푑′′푅 (푋) + 휆˜푅
(
푑ˆ퐵 (푠¯푋)− 푑푅 (푋)
) (A-128)
For 푋 ≥ 푋푅 : {
푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵 (푠¯푋)
푑푅 (푋) = 푑ˆ푅 (푠¯푋) .
(A-129)
The boundary conditions now read:
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑퐵 (푋) = lim
푋↗퐷푅
푑퐵 (푋)
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑′퐵 (푋) = lim
푋↗퐷푅
푑′퐵 (푋)
lim
푋↘퐷퐵
푑퐵 (푋) = 훼퐵
(
퐷퐵푦퐵 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
퐵 (퐷퐵)
)
lim
푋↘퐷푅
푑푅 (푋) = 훼푅
(
퐷푅푦푅 +퐺
푢푛푙푒푣
푅 (퐷푅)
)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
푑푅 (푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑푅 (푋) (A-130)
lim
푋↘푋퐵
푑′푅 (푋) = lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑′푅 (푋)
lim
푋↗푋퐵
푑퐵 (푋) = 푑ˆ퐵 (푠¯푋퐵)
lim
푋↗푋푅
푑푅 (푋푅) = 푑ˆ푅 (푠¯푋푅) .
The solution to this system follows by standard arguments from the theory of diﬀerential equations. Tech-
nically, this modiﬁcation constitutes a simpliﬁcation of the presented main case: The functional form is
straightforward and does not need to be determined as the solution of an inhomogeneous ODE using the
fundamental system of solutions of the homogenous ODE (cf. footnote 31). Therefore, we do not present
the solution here.
132
The Impact of Managerial Control over Cash on Credit Risk and
Financial Policy
Marc Arnold∗
October 14, 2011
Abstract
This article analyzes the impact of managerial control over cash holdings on credit risk and
corporate ﬁnancial policy. I identify two channels which drive the total eﬀect of cash on credit
risk. First, the fact that a manager can use cash to service debt when equityholders are unwilling
to inject funds into the ﬁrm reduces credit risk. Second, as equityholders anticipate that ceasing
to inject funds does not lead to immediate default, they optimally stop contributing funds earlier
in ﬁrms with larger cash holdings. The second channel increases credit risk. Because a manager
holds excess cash to reduce the probability of corporate default, the relative strength of the two
opposing channels can explain the relationship between observed excess cash levels and ﬁrm
or industry characteristics. The paper also discusses the impact of the market for corporate
control, the agency costs of cash, and the under-leverage puzzle.
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1. Introduction
The empirical corporate ﬁnance literature ﬁnds that ﬁrms accumulate excess cash if they have the
opportunity to do so. According to Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003), and Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (2003), for example, managers are more likely to build excess cash balances
when they are entrenched, or when shareholder rights are low. There also is anecdotal evidence
that managers target cash in excess of the level desired by equityholders. When Kirk Kerkorian
attempted a takeover of Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler’s management insisted on keeping large
cash reserves because it considered drawing funds from alternative sources during a ﬁnancial crisis
unrealistic (Yun 2009). Similarly, Froot (1992) describes the case where Intel’s executives defended
their massive cash balance by saying that it was an important competitive weapon, especially during
recession. Given the tremendous amount of cash in ﬁrms’ balance sheets reported in Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz (2009), and the observation in Faulkender and Petersen (2006), and Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (2006) that the marginal value of cash to equityholders is considerably below one,
it seems important to understand the sources and consequences of excess cash.
Managers state that, for them, cash most importantly serves a self-preservation motive, i.e., a
basic ﬁnancial insurance function to provide a buﬀer against corporate bankruptcy in future hard
times (Lins, Servaes, and Tufano 2009). The present paper shows that this motive can explain
observed excess cash levels. It also allows to link excess cash to ﬁrm and industry characteristics.
Additionally, I analyze the impact of excess cash on credit risk and on the corporate ﬁnancial policy.
I extend the basic trade-oﬀ model of capital structure in the spirit of Leland (1994) by incor-
porating both a corporate cash policy and agency conﬂicts between managers and shareholders.
Shareholders agree to leave cash within the ﬁrm because of future proﬁtable investment opportu-
nities which can only be captured by investing quickly out of cash. This is the standard precau-
tionary motive (Huberman 1984, Kahan and Yermack 1998, Mikkelson and Partch 2003). Due to
their control over cash resources, however, managers have an additional motive for holding cash:
Cash reduces a ﬁrm’s default risk by providing a buﬀer against bankruptcy during times where
equity ﬁnancing is not available. It is shown that due to this self-preservation motive, managers
target a cash level in excess of the one which maximizes equityholders’ wealth when they trade oﬀ
the impact of cash on the value of their ﬁxed income stream against the impact on their equity
compensation. They can target excess cash because of costs to replace the management.
To explain to what extent excess cash is driven by managers’ self-preservation motive, one ﬁrst
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needs to understand how cash aﬀects the default risk of ﬁrms. I identify two channels. First, as
managers control cash, they can use it to defer default when equityholders are unwilling to inject
funds during economic distress. Postponement of default is possible by servicing debt out of cash
holdings until cash is exhausted. Using cash to defer default is beneﬁcial for managers because
it allows them to obtain the ﬁxed salary, and their personal utility from investing cash over an
extended period of time. This result reﬂects the common intuition about how cash reduces credit
risk.
Second, I show that there also is an indirect eﬀect of cash on credit risk. In standard capital
structure models without cash, it is optimal for equityholders to inject funds until the asset value
reaches a certain trigger. As equityholders are protected on the downside due to limited liability,
but still participate on the upside if the asset value recovers, the trigger is below the nominal value
of debt. Hence, the option feature of equity induces access to equity funds even if the ﬁrm is
insolvent on a ﬂow basis. In a ﬁrm with cash holdings, equityholders anticipate that ceasing to
inject funds will not lead to immediate default. In case of insolvency on a ﬂow basis, they can
stop injecting funds without losing their option claim on the ﬁrm’s assets because debt will still be
serviced out of cash holdings. The possibility to save coupon payments before a potential default
induces equityholders to stop contributing funds earlier than in a ﬁrm without cash. Hence, cash
makes it harder for ﬁrms to obtain equity funds during bad times. This important indirect eﬀect
of cash increases credit risk. It has, so far, been neglected in the theoretical literature.
I then quantitatively investigate the relative strength of the direct and indirect eﬀects of cash
holdings on credit risk. I ﬁnd that excess cash due to managers’ self-preservation motive can be
substantial. In the baseline ﬁrm, managers’ target cash level is about 20% above the one which
maximizes shareholder wealth. Depending on ﬁrm and industry characteristics, excess cash can
reach 182% of the level that shareholders would deem optimal. The agency costs of this distortion
are important, implying up to a 9.7% wealth loss to equityholders for realistic parameters. The
bias towards excess cash is restricted by the equityholders’ willingness to contribute the idle cash,
and by the market for corporate control.
I also employ a dynamic approach in the spirit of Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) by
simulating over time a model-implied cross-section of ﬁrms which is structurally similar to S&P
500 ﬁrms. Importantly, it is shown that the self-preservation motive induces an amount of excess
cash which generates realistic cash-properties in an economy. In particular, I ﬁnd that the average
market value of cash to ﬁrms, and the marginal value of cash to equityholders in a simulated
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economy correspond closely to their empirical counterparts reported in Pinkowitz and Williamson
(2002) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006), respectively.
The presented model derives new predictions, and also talks to recent empirical ﬁndings. First,
I show that when incorporating managerial control over cash, managers use cash to service debt
instead of investment during economic distress. Hence, close to default, cash does not generate value
to equityholders but mainly accrues to debtholders. Equityholders should, therefore, optimally
leave less cash within riskier ﬁrms. Empirically, however, riskier ﬁrms hold larger amounts of cash
(Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan 2007, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009). I show that the self-
preservation motive can explain this relationship: Managers of risky ﬁrms optimally target larger
excess cash than those of safe ﬁrms because the direct eﬀect of cash on credit risk is positively
related to the asset volatility.
Second, a number of recent papers point to a hedging motive behind corporate cash holdings, as
cash may allow ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms to hedge future investment against income shortfalls
(Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 2007, Faulkender and Petersen 2006, Acharya, Bharath, and
Srinivasan 2007, Denis and Sibilkov 2010). I argue that when agency conﬂicts are incorporated,
cash is not a suitable hedging tool to ensure investment in future bad states: Managers will use
these funds to service debt payments instead of investing when equityholders stop contributing
funds.
Finally, managerial control over cash also aﬀects the choice of optimal leverage. Besides pro-
viding a tax shield and imposing bankruptcy costs, debt also causes underinvestment costs because
cash is used to service debt instead of being invested during economic distress. These costs induce
lower optimal leverage than in the standard trade-oﬀ theory of capital structure.
1.1. Related literature
Understanding what triggers default is a central issue in the literature on capital structure and
credit risk. Models of economic distress assume that ﬁrms default when the market value of assets
falls below a certain boundary (Leland 1994, Longstaﬀ and Schwartz 1995). Should a temporary
cash shortfall lead to a liquidity crisis, shareholders will meet the required debt payments by raising
outside ﬁnancing. Cash holdings are, therefore, irrelevant under this approach. In contrast, ﬁnancial
distress models postulate that default occurs when cash shortages result in the inability of ﬁrms to
make promised debt payments (Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein 1994). Due to market frictions,
a distressed ﬁrm may be unable to raise necessary external ﬁnancing, despite the fundamentally
136
sound nature of its business.
It is surprising that even though holdings of cash are extensively used in empirical bankruptcy-
predicting models (Altman 1968, Zmijewski 1984), no theoretical paper exists that rigorously in-
vestigates the interaction between economic and ﬁnancial distress. My work combines the two
approaches by incorporating cash in the standard economic distress model of Leland (1994). In
particular, it is shown that if ﬁrms have both access to outside ﬁnancing and cash, they default
when the asset value remains below the threshold where equityholders optimally stop contributing
funds, until cash is exhausted. This setting reﬂects the empirical ﬁnding in Davydenko (2007) that
a transitory cash shortage can trigger default only to the extent that a ﬁrm is restricted from rais-
ing new ﬁnancing against its remaining assets. The authors show that persistent economic distress
causes ﬁnancial distress, when money-losing ﬁrms run out of the liquid funds necessary to pay their
creditors and suppliers. While this basic point is already recognized in the empirical literature, the
implications from a realistic default triggering of ﬁrms with cash for credit risk and ﬁnancial policy
have not been fully developed. My model also aims at ﬁlling this gap.
The presented model is closely related to the growing literature on the role of cash holdings
within structural models. Gamba and Triantis (2008) explain how debt ﬂotation costs lead to
simultaneous cash and debt holdings. Morellec and Nikolov (2009) ﬁnd that the secular increase
in cash holdings in the US can partially be explained by the intensity of industry competition,
and Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2010) show how capital market supply frictions aﬀect
corporate behavior. While these papers abstract away from both agency issues and credit risk,
there exist two closely related studies on cash holdings which also incorporate agency. Nikolov and
Whited (2009) estimate a dynamic model of ﬁrm investment and cash accumulation in the presence
of shareholder-manager conﬂicts. The authors argue that when management derives a psychological
ﬂow beneﬁt per unit of installed capital, managers like to build empires, hold suboptimal levels
of internal liquidity, and use too much costly external ﬁnancing. While I also consider private
utility from investment, my work incorporates credit risk which induces managers to target excess
cash to protect their ﬁxed compensation and future investment against bankruptcy. In the model
of Mahmudi and Pavlin (2010), the objective function of the manager is extended to capture a
perceived cost to payout reductions. Higher cash today decreases the probability of having to cut
dividends tomorrow, and, consequently, lowers managers’ expected disutility. My model is similar
to theirs with respect to the idea that managers’ personal motive for saving cash can be important
for ﬁrm policy. Instead of perceived costs of payout reductions, however, the reason for excess cash
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in my model is the self-preservation motive induced by credit risk. In short, the main diﬀerence of
this paper to the existing theoretical work is that I simultaneously capture corporate cash, risky
debt, and agency issues in an integrated framework.
My work also contributes to the discussion in the empirical literature on the relation between
cash holdings and agency problems by showing that self-preservation is an important motive behind
excess cash. It is widely accepted that ﬁrms hold dramatically more cash than one would expect
from the static tradeoﬀ theory where managers maximize shareholders’ wealth (Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson 1999). Additionally, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003), Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (2006), Kalcheva and Lins (2007), and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008)
show that the market value of cash reserves is lower when ﬁrms are poorly governed, and when
there is weak shareholder protection. While they argue that cash hoarding by managers is value-
reducing, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) ﬁnd that a policy of high cash holdings may in fact be
value-enhancing. All these studies, however, focus primarily on the eﬀects rather than on the
motive behind excess cash. An exception is the work of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) who show
that riskier cash ﬂows, particularly concentrated among smaller high tech ﬁrms, have caused the
dramatic growth of excess cash in recent years.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
and 4 discuss the results and empirical implications. Model extensions are presented in Section 5
before I conclude in Section 6.
2. The model
The model setup is a standard continuous time model of capital structure decisions in the spirit
of Leland (1994), extended to account for cash holdings. All agents including managers are risk-
neutral and discount at a constant interest rate 푟. Assets are continuously traded in arbitrage-free
markets. Time is continuous, and uncertainty is modeled by a complete ﬁltered probability space
(Ω,ℱ , (ℱ푡){푡≥0} ,ℚ). The ﬁrm issues perpetual debt with contractual coupon payments 푐. The
motive for issuing debt is the tax shield provided by debt ﬁnancing. Corporate taxes are paid at
a rate 휏 , and full oﬀsets of corporate losses are allowed. The value of the ﬁrm’s invested assets
(푉푡)푡≥0 is assumed to be independent of capital structure choices and the cash policy. Under the
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risk-neutral measure ℚ, it is governed by the following process:
푑푉푡 = (푟 − 훿)푉푡푑푡+ 휎푉푡푑푊푡 (1)
In Equation (1), 훿 is the ﬁrm’s payout ratio from invested assets, 휎 denotes the constant volatility
of asset returns, and (푊푡)푡 ≥ 0 is a standard Brownian motion. The model abstracts away from
any transaction costs such as equity issuance costs.
Besides invested assets, a ﬁrm also holds cash 퐿 if it is worthwhile for equityholders to do so.
As in Holmstroem and Tirole (2000), cash is deﬁned as holdings which the ﬁrm can quickly resell
or pledge as collateral at its face value. Managers raise additional equity in order to obtain the
cash when initiating the ﬁrm. Following Keynes (1936), numerous empirical studies suggest that
the precautionary motive is a critical determinant of corporate cash holdings (Harford, Mikkelson,
and Partch 2003, Mikkelson and Partch 2003, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004, Faulkender
and Petersen 2006, Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007).1 To capture this motive, I assume
that ﬁrms expect to have access to proﬁtable investment opportunities in the future which can
only be captured with cash that is readily available, and are not feasible with outside ﬁnancing.
The literature describes several reasons for this friction.2 The investment opportunities occur
periodically according to a Poisson process with intensity 푦. Each investment produces a proﬁt
equal to 푅(퐿) = 퐴퐿훾 , with 퐴 > 0, and 0 < 훾 < 1. For tractability, it is assumed that these proﬁts
accrue instantaneously, and that managers invest the entire amount 퐿.3 The proﬁt function 푅 has
1 The basic idea and the derived insights on excess cash also apply to alternative motives of corporations to hold
cash. The only necessary assumption is that cash holdings cause beneﬁts which occur continuously or periodically,
such as reductions in competition or transaction costs (Miller and Orr 1966, Baskin 1987, Froot 1992, Morellec,
Nikolov, and Schu¨rhoﬀ 2009), or beneﬁts described in the real options literature. The latter argues that cash allows
managers to ﬂexibly and rapidly adapt to altered future conditions which can expand a project’s or investment
opportunity’s value (Trigeorgis 1993, Yeo and Fasheng 2003).
2 Borrowing or issuing stock entails direct and indirect costs such as the eﬀects of conﬂicts between bondholders
and stockholders described in Myers (1977) or Jensen (1986), and the eﬀects of information problems with outside
investors identiﬁed by Myers and Majluf (1984). With cash, ﬁrms avoid forgoing proﬁtable investment oppor-
tunities when it becomes too costly to raise external money for certain projects (Huberman 1984, Lins, Servaes,
and Tufano 2009). Similarly, an attempt to convince the market of a project can take time and entails the dis-
semination of information, which may deteriorate the project’s value, because public information can be used by
competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983).
3 In case of a time lag between investment and the proﬁt, one needs to specify what happens when economic
distress occurs during the lag. If managers can pledge or sell the investment, the predictions of my model remain
unchanged. Assuming investment of the entire amount is natural in the current setup: Only the precautionary
motive induces equityholders to leave any idle cash within the ﬁrm. As 푅(퐿) is constant, managers have no
justiﬁcation for keeping unused cash within the ﬁrm.
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standard properties, i.e., it is increasing, concave, and continuously diﬀerentiable.4 The net payout
to equityholders from the entire cash 퐿 being invested upon the occurrence of an opportunity is
equal to 푅(퐿) − 퐿. 퐿 is deducted because the initial cash level is maintained. Hence, the total
payout of 퐿 units of cash periodically invested up to time 푡 can be expressed as a compound Poisson
process, i.e., as
퐼푡 =
푁푡∑
푖=1
(푅푡푖(퐿)− 퐿), (2)
where 푁푡 is a pure Poisson process with intensity 푦, and 푅푡푖(퐿) represent the periodical proﬁts
from the cash amount 퐿 invested at time 푡푖. The intensity is ﬁrst modeled to be independent of 푉 .
Later, I consider the case where it is stochastic, and correlated with 푉 .
While the ability to capture investment opportunities is beneﬁcial for ﬁrms, holding cash is
also costly. In particular, the continuous yield 푙 from cash holdings is assumed to be smaller than
the interest rate 푟, expressing the notion that cash remains invested in very liquid assets which
typically yield a low return. The relation 푙 < 푟 may also capture the tax disadvantage of cash
holdings (Graham 2000, Riddick and Whited 2009).
Even though a ﬁrm may operate forever, shareholders have limited liability and, thus, the option
to default on their obligations. In the framework of Leland (1994) and Duﬃe and Lando (2001),
bankruptcy is triggered when they cease injecting funds into the ﬁrm. Shareholders will optimally
do so when the economic net worth of equity is zero. This stock-based deﬁnition of default implies
that the ﬁrm is insolvent on a ﬂow basis at the default date. Managers can not operate the ﬁrm’s
assets beyond the default date which maximizes equity value because they are unable to meet
current debt obligations after this date. Hence, shareholders have control rights over the decision
to default. This existing framework neglects the impact of cash holdings on the default policy.
Cash introduces an important source of manager ﬂexibility: Managers’ control over cash holdings,
or “deep pockets”, allows them to service debt out of cash holdings when equityholders cease to
inject the necessary capital to ﬁnance continued operation of the ﬁrm. In particular, I assume
that they can defer default by pledging the cash (퐿) to debtholders in order to satisfy the coupon
payments 푐 up to 퐿/푐 units of time. Managers will always pledge when equityholders cease to inject
funds because they lose any claim on the ﬁrm if it defaults.
To formalize this default setting, I deﬁne the following random variables:
4 The most natural interpretation of the assumed concavity is that there are technologically decreasing returns to
scale, or a downward sloping demand curve. The qualitative results do not critically depend on the supposed
functional form of the proﬁt function.
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푔푉퐵푡 = 푠푢푝
(
푠 ≤ 푡 : 푉푠 = 푉퐵
)
, (3)
휃푉퐵 = 푖푛푓
(
푡 ≥ 0 : (푡− 푔푉퐵푡 ) ≥ 푑, 푉푡 ≤ 푉퐵
)
, (4)
where 푉퐵 is the threshold value of invested assets below which equityholders cease injecting
funds into the ﬁrm, 푔푉퐵푡 denotes the last time before 푡 that the value of the ﬁrm’s assets reaches
푉퐵, 푑 =
퐿
푐 , and 휃
푉퐵 denotes the liquidation time. As long as 푉 < 푉퐵, the ﬁrm is in an “economic
distress” situation because it is unable to obtain outside equity ﬁnancing. I assume that distress-
costs (휌푉 ) accrue during economic distress, and that 휌 < 훿.5 Distress costs reﬂect the idea that ﬁrms
incur indirect costs such as lost proﬁts when customers switch to other producers in anticipation
of a potential liquidation (Webb 1987). As dividends are given by 훿푉 − 푐, and (훿 − 휌)푉 outside
and inside economic distress, respectively, this setting is in accordance with the observation that
dividends are often cut but not omitted during distress (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1990).
The default time 휃푉퐵 is ﬁnally given by the ﬁrst time the pledged cash amount 퐿 is exhausted,
i.e., does not cover additional coupon payments. It occurs when the value of the ﬁrm’s assets has
spent 푑 = 퐿푐 units of time consecutively below the default threshold 푉퐵. This default deﬁnition cap-
tures in a simple way the notion in Davydenko (2007), who ﬁnds empirical evidence that persistent
economic distress leads to default when ﬁrms run out of liquid funds to meet debt service payments.
Default induces immediate liquidation where debtholders recover the value of the unlevered assets
minus the direct bankruptcy costs. The latter correspond to a fraction (1 − 훼) of the unlevered
asset value. Proceeds from liquidation are distributed according to absolute priority. Additionally,
debtholders receive the pledged cash amount which represents the (delayed) debt service during
economic distress.6
Note that cash has two functions in my model: It is either used for investments, or pledged
to debtholders to avoid immediate default during economic distress. This setting is in accordance
with evidence from the empirical literature. Campello, Graham, and Campbell (2010) show that
the recent ﬁnancial crisis led ﬁrms to burn through their cash to ﬁnance continued operation, and
5 If 휌 > 훿, 푑 becomes stochastic because not only 푐 but also (휌− 훿)푉 has to be ﬁnanced out of cash holdings during
economic distress.
6 Alternative debt service settings during times where equityholders cease to inject funds can aﬀect the valuation of
debt. For example, direct coupon payments out of cash holdings slightly increase the value of debt because cash
already accrues before default via these payments, whereas with pledging, debtholders recover the entire cash at
default. The quantitative eﬀect is, however, limited and has no impact on the basic prediction of the model.
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to bypass attractive investment opportunities. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)
ﬁnd that ﬁrms typically lose excess cash by covering losses in weaker ﬁnancial conditions, rather
than by spending on new projects. Additionally, common bond covenants described by Smith and
Warner (1979) induce a similar setting even if cash is not physically pledged to debtholders in
reality because they restrict investment or spending cash if key ﬁnancial ratios are below a certain
threshold.
I assume that managers face a standard compensation package with ﬁxed income 휔, and a
variable compensation. The underlying idea of incorporating a ﬁxed income is that managers earn
less after losing their job (Fee and Hadlock 2004). As in Nikolov and Whited (2009), managers’
variable compensation consists of a share Ψ of the equity capital.7 Following the spending hy-
pothesis of Jensen (1986), I also incorporate the notion that managers derive utility from investing
cash reserves, i.e., from undertaking new projects. Their private utility obtained from investing the
amount L is assumed to correspond to 휂푙표푔(퐿).8 Taking the logarithm reﬂects the idea that man-
agers’ marginal utility from investments is positive and decreasing in the spent amount. It captures
in a simple fashion the notion reported in the literature that ﬁrms invest more when their cash hold-
ings are high (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004, Kim, Mauer, and Sherman 1998, Marchica
and Mura 2008). For simplicity, the beneﬁts a manager receives from 휔, Ψ, and 휂 are assumed to
be additively separable. Additionally, as the model is set up in a risk-neutral framework, I abstract
away from deducting the value of management’s compensation package from the asset value.
In a standard neoclassical model, ﬁrms target a cash level which maximizes the equity value
by balancing marginal beneﬁts against marginal costs of cash. Inspired by the empirical literature
around Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), and
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I incorporate that entrenched managers deviate from this level,
and target a corporate cash level which maximizes their own private beneﬁts. They can do so
because replacing the management by a takeover is costly. Takeover threats are modeled by deﬁning
an alternative management team 퐴 which would select the optimal cash policy of equityholders, and
takeover costs 푇 . The intensity of the occurrence of investment opportunities under the alternative
management team (ability to ﬁnd proﬁtable investment opportunities) is 푦퐴.
7 The survey of Murphy (1999) on CEO compensation documents that compensation packages typically consist of
a ﬁxed wage, proﬁt share, straight equity, and options. I ignore the proﬁt share because cash has limited eﬀect on
ﬁrm proﬁts. The model could easily be adapted to separate between straight equity and options. I do not expect
new insights from analyzing option based compensation because cash only marginally changes ﬁrm volatility.
8 Alternatively, one could introduce a psychological ﬂow beneﬁt for managers per unit of capital, or per unit of
cash under their control, expressing managerial preference for empire building. Untabulated results show that the
qualitative predictions maintain in such a setting.
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Recent research aims at explicitly tracking the accumulation, or build-up, process of cash hold-
ings (De´camps and Villeneuve 2007, Bolton, Chen, and Wang 2009, Riddick and Whited 2009).
In contrast to this literature, I argue that ﬁrms - much like a debt policy - initiate a cash policy
characterized by their target cash level when setting up the ﬁrm. In fact, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) indicate that ﬁrms target a particular cash
level, and (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009) show that they seem to initiate cash holdings at their IPO
instead of building-up cash over time. For tractability, I assume that ﬁrms maintain this target
cash level as long as they have access to ﬁnancing, i.e., are outside economic distress. In reality, of
course, ﬁrms’ cash holdings are not constant. If they only deviate randomly from their target cash
levels, however, one should be able to explain empirically observed patterns by studying the cash
policy.
3. Results
3.1. Valuation of corporate securities
Before analyzing the impact of cash holdings on credit risk and ﬁnancial decisions, it is useful to
identify the sources of value within the ﬁrm. The value of a leveraged ﬁrm with cash holdings can
be written as:
퐹 (푉,퐿) = 피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢[훿푉푢 + 휏푐1푉푢>푉퐵 − 휌푉푢1푉푢<푉퐵 ]푑푢
)
+피푄
(푁휃푉퐵∑
푖=1
푒−푟푡푖(푅푡푖(퐿)− 퐿)1푉푢>푉퐵
)
+ 푙퐿피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢1푉푢>푉퐵푑푢
)
+훼피푄(푒−푟휃
푉퐵푉휃푉퐵 ) + 퐿피푄(푒
−푟휃푉퐵 ). (5)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side captures the cash ﬂows of assets in place until liquidation,
i.e., the payout (훿), tax beneﬁts akin to a security that pays a constant coupon (휏푐), and economic
distress costs (휌). The second term is the value of the expected payouts from investing cash in the
periodically occurring opportunities, and the third term is the value of the continuous yield from
cash holdings. Note that these beneﬁts of cash only accrue as long as the ﬁrm is not in economic
distress. Below 푉퐵, management pledges the cash to secure coupon payments in order to defer
default. Strictly speaking, the loss during economic distress of both the opportunity to invest and
the yield from cash also reﬂects (indirect) distress costs. The fourth term on the right hand side
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of Equation (5) captures the recovery value upon liquidation. The last term, ﬁnally, expresses the
notion that the (pledged) cash accrues to debtholders at default. Solving this equation yields the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. The ﬁrm value for a given default threshold satisﬁes
퐹 (푉, 퐿) = 푉 − 훿푉퐵
휆2 + (휎 + 푏)휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉 − 훿푉퐵
휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
1
휆− 휎 − 푏
+
휏푐+ Γ(퐿)
푟
(
1− (휆− 푏
2휆
+
휆+ 푏
2휆
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
)
+훼푉퐵(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−(푏+ 휎)√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
+ 퐿
푒푎
√
2푟
Φ(
√
2푟푑)
+(훿 − 휌)((1/훿)(푉 − 휙(−(휎 + 푏)√푑)
휙(휆
√
푑)
푉퐵(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
)
−(푉/훿 − 푉퐵
휆2 + (휎 + 푏)휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉 − 푉퐵
휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
1
휆− 휎 − 푏
))
, (6)
where Φ(푥) = 1 + 푥
√
2휋푒푥푝(푥
2
2 )푁(푥), N is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
휆 =
√
2푟 + 푏2, 푎 = (1/휎)(푙표푔(푉퐵/푉 )), 휉 = (1/휎)(푏 + 휆), 푏 is deﬁned as 푏 = (1/휎)(푟 − 훿 − 휎2/2),
and Γ(퐿) =y(푅(퐿)− 퐿) + 푙퐿.
Proof. See in the Appendix.
Next, the value of debt is derived. I consider debt contracts which are characterized by a
perpetual ﬂow of coupon payments (푐), and the commitment that the ﬁrm is immediately liquidated
if it is unable to service debt. As equityholders stop injecting funds into the ﬁrm when 푉 reaches
푉퐵, management needs to pledge the available cash to debtholders in order to continue satisfying
the debt service during economic distress.
Prior to calculating the value of corporate debt, I need to deﬁne what happens if the asset
value recovers from economic distress before cash is exhausted, i.e., if 푉 reaches 푉퐵 between 푔
푉퐵
푡
and 휃푉퐵 . Suppose that renegotiation takes place in this case whereat debtholders try to induce
equityholders to resume the debt service, and that a failure to renegotiate triggers immediate
default. By construction of the economic distress threshold, equityholders are indiﬀerent about
resuming the debt service if the initial cash level (퐿) is maintained when 푉 reaches 푉퐵 after 푔
푉퐵
푡 .
Hence, debtholders will always waive the pledged coupon payments for successful renegotiation,
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i.e., leave 퐿 units of cash within the ﬁrm, if9
퐷(푉퐵, 퐿) ≥ 훼푉퐵 + 퐿. (7)
The left hand side of Inequality (7) denotes the continuation value of debt at the economic
distress threshold (푉퐵). The right hand side is the recovery value if renegotiation fails, and default
is triggered. Given that Inequality (7) holds, the value of corporate debt D(V,L) can be deﬁned as
퐷(푉, 퐿) = 퐸푄(
∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢푐1푉푢>푉퐵푑푢) + 훼퐸푄(푒
−푟휃푉퐵푉휃푉퐵 ) + 퐿피푄(푒
−푟휃푉퐵 ). (8)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side captures the regular coupon payments up to economic
distress. The second term is the recovery value of the ﬁrm. Note that debtholders anticipate
the occurrence of economic distress, default, and the outcome of renegotiation. The last term in
Equation (8) expresses the value of the pledged cash to debtholders. Proposition 2 shows the debt
value and the renegotiation condition in closed form.
Proposition 2. The debt value of a ﬁrm is given by
퐷(푉, 퐿) =
푐
푟
(
1− (휆− 푏
2휆
+
휆+ 푏
2휆
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
)
+훼푉퐵(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−(푏+ 휎)√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
+ 퐿
푒푎
√
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Debt is successfully renegotiated at 푉퐵 after 푔
푉퐵
푡 , if
푐
푟
(1− 휆− 푏
2휆
− 휆+ 푏
2휆
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)
+훼푉퐵(
Φ(−(푏+ 휎)√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
− 1) + 퐿( 1
Φ(
√
2푟푑)
− 1) ≥ 0. (10)
Proof. See in the Appendix.
9 The sharing rule for the cash ﬂows from assets in place at renegotiation with restructuring typically results from a
bargaining game between ﬁrm claimants (Fan and Sundaresan 2000). Because bargaining with restructuring such
as debt-equity swaps is reported to be prohibitively costly and time consuming in reality, I abstract away from
restructuring. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) investigate restructuring, but assign all the bargaining power to
equityholders. However, if debtholders refuse the proposal of the exchange oﬀer at renegotiation, equityholders
will be much worse oﬀ. Hence, as long as debtholders have any bargaining power, the outcome of renegotiation
with restructuring will leave debtholders above their indiﬀerence point. In my model, the participation constraint
for debtholders at renegotiation is not binding for most parameter speciﬁcations.
145
Condition (10) is satisﬁed for reasonable parameter values if the payout ratio is not too high.
As dividend restrictions represent the most frequently used covenants in both private and public
debt (Bradley and Roberts 2004), this condition is likely to be satisﬁed in reality.
The continuation value of equity is given by the diﬀerence between the value of the ﬁrm and
the value of debt:
퐸(푉, 퐿) = 푉 − 훿푉퐵
휆2 + (휎 + 푏)휆
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(11)
In the presented setting with corporate cash, shareholders hold a Parisian down-and-out call option
on the ﬁrm’s assets. That is, they have a residual claim on the cash ﬂows generated by the ﬁrm
unless the value of the assets reaches the distress threshold and remains below this threshold until
the (pledged) cash is exhausted. The value of equity at initiation is equal to the continuation value
of equity, minus the initial cash (퐿) contributed by equityholders. Note that a cash policy of 퐿 = 0
induces 푑 = 0, and Φ(0) = 1. In this special case, Equation (11) simply collapses to the equity
value in Leland (1994), i.e., to 푉 + (휏−1)푐푟 (1−( 푉푉퐵 )−휉)−푉퐵 푉푉퐵
−휉
, where the liquidation time is given
by the ﬁrst passage time of the state variable to 푉퐵. When 퐿 goes to inﬁnity, economic distress
never leads to liquidation. Debt essentially becomes riskless but Γ(퐿), and, hence, the equity value
tend towards minus inﬁnity.
The timing of economic distress depends on the threshold selected by shareholders. For each
coupon level, this threshold can be characterized by the economic distress policy which maximizes
the equity value. It satisﬁes the smooth-pasting condition (Dumas 1991). Hence, the economic
distress threshold where equityholders optimally stop contributing funds is given by
∂퐸(푉,퐿)
∂푉
∣푉=푉 ∗퐵
!
= 0, (12)
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which yields
푉 ∗퐵 =
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. (13)
3.2. The target cash policy
The total private beneﬁt a manager receives from a ﬁrm is given by
피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0 푒
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휃푉퐵
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)
.
It can be expressed in closed form:
Proposition 3. Managers’ total private beneﬁt is given by
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, (14)
with 푎 = (1/휎)(푙표푔(푉 ∗퐵/푉 )), and 푏 = (1/휎)(푟 − 훿 − 휎2/2).
Proof. See in the Appendix
The ﬁrst term in Equation (14) is the value of the ﬁxed income 휔 obtained up to default.
The second term expresses the value of the equity based compensation Ψ. The last term, ﬁnally,
corresponds to managers’ personal utility from investing (spending) cash.
The target cash policy 퐿∗ is chosen to maximize managers’ private beneﬁt subject to two
constraints. The ﬁrst requires that equityholders are initially willing to contribute the demanded
cash (participation constraint).10 The second is that the incumbent management can preclude a
takeover because the ﬁrm value is larger than the ﬁrm value 퐹퐴 under the alternative management
team minus transaction costs.11
퐿∗ := argmax퐿푈(푉, 퐿)
푠.푡. 퐹 (푉,퐿) ≥ 퐹 (푉, 0) + 퐿
퐹 (푉, 퐿) ≥ 퐹퐴(푉, 퐿퐴)− 푇. (15)
10 This condition also ensures that 푅(퐿∗) > 퐿∗, because holding cash is costly.
11 The second condition can also be interpreted in alternative ways: For example, 푇 may represent costs of bargaining
between managers and equityholders, and 퐹퐴 the ﬁrm value with the expected bargained level of cash holdings.
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The System (15) shows that within certain bounds, managers have full control over the choice of the
corporate cash policy 퐿∗. This control has two direct implications. First, it is optimal for managers
to capture the investment opportunities when they occur as long as the ﬁrm is not in economic
distress. The reason is that investing increases each term in Equation (14). Second, managers’
beneﬁt is zero at default. Hence, they optimally use (pledge) cash to delay default as soon as
equityholders stop injecting funds because their total beneﬁt at 푉 ∗퐵 from continued operation, i.e.,
푈(푉 ∗퐵, 퐿
∗), is always larger than 0.
3.3. Optimal debt policy
While the distress policy is chosen (ex-post) by equityholders to maximize the value of equity
after the issuance of corporate debt and management’s choice of the cash policy, the optimal
debt policy maximizes 퐸(푉,퐿∗) − 퐿 plus the proceeds from the debt issue.12 As 퐹 (푉, 퐿∗)퐿 =
퐸(푉, 퐿∗)− 퐿+퐷(푉, 퐿∗), the optimal coupon is chosen by equityholders to maximize the value of
the ﬁrm, i.e., 푐∗ := 푎푟푔푚푎푥푐퐹 (푉,퐿∗)− 퐿.
4. Empirical implications
This section discusses the results and empirical implications of the model for credit risk, ﬁnancial
policy, excess cash holdings, and agency costs.
4.1. Parameter choice
Input parameters are set in accordance with the literature to reﬂect a typical S&P 500 ﬁrm (Franc¸ois
and Morellec 2004, Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec 2006): The initial value of the ﬁrm’s invested
assets, 푉 = 100; the riskless interest rate, 푟 = 6%; the net tax advantage of debt, 휏 = 0.15;
liquidation costs, (1 − 훼) = 40%; costs of economic distress, 휌 = 3%; the constant payout rate,
훿 = 5%; the volatility of assets in place, 휎 = 0.2. Following the quotes in Meeks and Meeks (2001),
takeover costs are assumed to be 5% of the unlevered asset value. Additionally, I need to specify the
compensation of managers, the yield of cash holdings, and the proﬁtability of investments. In the
baseline scenario, I choose 휔 and Ψ to reﬂect that equity based management compensation accounts
for about 60% of the total monetary compensation for S&P 500 ﬁrms (Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005).
12 Managers need to communicate the cash policy associated with each debt policy at initiation, because they must
raise the necessary cash from equityholders. Given the knowledge of the cash policy, debtholders anticipate the
threshold 푉 ∗퐵 for each coupon level.
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I start without the personal utility from investing cash as this term is not observable in reality. As
an extension, I also incorporate managers’ private utility from investing by setting 휂 such that the
expected utility from investment represents 10%, or 20% of their overall utility. The yield of very
liquid assets (cash) is set to 푙 = 2%.
For the curvature of the proﬁt function of invested capital, Riddick and Whited (2009) obtain
a 훾 around 0.75, and Hennessy and Whited (2007) one around 0.63. I choose 훾 = 0.7 in the proﬁt
function of investment opportunities (퐴퐿훾). Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Loughran and Ritter
(1997) ﬁnd an average operating income (EBITDA) to assets ratio around 15% for Compustat and
S&P 500 ﬁrms, respectively. I calibrate the parameter 퐴 such that the immediate NPV of investing
퐿∗ in the opportunity corresponds to the (after tax) NPV of the same amount invested in assets
yielding a 15% operating income. This calibration yields 퐴 = 4.2. I also validate my results with
alternative choices for 퐴. Finally, the intensity of the occurrence of investment opportunities is set
to 푦 = 0.1, such that the model’s predicted cash ratio equals 11.04 for the average ﬁrm. This ratio
corresponds to the average cash ratio observed for S&P 500 ﬁrms between 1999 and 2009 outside
the information technology sector. In the baseline speciﬁcation, I assume that 푦 = 푦퐴. While
the quantitative results vary with these parameters, I show that the important predictions do not
critically depend on their choice.
4.2. Optimal distress policy of shareholders
Once the cash policy is determined and debt has been issued, shareholders’ only choice is the
ex-post selection of the economic distress policy. In particular, they choose the distress threshold
which maximizes the value of equity, that is, the optimal asset value where they stop injecting
funds into the ﬁrm. Default, however, is triggered when managers are unable to continue service
coupon payments during economic distress by pledging cash, i.e., when cash is exhausted.
When choosing the optimal economic distress policy in a ﬁrm with cash holdings, equityholders
trade oﬀ their beneﬁt of economic distress, i.e., sparing (after tax) debt service without losing
potential future income, against distress costs (훿푉 ), the foregone total expected instantaneous
yield from cash holdings (Γ(퐿)) generated by the yield of cash (푙) plus the expected payouts from
investment opportunities, and the probability of bankruptcy. Figure 1 depicts the optimal distress
threshold of a ﬁrm with cash holdings of 퐿/푉 = 0.1 (solid line). The dashed line shows the distress
policy analog of a ﬁrm with identical total payoﬀ, but without cash holdings. Note that in standard
structural models without cash, the distress threshold corresponds to the default threshold, as ﬁrms
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immediately default when equityholders stop contributing funds.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 reveals that equityholders stop contributing funds earlier in a ﬁrm with cash than in
an otherwise identical ﬁrm without cash.13 The intuition for this important result is as follows: In
standard structural default models, equityholders keep servicing debt until the distress threshold
is reached, even if the net-worth of a ﬁrm is already negative. The reason is that, while protected
on the downside by limited liability of equity, they can still proﬁt from a potential rebound of
the ﬁrm value. Ceasing to inject funds triggers immediate default, which results in a loss of the
potential upside. With cash holdings, however, equityholders anticipate that the ﬁrm will not
immediately default when they stop injecting funds. In case of substantial negative net-worth,
they can consequently cease to ﬁnance the debt service while still observing how the ﬁrm evolves
thereafter. The possibility to save coupon payments during economic distress while maintaining
the upside if the ﬁrm rebounds explains why equityholders stop injecting funds earlier in a ﬁrm
with cash holdings.
The ﬁnding in Figure 1 challenges the traditional view that cash holdings simply reduce default
risk. I show that the total impact of cash on credit risk can be divided into a direct, and an
indirect eﬀect. The obvious, direct eﬀect is that higher cash admits managers more time to defer
default when shareholders stop contributing funds, which decreases credit spreads. The indirect
eﬀect occurs because equityholders stop contributing funds earlier for larger cash holdings. Hence,
higher cash makes it harder for ﬁrms to raise external funds when they perform bad.
Table I explores the quantitative impact of cash on credit risk. The second column shows the
direct marginal eﬀect of cash on credit risk. It corresponds to the marginal decrease of a ﬁrm’s
credit spread if one additional unit of cash is added to the optimal level, given that the default
boundary is left constant at the one of an otherwise identical ﬁrm with optimal cash holdings. The
third column shows the indirect marginal eﬀect caused by the fact that equityholders optimally
increase the default threshold with an additional unit of cash. It is given by the credit spread of a
ﬁrm with 퐿∗+1 units of cash (and with an optimal default threshold for this cash level) minus the
credit spread of the otherwise identical ﬁrm with a hypothetical default threshold equal to the one
of a ﬁrm with optimal cash holdings 퐿∗. Finally, the total marginal eﬀect of cash on credit risk is
13 When the debt service is lower than the expected hypothetical payout from cash in the ﬁrm without cash,
equityholders will, in fact, never stop contributing funds in this example (see the solid line below 1.1).
150
captured in the fourth column as the total decrease in the credit spread if one additional unit of
cash is added to a ﬁrm with optimal cash holdings. In the baseline scenario, the credit spread is
43 basis points (bps). The direct marginal eﬀect of cash reduces credit spreads by 2.8 bps. The
indirect marginal eﬀect, however, increases credit spreads by 1.63 bps, canceling a large portion
(58%) of the direct marginal eﬀect. As a result, the total marginal reduction in credit spreads
from additional cash is only 1.17 bps. The importance of the indirect eﬀect could explain why,
despite the intuitive appeal and widespread use of liquidity proxies in empirical default-predicting
models, many studies conclude that liquidity measures are not signiﬁcantly negatively associated
with default (Zmijewski 1984, Begley and Watts 1996, Shumway 2001, Hillegeist, Keatin, Cram,
and Lundstedt 2004).
In the last column, Table I also shows the total marginal eﬀect of cash on the value of a ﬁxed
income stream of 1 obtained up to default.
INSERT TABLE I HERE
The results in Table I suggest that the eﬀect of cash holdings on credit risk depends on ﬁrm
characteristics. During economic distress, equityholders forego the instantaneous yield of cash
because cash is pledged, incur distress costs, and lose the tax shield. Hence, when 푙, 휌, and 휏 are
lower, equityholders’ opportunity costs of economic distress decrease which enhances their incentive
to stop contributing funds early. Graphically, the dashed line in Figure 1 moves to the upper left.
As a result, the indirect marginal eﬀect becomes stronger compared to the baseline scenario which
causes a weaker total reduction of credit risk from additional cash.
Next, I investigate how the results are related to the payout ratio. Decreasing the payout
ratio raises the risk-neutral drift of the asset value which increases the probability of recovery from
economic distress. One unit of additional cash, consequently, enhances the value of the ﬁxed income
stream more than in the baseline scenario. Table I, however, also shows that the total marginal
eﬀect of cash on credit risk decreases because debtholders lose coupon payments in case of recovery
from economic distress.
A higher asset volatility particularly increases the direct marginal eﬀect of cash on credit risk,
because the probability of reaching a given economic distress threshold is larger. As a consequence,
the total marginal eﬀect of cash becomes stronger than in the baseline parameter setting.
In sum, the model generates speciﬁc empirical predictions, namely that the marginal impact of
cash on credit spreads should be weaker for a lower yield of cash, lower economic distress costs, a
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lower tax shield, a smaller payout ratio, and a lower volatility of assets.
4.3. Corporate debt policy choice
When applied to ﬁnancing decisions, standard structural models typically generate leverage ratios
that exceed those observed in practice. This observation is called the under-leverage puzzle. I
show that one potential explanation for this limitation is that standard models overlook important
determinants of the corporate debt policy, namely investment opportunities and cash holdings.
Equation (5) indicates that debt ﬁnancing aﬀects ﬁrm value in several ways. First, it provides
a tax shield. Second, debt aﬀects distress and bankruptcy costs by changing the corresponding
distress and bankruptcy policy. Third, debt causes underinvestment as cash is pledged and not
invested during economic distress, and it also induces a loss of the investment opportunities upon
default.
Without cash holdings, the optimal leverage corresponds to 50.3% for my baseline parameters.
If investment opportunities and cash holdings are incorporated, equityholders choose a signiﬁcantly
lower leverage of 42.5% when they trade oﬀ the costs and beneﬁts of leverage. There are several
reasons for this result. First, cash makes debt more expensive because equityholders optimally stop
contributing funds earlier than in a ﬁrm without cash. Early economic distress is costly because
the yield of cash is lost, economic distress costs accrue, and the tax shield is foregone when the
ﬁrm is unable to raise external equity. Second, cash aﬀects the costs of debt via the default timing.
It allows managers to deviate from a default policy which maximizes the ex-post value of equity.14
Third, the recovery rate of total assets decreases when incorporating investments, because these
opportunities are lost in case of default. Finally, investment opportunities and the associated proﬁts
are foregone during economic distress. The underinvestment problem of debt is, consequently, more
severe with larger cash holdings as equityholders stop contributing funds earlier.
4.4. Corporate cash policy and excess cash
I now turn to understanding the extent to which managerial control over cash inﬂuences the corpo-
rate cash policy. Managers trade oﬀ their private beneﬁts and costs of cash according to Equation
(15) when determining the cash policy 퐿∗. The discretionary use of cash allows them to avoid
immediate default in case of economic distress, and, therefore, to extend the period they obtain the
14 The direction of this eﬀect on the ex-ante value of equity, however, depends on the leverage ratio because the
deviation also inﬂuences the issue price of debt.
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ﬁxed income (and utility from investments). This function of cash as a buﬀer against bankruptcy
in hard times induces managers to target excess cash, i.e., a cash level beyond the target 퐿푆퐻 of
equityholders (self-preservation motive).
INSERT TABLE II HERE
Table II describes the corporate cash policy choice and its determinants in an unrestricted ﬁrm
without a market for corporate control. Besides the shareholder wealth maximizing cash ratio
(퐿푆퐻/푉 ) and the corporate cash ratio (퐿∗/푉 ), the table also reports excess cash ratios ((퐿∗ −
퐿푆퐻)/푉 ). In the baseline parameter speciﬁcation, the cash ratio (퐿∗/푉 ) targeted by managers
corresponds to 11.04%, which is considerably higher than the equity value maximizing cash level
of 9.22%.15
Next, Table II investigates the impact of management compensation on the cash policy. The
results are very sensitive to the relation between ﬁxed and variable compensation. The lower the
equity part Ψ, the higher managers’ incentive to hold excess cash. The reason is that the equity
share in their compensation package internalizes the costs of deviating from a shareholder value
maximizing strategy. In fact, managers target a cash and excess cash ratio of 26.46% and 17.09%,
respectively, when they are only compensated with a ﬁxed wage. The takeover constraint in the
optimization problem (15) is binding in this case, as managers wish to raise an inﬁnite amount of
cash when they set up the ﬁrm. The ﬁndings conﬁrm the empirical results in Marchica and Mura
(2008) who show that ﬁrms with persistent high cash holdings seem to have signiﬁcantly lower
managerial ownership. When the equity part accounts for 30% of the overall monetary compensa-
tion, the target cash ratio is 14.20% which is still 4.73% of assets larger than the shareholder wealth
maximizing level. As expected, excess cash vanishes when managers are almost exclusively (90%)
compensated on an equity-linked basis.16 Finally, the table also shows that excess cash is strongly
positively related to managers’ private utility from investing cash 휂. One could easily extend the
present analysis to include a private utility for managers from retaining control which would simply
induce a higher portion of the ﬁxed compensation, and, consequently, larger excess cash.
The analysis of the yield on very liquid, cash-like securities 푙 indicates that, as expected, the
shareholder wealth maximizing cash ratio decreases with lower 푙 because the opportunity costs of
15 I also calibrate the parameter 퐴 of the proﬁt function to an average operating income to assets ratio of 12% and
18%, respectively. The corresponding excess cash ratios are 1.01% and 2.97%, respectively.
16 Of course, equity-linked compensation induces other costs not captured in my model, see for example Hall and
Murphy (2002).
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holding liquid assets, given by 푟 − 푙, increase. To explain the amount of excess cash, I need to
investigate mangers’ trade-oﬀ when choosing the target cash policy. They balance the positive
eﬀect of excess cash on the value of their ﬁxed income against the negative eﬀect on their equity
compensation. The previous Table I shows that the former is weaker for lower 푙. At the same
time, excess cash has a stronger negative eﬀect on the value of the equity compensation due to the
higher opportunity costs of holding cash. Both eﬀects attenuate managers’ propensity for excess
cash when 푙 becomes lower. These results are in line with Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) who
ﬁnd empirically that both corporate cash holdings and excess cash decrease with the opportunity
cost of holding liquid assets.
Table I indicates that the self-preservation motive of managers is weaker for smaller distress
costs 휌 and a lower tax advantage of debt 휏 . At the same time, the impact of excess cash on the
equity part of the compensation is only moderately aﬀected by these parameters. Hence, managers
target lower excess cash when 휌 or 휏 decrease. Finally, the last two rows in Table II show that a
lower payout ratio is associated with larger excess cash, mainly because the total marginal eﬀect
of additional cash on the value of managers’ ﬁxed income increases for lower 훿.
The explanations to the results in Table II illustrate that to assess managers’ propensity for
excess cash due to the self-preservation motive, it is essential to understand how cash holdings
aﬀect credit risk.
Cash is costly to equityholders because of its holding costs and the fact that it accrues to
debtholders upon default. For excess cash, these costs do not outweigh the beneﬁts from the addi-
tionally admitted investments. To estimate the value loss to equityholders from the misalignment
of incentives, I compute ex-post agency costs. They are calculated as the percentage reduction in
the ex-post equity value of a ﬁrm with cash holdings equal to 퐿∗ compared to an otherwise identical
ﬁrm with holdings equal to 퐿푆퐻 .17 This exercise is useful because it assists in the interpretation
of the economic magnitude of the impact of excess cash on the equity value of ﬁrms.
In the baseline setting, agency costs are relatively moderate at 0.17% of the equity value.
The magnitude of equityholders’ loss is within the tolerance on the part of shareholders for value
destruction, in which the limit is imposed by any costs of assuming control of the corporation.
17 Managers’ cash policy is an ex-post ﬁnancial policy. They maximize the valuation of their claims after debt has
been issued. Debtholders anticipate the cash policy choice when debt is issued. The ex-ante agency costs to
equityholders of levered ﬁrms, given by the percentage reduction in the ex-ante ﬁrm value with 퐿∗ compared to
the one with 퐿푆퐻 , are lower than the ex-post agency costs. In fact, the ﬁrm value even increases under 퐿∗ for
many parameter combinations. The reason is that excess cash makes debt safer, which induces higher debt issue
proceeds. Hence, even without takeover costs (or negotiation frictions), equityholders may, ex-ante, agree that
managers control the cash policy decision.
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Agency costs are, however, highly dependent on the parameter speciﬁcation. For example, with
30% equity compensation they increase to 0.91%, and with 20% utility from investing even to
5.66%.
Table II shows that excess cash holdings can be large in certain ﬁrms, especially when, as in
reality, compensation schemes can not be solely designed to implement the optimal cash policy. This
ﬁnding motivates to analyze to what extent the threat of a control challenge prompts managers
to target a more eﬃcient cash level. The impact of the market for corporate control depends on
the opportunity costs of replacing the management faced by investors. The opportunity costs are
determined by the ability of the alternative management team, captured by the intensity 푦퐴, and
by the takeover costs 푇 . Table III summarizes the results for a ﬁrm with managers that obtain
60% of their monetary compensation from equity, and 10% of their total utility from investing
cash. Panel A indicates that the higher the costs 푇 imposed by control challenges, the larger are
the selected corporate cash and excess cash ratios. In the last row, takeover treats are too weak to
inﬂuence the management’s choice of the target cash policy. Panel B additionally investigates the
impact of the alternative management’s ability to ﬁnd proﬁtable investment opportunities, 푦퐴, on
corporate cash holdings. The resulting corporate cash ratios and excess cash ratios are larger if the
ability of the alternative management is lower than the one of the incumbent. Overall, the results
suggest that because of their speciﬁc human capital, and the costs imposed by control transactions,
self-interested managers are partially entrenched which allows them to exploit the reduced threat
of takeovers by targeting larger excess cash.
INSERT TABLE III HERE
The outcome in Table III reﬂects the results in the empirical literature. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith,
and Servaes (2003), for example, conﬁrm that entrenched managers are more likely to build excess
cash balances, and that greater shareholder rights (captured by smaller takeover costs in my model)
are associated with lower excess cash. Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) show that ﬁrms
in countries with poor investor protection hold more excess cash, and that liquid assets in those
countries contribute substantially less to ﬁrm value than the ones held by ﬁrms in countries with
stronger investor protection. In my model, cash is indeed less valuable to ﬁrms when takeover
costs are larger due to the higher excess holdings. The results in Kalcheva and Lins (2007) propose
that value discounts apply to ﬁrms expected to be exposed to relatively severe managerial agency
problems if they have a combination of managerial entrenchment, high cash holdings, and poor
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external protection against expropriation. Consistent with this idea, my model assigns the highest
agency costs (discount) when managerial entrenchment is combined with high takeover costs. For
example, agency costs are 0.61% of the equity value for 푇 = 0.1 and 푦퐴 = 0.1, but correspond
to 2.26% for 푇 = 0.9 and 푦퐴 = 0.098. Similar thoughts are reported by Yun (2009) who shows
that ﬁrms increase cash holdings relative to lines of credit when state antitakeover laws reduce
future control threats and when internal governance is weak. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008)
argue that more managerial entrenchment may increase the transaction costs bounds within which
managers can operate before it becomes worthwhile to remove them, but they still must be careful
not to accumulate large, unused cash stockpiles. Faleye (2004) conﬁrms this argument by showing
that proxy contests are increasing in excess cash reserves. Moreover, executive turnover and cash
distributions to shareholders rise, while cash holdings signiﬁcantly decline following such contests.
Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that self-interested managers balance the
private beneﬁts of cash against increased takeover threats.
In reality, shareholders can also rely on alternative management control mechanisms to induce
managers to deviate from their personal target cash level towards the one which maximizes the
value of equity. The presented analysis could be analogously applied to such mechanisms, or to a
costly bargaining game between shareholders and managers on the cash policy.
4.5. Do riskier ﬁrms hold a higher amount of cash?
In this section, I derive the relationship between asset risk and corporate cash holdings. I ﬁrst
explain the relationship between the equity value maximizing cash ratio and the asset volatility.
Then, I discuss how managers’ target excess cash depends on the riskiness of assets. Finally, I show
that when managers’ propensity for excess cash dominates the relationship between the equity value
maximizing cash ratio and the asset volatility, the relationship between corporate cash holdings
and asset volatility turns positive.
Recent empirical studies document that riskier ﬁrms tend to hold more cash (Kim, Mauer, and
Sherman 1998, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 2008, Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2010, Mahmudi and
Pavlin 2010, Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev 2011). The standard reasoning is that cash
holdings are valuable to constrained ﬁrms because they allow to avoid passing up valuable invest-
ment opportunities when other sources of funds are unavailable. Firms in industries with more
volatile cash ﬂows are then expected to hold more liquidity because of the higher probability of
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cash ﬂow shortfalls.18 Such a rational from a precautionary motive does not maintain once I incor-
porate agency conﬂicts. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the cash ratio which maximizes
shareholder wealth (퐿푆퐻/푉 ) and the asset volatility.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
For a wide range of asset volatilities, the relationship is negative. The reason is that the expected
return from cash to equityholders decreases with credit risk because managers use cash to defer
default instead of investing during economic distress (see Section 2), and because cash accrues to
debtholders upon default.19
Figure 3 plots excess cash against the asset volatility, and shows that they are positively related.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
The intuition for this result directly evolves from managers’ control over cash holdings. Accord-
ing to their trade-oﬀ described in Equation (14), managers have a propensity towards excess cash
to increase the value of their ﬁxed income. Table I shows that when the asset volatility increases,
this self-preservation motive becomes stronger. Hence, managers of risky ﬁrms will optimally target
higher levels of excess cash.
Finally, as the target corporate cash ratio 퐿∗/푉 corresponds to the sum of the shareholder wealth
maximizing cash ratio and excess cash, the relationship between asset risk and 퐿∗/푉 depends on
whether the eﬀect in Figure 2 or 3 dominates. Figure 4 shows that the latter dominates in the
baseline parameter speciﬁcation such that the relationship between asset risk and the corporate
cash ratio (퐿∗/푉 ) turns positive.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
This result suggests that agency conﬂicts, i.e., managers endogenously targeting higher excess
18 Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2011) argue that in the presence of restrictions on external ﬁnancing, and
when future cash ﬂows are only partially pledgable, this result is driven by ﬁrms’ trade-oﬀ between investing
available cash in a proﬁtable long-term project and retaining cash in order to reduce the likelihood of losing the
future cash ﬂows from the project due to default. The incentive of equityholders to inject cash when liquidity is
scarce, however, increases with the long-term expected cash ﬂows from previous investments in proﬁtable projects.
Therefore, incorporating endogenous external ﬁnancing clearly dampens the described trade-oﬀ. Moreover, one
hardly observes ﬁrms with plenty of proﬁtable long-term projects defaulting due to a temporary liquidity shortfall
(Davydenko and Strebulaev 2007).
19 For very high asset volatilities, the credit risk decreases with the volatility. The reason is that riskier ﬁrms
optimally initiate a lower coupon. A lower coupon allows a longer survival time during economic distress for a
given amount of cash. At high levels of volatility, this eﬀect dominates the one of the asset volatility on the
probability of reaching distress.
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cash in riskier ﬁrms, are responsible for the empirical ﬁnding that cash holdings are positively
associated with credit risk. Mauer and Liu (2011) provide striking empirical evidence for this view.
The authors show that ﬁrms which encourage CEO risk-taking hold more cash. Importantly, they
also ﬁnd that the marginal value of cash to equityholders decreases for ﬁrms with high risk-taking
incentives which supports my hypothesis that the positive relation between cash holdings and CEO
risk-taking is driven by a desire on part of managers to hold excess liquidity.
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) argue that the recent increase in corporate cash holdings is
concentrated among small ﬁrms in industries that experienced the greatest increase in idiosyncratic
cash ﬂow volatility. As Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Baker and Hall (2004) ﬁnd
that CEOs of smaller ﬁrms have a lower dollar incentive from equity compensation, and because
a higher portion of ﬁxed income even enforces the positive relationship between managers’ target
excess cash and asset risk, my model suggests that agency is, at least partially, responsible for the
reported pronounced increase of corporate cash holdings within smaller ﬁrms which became riskier.
A normative implication from this insight is that riskier ﬁrms should implement stronger mech-
anisms to limit excess cash holdings than ﬁrms with lower risk. As long as these mechanisms are
costly, one would, however, still observe the proposed relationship.
4.6. Simulation approach
In this section, I adapt a simulation approach in the spirit of Strebulaev (2007), and Bhamra,
Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) to explore the empirical cash properties of a model-implied economy
of ﬁrms which is structurally similar to the real economy. It is shown that, once the intensity 푦
is calibrated to observed corporate cash levels, the self-preservation motive predicts an amount
of excess cash which induces cash-properties in the model-implied economy comparable to their
empirical counterparts.
Following a simulation approach is important for several reasons. First, the previous results are
obtained under the assumption that ﬁrms are at issue. In reality, however, they are mostly not at
issue. Over time, ﬁrms deviate from the initially optimal structure because they do not continuously
adapt their cash and debt policies. Only a simulation approach can explore the impact of these
deviations on observed cash properties in an economy.
Second, as Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) argue, it is not clear that the results of a
structural model for a typical individual ﬁrm can be compared to the empirical average results for a
sample of ﬁrms of which the typical ﬁrm is representative. The reason is that real ﬁrms in a sample
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diﬀer widely in their ﬁrm characteristics, and that parameters of interest are non-linear in these
characteristics. Therefore, it can be crucial to generate a sample implied by the model which has
similar characteristics than the real ﬁrm sample, and to compare the resulting average parameter
of interest to its empirical counterpart.
Third, the main feature modeled by this paper is that cash is used by managers to service debt
during economic distress. Cash, therefore, mainly accrues to debtholders when ﬁrms approach
default. At initiation, however, ﬁrms are not close to default because they are structured opti-
mally. Hence, to investigate the model-implied cash properties of ﬁrms approaching default, and
to compare them to the ones of real ﬁrms in an economy, a simulation approach is necessary.
In order to obtain the empirical implications of my model, I imitate the true dynamics of S&P
500 ﬁrms by simulating over time a cross-section of ﬁrms that resembles its empirical counterpart. I
start with a range of diﬀerent ﬁrms which are initially structured optimally. In particular, I consider
ﬁrms with asset volatilities from 0.15 to 0.25 (step size 0.025), with intensities of the occurrence of
investment opportunities from 0.025 to 0.3 (step size 0.025), and with managers that have an 휂,
i.e., a private utility from investing cash, from 0 to 4 (step size 1). Parameter combinations which
do not satisfy the participation constraint of equityholders, and the takeover constraint in System
(15) are deleted. Each of the remaining 257 parameter combinations is quarterly simulated forward
100 times over 10 years, which leaves me with a model generated economy of 25700 diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Next, for every year over the period from 1999 to 2009, I take the empirical sample of S&P 500
ﬁrms from Compustat, and construct the average cross-sectional distribution of their quasi-market
leverage and cash ratio. The quasi-market leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of book debt to the
sum of book debt and the market value of equity. Book debt is total assets (item 6) minus book
equity (Baker and Wurgler 2002). Book equity is total assets minus total liabilities (item 181)
minus preferred stock (item 10, replaced by item 56 when missing) plus deferred taxes (item 35)
plus convertible debt (item 79). The cash ratio corresponds to cash and marketable securities (item
1) divided by total assets (item 6). The information technology sector is excluded, because it is
characterized by ﬁrms with very low leverage and very large cash holdings often exceeding their
entire asset value. It is diﬃcult to replicate such ﬁrms with reasonable parameter values without
violating the participation constraint in System (14). An alternative model of cash holdings tailored
to this sector would be needed. My results are only marginally aﬀected by the exclusion of the
ﬁnancial and utility sector.
I then match the average historical distribution of S&P 500 ﬁrms with its model-implied coun-
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terpart in the generated economy. In particular, for each observation in the empirical sample, I
select the observation in the model generated economy with the minimum distance regarding the
deviation from the empirical average quasi-market leverage and cash ratio. The matching is gen-
erally very accurate, with a median Euclidean distance of 0.0032.20 That is, the median ﬁrm is
matched with the root of the sum of the squared deviations being 0.0032. This matching procedure
allows me to construct a cross-sectional distribution of model-implied ﬁrms which is almost iden-
tical to the one empirically observed. Note that I do not assume that the initial model generated
economy consists of ﬁrms which are similar to S&P 500 ﬁrms. Rather, I choose only those ﬁrms
within this economy which can be identiﬁed as being very similar to S&P 500 ﬁrms.
Finally, I simulate the matched model-implied ﬁrms forward for 10 years with quarterly time
intervals, which gives me a simulated data set. Table IV presents the properties of cash within this
simulated data set. They are then directly compared to empirical studies. I concentrate on the
main cash features considered important to be explained by a model of corporate cash holdings such
as observed levels, market values, and the marginal values of cash. To explore the distributional
features of my results, I repeat the entire simulation 1000 times, and report the average, the mean,
and the 25푡ℎ and 75푡ℎ percentiles.
INSERT TABLE IV HERE
The average cash ratio in my simulated data set is 11.37, very close to the average of 11.04 in
the empirical sample of S&P 500 ﬁrms. This result is not surprising, as the cash ratio is matched
in the matching procedure.
In Panel A of Table IV, I report the average as well as distributional properties of the ratio
of the market value of cash to its face value for my simulated sample of ﬁrms. The market value
of cash is the total value to the ﬁrm of holding cash. The face value simply corresponds to the
nominal amount of cash. The average ratio is 1.2959 which reﬂects the corresponding estimate of
1.25 from Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002) very well.
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) report the marginal value of cash for an average Compustat
ﬁrm over the 1971 to 2001 period. Their estimate of the impact of a change in cash holdings
suggests that an extra dollar of cash is, on average, only valued by shareholders at 0.75. When
they allow the change in cash to interact with the level of cash and with leverage, the estimated
20 The average Euclidean distance is higher at 0.033 due to a few ﬁrms with very low leverage, but very high cash
ratios which my model matches with a relatively large Euclidean distance.
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marginal value of cash is 0.94 at the mean leverage and mean cash ratio. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007) derive similar values for poorly governed ﬁrms, and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006)
obtain comparable results with international data. The authors also show that the marginal value
of cash is above 1 for low levels of cash, but decreasing with the ﬁrms’ cash positions to levels
below 1. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that there is an upper bound on the amount of
cash for which a ﬁrm is rewarded, but that the mean ﬁrm holds cash in excess of that upper bound
due to the self-preservation motive of managers. Panel B investigates the marginal value of cash
to equityholders in my simulated data set. It is calculated numerically as the ﬁrst derivative of the
continuation value of equity in Equation (11) with respect to 퐿 at model-implied corporate cash
levels. The resulting average value in the simulated data set is 0.6938 which is very close to the
marginal value of cash reported in Faulkender and Petersen (2006).21
The results show that the model, once calibrated to empirically observed corporate cash levels,
is able to replicate the observed market value of cash to ﬁrms, as well as the marginal value of cash.
Hence, the self-preservation motive captures the empirically reported properties of cash quite well
Panel C of Table IV shows the mean, the median, and the 25푡ℎ and 75푡ℎ percentiles of the
regression coeﬃcient of leverage on the marginal value of cash in my simulated data set. A simple
OLS regression with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects is applied. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that if
ﬁrms use cash to pay down debt, a small increase in cash reserves should partially go to increasing
debt value, not solely to increasing equity value. Thus, the marginal value of cash to equityholders
should be larger for ﬁrms with low leverage than for those with high leverage. The authors show
that the marginal value of cash to equityholders is, indeed, decreasing with leverage. As my model
captures that cash accrues to debtholders in case of economic distress, the coeﬃcient of leverage
in the simulated data set is also negative, and very stable around a mean of −0.1176. This result
suggests that managers’ control over cash is a realistic feature.
Finally, as the focus of this paper is on the self-preservation motive driven by the impact of cash
on default, it is important that the presented model is able to quantitatively explain the empirical
determinants of credit risk. Table V, therefore, lists the coeﬃcients of a OLS-regression of credit
spreads on the cash ratio, leverage, and asset volatility in my simulated data set. The coeﬃcients on
leverage and asset volatility are quantitatively very similar to their empirical counterparts reported
in Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2011). While the coeﬃcient on the cash ratio has the
21 For the benchmark ﬁrm with optimal leverage, the marginal value of cash corresponds to ∂퐸(푉,퐿
∗)
∂퐿
= 0.79 at
initiation. It is slightly higher than the average in the simulation mainly because the marginal value of cash
decreases when ﬁrms approach default, but does hardly increase when 푋 rises above its initial value.
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expected sign, its magnitude is not directly comparable to the one of the coeﬃcient in their Table
5 because the authors apply an instrumental variable approach.22
INSERT TABLE V HERE
5. Extension
In this section, I consider the impact of correlated investment opportunities on corporate cash
holdings.
5.1. Corporate cash policy and correlated investment opportunities
In reality, investment opportunities are likely to be correlated to the value of assets. To capture
this feature in a simple fashion, I assume that the Poisson intensity of the occurrence of investment
opportunities follows
푑푦푡 = 휎푦푦푡푑푊
푦
푡 , (16)
with 퐸(푑푊푡푑푊
푦
푡 ) = 훽푑푡. When 푦푡 is stochastic, the distress policy of equityholders can not
be expressed in term of a ﬁxed asset value (푉퐵), because their decision to stop injecting funds
depends on the pair (푉푡, 푦푡). To reduce the number of state variables from 2 to 1, I deﬁne 퐴푡 =
푉푡 + 퐸푄
∫∞
푡 (푅(퐿) − 퐿)푦푢푒−푟푢푑푢 = 푉푡 + (푅(퐿)−퐿)푟 푦푡 which comprises the entire stochastic part of
the total asset value. This deﬁnition of 퐴푡 allows to characterize the distress policy in terms of a
constant 퐴퐵. To simplify calculations, it is assumed that 훿 = 푟, and that debtholders also recover
the fraction 훼 of the value of the investment opportunities upon default. Proposition 4 expresses
the value of equity and debt with correlated investment opportunities.
Proposition 4. If the Poisson intensity of the occurrence of investment opportunities is correlated
22 In their plain OLS regression in Table 4, Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2011) obtain a positive coeﬃcient
for the cash ratio. I also get a positive coeﬃcient of similar magnitude when regressing credit spreads on the cash
ratio without controls. This result, however, occurs because the unobserved 푋 drives both credit spreads and the
cash ratio.
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to the value of assets, the continuation value of equity for a given default policy (퐴퐵) is given by
퐸(푉, 퐿, 푦) = 퐴− 푟퐴퐵
휆2 + (휎퐴 + 푏)휆
(
퐴
퐴퐵
)−휉 − 푟퐴퐵
휆
(
퐴
퐴퐵
)−휉
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
1
휆− 휎퐴 − 푏
+
(휏 − 1)푐+ 푙퐿
푟
(
1− (휆− 푏
2휆
+
휆+ 푏
2휆
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)(
퐴
퐴퐵
)−휉
)
+(푟 − 휌)((1/푟)(퐴− 휙(−(휎퐴 + 푏)√푑)
휙(휆
√
푑)
퐴퐵(
퐴
퐴퐵
)−휉
)
−(퐴/푟 − 퐴퐵
휆2 + (휎퐴 + 푏)휆
(
퐴
퐴퐵
)−휉 − 푉퐵
휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
1
휆− 휎퐴 − 푏
))
, (17)
and the value of debt corresponds to
퐷(푉, 퐿, 푦) =
푐
푟
(
1− (휆− 푏
2휆
+
휆+ 푏
2휆
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)(
퐴
퐴퐵
)−휉
)
+ 훼퐴퐵(
퐴
퐴퐵
)−휉
Φ(−(푏+ 휎퐴)
√
푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
, (18)
where Φ(푥) = 1 + 푥
√
2휋푒푥푝(푥
2
2 )푁(푥), N is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
휎2퐴 = (휎 + 푅휎푦훽)
2 + 푅2(휎푦
√
1− 훽2)2, 푅 = 퐼0/푉 , 퐼푡 = 퐵푦푡, 퐵 = (푅(퐿)−퐿)푟 , 휆 =
√
2푟 + 푏2,
푎 = (1/휎퐴)(푙푛(퐴퐵/퐴)), 휉 = (1/휎퐴)(푏+ 휆), and 푏 = (1/휎퐴)(−휎2퐴/2).
Proof. See in the Appendix.
The following Table VI summarizes the results when the cash policy is determined according to
the System (15), and the debt policy is chosen such that the ex-ante value of equity is maximized.
The cash ratio which maximizes shareholder wealth (퐿푆퐻/푉 ) is positively related to the correlation
coeﬃcient 훽 between the rate of occurrence of investment opportunities and the asset value. The
reason evolves from the observation that cash can either be used by management to invest, or to
defer default during economic distress. In case of a negative correlation, equityholders anticipate
that cash holdings are likely to be used to defer default instead of being invested when investment
opportunities occur at a higher rate, and tend to be invested in times when opportunities occur at
a lower rate. As a consequence, they optimally leave less cash within the ﬁrm than in the case of
a positive correlation.
INSERT TABLE VI HERE
This ﬁnding contrasts the results in Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), who argue that
issuing risky debt today and keeping the proceeds in the cash account is equivalent to transferring
resources from future states with high cash ﬂows into future states with low cash ﬂows. As a conse-
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quence, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms with a negative correlation between cash ﬂows and investment
opportunities should prefer to issue more debt and to hold higher amounts of cash as a hedging de-
vice. The beneﬁt of carrying cash balances is to enhance ﬁrm value by relaxing ﬁnancial constraints
in future bad times when valuable investment opportunities tend to arise. My results show that
when incorporating that managers act in their own interest, cash is not a suitable mean to transfer
resources for investment from good to bad states. The reason is that managers optimally use these
funds to avoid default by servicing debt instead of investing during economic distress. Note that it
is generally not optimal for equityholders to give debtholders priority over cash reserves during bad
times due to its negative impact on future investment. In reality, however, managers’ control over
cash balances, and common debt covenants restricting investment when the ﬁrm struggles induce
such a priority.23 Due to the agency conﬂict, my model predicts that equityholders optimally leave
less cash in ﬁrms with high hedging needs because they are more aﬀected by future underinvest-
ment. In fact, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) ﬁnd that cash levels and hedging needs are
negatively related across both constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms (see their Table 2).
Table VI also shows the excess cash and the ﬁrm cash ratio. The marginal impact of excess cash
on the value of managers’ ﬁxed income stream is hardly aﬀected by the correlation between the
occurrence of investment opportunities and the asset value. Intuitively, the ability of managers to
defer default with cash does not depend on 훽. Hence, managers reduce their target cash level to a
weaker extent than equityholders do when 훽 decreases, because they are only partially compensated
with equity. As a consequence, excess cash is higher for lower 훽.
Finally, the target net debt ratio (퐷(푉,퐿
∗)−퐿∗
푉 ) in the last column of Table VI strongly decreases
when the correlation coeﬃcient goes up. The reasons are that the total asset value is more volatile
for higher 훽 which induces lower optimal leverage, and that the target corporate cash ratio increases
at the same time. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) report a pronounced decrease in net debt alongside
with the increase in corporate cash holdings. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2010) conﬁrm this ﬁnding
with international data. My model suggests that an increasing correlation of the occurrence of
investment opportunities to the asset value can provide a theoretical explanation.
23 The availability of cash balances for debt repayments instead of investment in bad times enables the ﬁrm to borrow
more at initiation. The increased debt capacity does, however, not create ﬁrm value from a hedging perspective,
since it is equivalent to raising more ﬁnancing, carrying it as cash balances, and merely paying cash balances back
to creditors.
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6. Conclusion
This paper incorporates the corporate cash policy into a standard trade-oﬀ model of capital struc-
ture. Cash can be valuable to capture investment opportunities. The control over cash, however,
allows managers to use it to defer, or avoid, default in case of economic distress. As they obtain a
ﬁxed income and utility from investments besides the equity linked compensation, the function of
cash as a buﬀer against bankruptcy in hard times induces managers to target excess liquidity. It is
shown that the impact of cash holdings on credit risk drives this self-preservation motive for cash.
This motive, in turn, explains the relationship of excess cash to ﬁrm or industry characteristics,
and matches empirically observed properties of cash. Moreover, the analysis quantiﬁes the costs of
managers’ tendency to overinvest in liquid assets.
The presented results also suggest directives for empirical research. In particular, the relation
between cash holdings and credit risk should depend on ﬁrm characteristics such as distress costs, or
the yield on liquid securities. Additionally, I show that excess cash drives the positive relationship
between ﬁrms’ cash holdings and asset risk. Hence, this dependence should be more pronounced for
corporations with lower takeover threats, a more entrenched management, or a higher ﬁxed income
of managers.
The model can be extended in many dimensions. A promising path could be to incorporate
managers’ ﬂexibility to sell assets, and to analyze its impact on the relation between cash holdings
and credit risk. Another interesting feature is (costly) renegotiation of both the debt policy and
the cash policy.
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Figure 1. Optimal distress policy. The dashed line shows the threshold where equityholders
optimally stop contributing funds in a ﬁrm without cash holdings. The solid line is the one of a
ﬁrm with a cash ratio of 퐿/푉 = 0.1. Standard input parameter values are used.
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Figure 2. Relationship between asset risk and the shareholder value maximizing cash ratio
(퐿푆퐻/푉 ). The solid line plots optimal cash ratios against the asset volatility. Standard input
parameter values are used.
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Figure 3. Relationship between asset risk and the excess cash ratio ((퐿∗ − 퐿푆퐻)/푉 ). The solid
line plots excess cash ratios against the asset volatility. Standard input parameter values are used.
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Figure 4. Relationship between asset risk and the corporate cash ratio (퐿∗/푉 ). The solid line
plots corporate cash holdings against the asset volatility. Standard input parameter values are
used.
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8. Tables
Table I
Cash Holdings and Credit Risk
This table explores the marginal impact of cash on credit risk. The baseline parameters are 푉 = 100, 푟 = 0.06,
휏 = 0.15, 훼 = 0.6, 휌 = 0.03, 훿 = 0.05, 휎 = 0.2, 푙 = 0.02, 푇 = 0.05%, 퐴 = 4.2, 훾 = 0.7, 푦 = 0.1. 푉 is the initial
value of the ﬁrm’s assets, 푟 the riskless interest rate, 휏 the net tax advantage of debt, 훼 the recovery rate, 휌 the
economic distress costs, 훿 the payout ratio, 휎 the asset volatility, and 푙 the average yield of cash and very liquid
securities. 퐴 and 훾 are the parameters of the proﬁt function, and 푦 is the Poisson intensity of the occurrence of
investments. Columns 2 to 4 show the direct, indirect and total marginal eﬀects of cash on credit spreads expressed
in basis points. The direct eﬀect is the decrease of the credit spread if one additional unit of cash is added, given
that the default boundary is left constant. The indirect eﬀect shows the increase of the credit spread caused by the
fact that equityholders optimally increase the default threshold with an additional unit of cash. Column 5 shows the
total marginal eﬀect of cash on the value of a ﬁxed income stream of 1.
Input Parameter Direct Marginal Indirect Marginal Total Marginal Total Marginal Eﬀect on
Values Eﬀect Eﬀect Eﬀect Value of Fixed Income
Baseline Parameters −2.8 1.63 −1.17 0.047
푙 = 0.01 −2.47 1.79 −0.68 0.041
휌 = 0.02 −3.04 2.24 −0.8 0.044
휏 = 0.14 −2.83 1.7 −1.13 0.046
훿 = 0.04 −2.3 1.23 −1.07 0.052
휎 = 0.21 −3.09 1.85 −1.24 0.05
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Table II
The Impact of Managerial Control on Excess Cash Ratios
This table summarizes the main predictions for excess cash ratios. The target cash level of managers is given by 퐿∗,
the one which maximizes shareholder wealth by 퐿푆퐻 . 푙 is the average yield of cash and very liquid securities, 휌 are
the economic distress costs a ﬁrm incurs during the time where equityholders stop contributing funds, 휏 denotes the
tax rate, and 훿 is the payout ratio. Cash Ratios are expressed in percentages of the asset value.
Input Parameter Values Shareholder Wealth Maximizing Excess Cash Corporate Cash
Cash Ratio Ratio Ratio
퐿푆퐻
푉
퐿∗−퐿푆퐻
푉
퐿∗
푉
Baseline Parameters 9.22% 1.82% 11.04%
0% Equity Compensation 9.37% 17.09% 26.46%
30% Equity Compensation 9.47% 4.73% 14.20%
90% Equity Compensation 9.20% 0.32% 9.52%
10% Utility From Investing 9.29% 7.46% 16.75%
20% Utility From Investing 9.27% 12.36% 21.63%
푙 = 0.03 11.88% 2.20% 14.08%
푙 = 0.01 7.34% 1.44% 8.78%
휌 = 0.04 9.12% 1.92% 11.04%
휌 = 0.02 9.32% 1.69% 11.01%
휏 = 0.16 9.15% 1.88% 11.03%
휏 = 0.14 9.29% 1.76% 11.05%
훿 = 0.06 9.24% 1.43% 10.67%
훿 = 0.04 9.25% 2.16% 11.41%
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Table III
Excess Cash and the Market for Corporate Control
This table summarizes the impact of the market for corporate control on excess cash. The excess cash ratio and the
ﬁrm cash ratio are deﬁned as in Table II. 푇 denotes takeover costs, and 푦퐴 expresses the ability of the alternative
management. Standard input parameter values are used with 10% private utility from investment.
Excess Cash Ratio Firm Cash Ratio
Baseline Parameters (T=5%) 7.46% 16.75%
Panel A: 푦퐴 = 푦 = 0.1
푇 = 0.1% 3.64% 12.89%
푇 = 0.5% 5.86% 15.14%
푇 = 0.9% 7.46% 16.75%
Panel B: 푇 = 0.5%
푦퐴 = 0.102 3.89% 13.09%
푦퐴 = 0.1 5.86% 15.14%
푦퐴 = 0.098 7.42% 16.62%
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Table IV
Valuation Properties of Cash
This table shows results from the simulated data panel of the true cross section of S&P 500 ﬁrms. Panel A and B
report averages and quantiles of the market to book values and the marginal values of cash, respectively (absolute
values). Panel C shows the average and quantiles of the coeﬃcient on leverage in OLS regressions with ﬁxed eﬀects
on the marginal value of cash.
Coeﬃcient
Panel A: Market to Book Value of Cash
Mean 1.2959
Median 1.2961
25% Quantile 1.2914
75% Quantile 1.3005
Panel B: Marginal Value of Cash
Mean 0.6938
Median 0.6937
25% Quantile 0.6924
75% Quantile 0.6951
Panel C: Relation between Leverage and Marginal Value of Cash
Mean −0.1176
Median −0.1170
25% Quantile −0.1234
75% Quantile −0.1117
Table V
Determinants of Credit Risk
This table shows the average and quantiles of the coeﬃcients from OLS regressions of credit spreads on explanatory
variables. Simulated data panels of the true cross section of S&P 500 ﬁrms is used for the regressions.
Cash Ratio Leverage Asset Volatility Constant
Mean −1.65 5.23 14.24 −3.62
Median −1.68 5.22 14.20 −3.60
25% Quantile −1.87 5.08 13.33 −3.82
75% Quantile −1.47 5.37 15.24 −3.42
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Table VI
Cash Holdings and Correlated Investment Opportunities
This table explores the impact of correlation between the occurrence of investment opportunities and the asset value
on cash holdings. 휎푦 is the volatility of the Poisson intensity of the occurrence of investments, and 훽 denotes the
correlation of the intensity to the asset value. Standard input parameter values are used. The shareholder wealth
maximizing cash ratio, the excess cash ratio, and the ﬁrm cash ratio are deﬁned as in Table II.
Shareholder Wealth Excess Cash Ratio Firm Cash Ratio Net Debt Ratio
Maximizing Cash Ratio 퐿
∗−퐿푆퐻
푉
퐿∗
푉
퐷(푉,퐿∗)−퐿∗
푉
퐿푆퐻
푉
휎푦 = 0.2,훽 = 0.5 10.50% 0.98% 11.48% 25.37%
휎푦 = 0.2, 훽 = 0 10.28% 1.02% 11.30% 30.36%
휎푦 = 0.2, 훽 = −0.5 9.96% 1.11% 11.07% 36.35%
휎푦 = 0.3,훽 = 0.5 10.65% 0.95% 11.60% 21.83%
휎푦 = 0.3, 훽 = 0 10.39% 0.97% 11.36% 28.62%
휎푦 = 0.3, 훽 = −0.5 9.92% 1.10% 11.02% 37.41%
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A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Firm value if given by
퐹 (푉,퐿) = 피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢[훿푉푢 + 휏푐1푉푢>푉퐵 − 휌푉푢1푉푢<푉퐵 ]푑푢
)
+피푄
(푁휃푉퐵∑
푖=1
푒−푟푡푖(푅푡푖(퐿)− 퐿)1푉푢>푉퐵
)
+ 푙퐿피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢1푉푢>푉퐵푑푢
)
−(1− 훼)피푄(푒−푟휃푉퐵푉휃푉퐵 ) + 퐿피푄(푒−푟휃
푉퐵
). (1)
Following the proof of Franc¸ois and Morellec (2004) on page 406− 408, it is straightforward to show that
피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢[훿푉푢 + 휏푐1푉푢>푉퐵 − 휌푉푢1푉푢<푉퐵 ]푑푢
)− (1− 훼)피푄(푒−푟휃푉퐵푉휃푉퐵 ) =
푉 − 훿푉퐵
휆2 + (휎 + 푏)휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉 − 훿 푉퐵
휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
1
휆− 휎 − 푏
+
휏푐
푟
− 휏푐
푟
(
휆− 푏
2휆
+
휆+ 푏
2휆
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
−(1− 훼)푉퐵( 푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−(푏+ 휎)√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
+(훿 − 휌)((1/훿)(푉 − 휙(−(휎 + 푏)√푑)
휙(휆
√
푑)
푉퐵(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
)
−(푉/훿 − 푉퐵
휆2 + (휎 + 푏)휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉 − 푉퐵
휆
(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
1
휆− 휎 − 푏
))
. (2)
To derive
피푄
(푁휃푉퐵∑
푖=1
푒−푟푡푖(푅푡푖(퐿)− 퐿)1푉푢>푉퐵
)
+ 푙퐿피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢1푉푢>푉퐵푑푢
)
, (3)
I ﬁrst express the expected instantaneous return from cash as
Γ(퐿)
!
= 푦(푅(퐿)− 퐿) + 푙퐿 (4)
by using the compensator of a compound Poisson process. If the Poisson intensity, the proﬁt function, and
the Brownian motion (푊푡)푡 are independent, one can rewrite Expression (3) as
Γ(퐿)피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢1푉푢>푉퐵푑푢
)
. (5)
Following the steps in Franc¸ois and Morellec (2004), the solution to Expression (5) is given by
Γ(퐿)
푟
− Γ(퐿)
푟
(
휆− 푏
2휆
+
휆+ 푏
2휆
Φ(−휆√푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)(
푉
푉퐵
)−휉. (6)
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Finally, the Laplace transform of 휃푉퐵 , i.e., 피(푒− 푥
2
2 휃
푉퐵 ), is given by 푒
푎푥
Φ(푥
√
푑)
(Chesney, Jeanblanc-Picque´,
and Yor 1997). Hence, 퐿피푄(푒−푟휃
푉퐵 )= 퐿 푒
푎
√
2푟
Φ(
√
2푟푑)
. Combining the individual results and rearranging yields
the expression. □
Proof of Proposition 2. The ﬁrst part of the proposition, Equation (9), directly follows from the proof
of Proposition 1. The second part is obtained by replacing 푉 by 푉퐵 in Equation (9), and comparing the
result to 훼푉퐵 + 퐿. □
Proof of Proposition 3. The value of the ﬁxed income stream to managers is given by
피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢휔푑푢
)
= 피푄
( ∫∞
0
푒−푟푢휔푑푢
) − 피푄( ∫∞휃푉퐵 푒−푟푢휔푑푢). The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is
simply equal to 휔푟 , the second term corresponds to the value of an inﬁnite stream obtained at 휃
푉퐵 . As the
Laplace transform of 휃푉퐵 is know, this second term can be expressed as 휔푟
푒푎
√
2푟
Φ(
√
2푟푑)
, which, subtracted from
휔
푟 , gives the desired result.
The value of the equity share to managers corresponds to Ψ times the continuation value of equity minus
the raised cash.
To derive the private utility from investing cash, I use the compensator of a compound Poisson pro-
cess to express the expected instantaneous utility as 푦휂푙표푔(퐿). Hence, 푦휂푙표푔(퐿)피푄
( ∫ 휃푉퐵
0
푒−푟푢1푉푢>푉퐵푑푢
)
=
푦휂푙푛(퐿)
푟
(
1− (휆−푏2휆 + 휆+푏2휆 Φ(−휆
√
푑)
Φ(휆
√
푑)
)( 푉푉퐵 )
−휉). □
Proof of Proposition 4 The intensity follows
푑푦푡 = 휎푦푦푡푑푊
푦
푡 , (7)
with 퐸(푑푊푡푑푊
푦
푡 ) = 훽푑푡. One can write the following decomposition
푑푦푡 = 휎푦푦푡(훽푑푊푡 +
√
1− 훽2푑푊 휖푡 ), (8)
where 푊 휖푡 is a Brownian motion independent of 푊푡. Deﬁne the stochastic part of the total asset value
(invested assets plus investment opportunities) as 퐴푡 = 푉푡 +퐸푄
∫∞
푡
(푅(퐿)−퐿)푦푢푒−푟푢푑푢 = 푉푡 + (푅(퐿)−퐿)푟 푦푡,
and the ex-post default strategy, 퐴퐵 , in terms of 퐴푡.
The value of the investment opportunities follows
푑퐼푡 = 휎푦퐵푦푡(훽푑푊푡 +
√
1− 훽2푑푊 휖푡 ), (9)
where 퐵 = (푅(퐿)−퐿)푟 . For simplicity, assume that 훿 = 푟 such that the total payout is equal to 푟푡퐴푡, and that
the recovery rate and distress costs are deﬁned on the stochastic asset value. The dynamics of 퐴푡 can now
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be written as
푑퐴푡 = 휎퐴퐴푡푑푊
퐴
푡 , (10)
where 푊퐴 is a standard Brownian motion, 휎2퐴 = (휎+푅휎푦훽)
2+푅2(휎푦
√
1− 훽2)2, 푅 = 퐼0/푉 , and 퐼0 = 퐵푦0.
Once the evolution of the stochastic asset value is known, we can calculate ﬁrm value as
퐹 (푉, 퐿, 푦) = 피푄
( ∫ 휃퐴퐵
0
푒−푟푢[푟퐴푢 + 휏푐1퐴푢>퐴퐵 − 휌퐴푢1퐴푢<퐴퐵 ]푑푢
)
+푙퐿피푄
( ∫ 휃퐴퐵
0
푒−푟푢1퐴푢>퐴퐵푑푢
)− (1− 훼)피푄(푒−푟휃퐴퐵퐴휃퐴퐵 ) + 퐿피푄(푒−푟휃퐴퐵 ), (11)
and debt value as
퐷(푉, 퐿, 푦) = 퐸푄(
∫ 휃퐴퐵
0
푒−푟푢푐1퐴푢>퐴퐵푑푢) + 훼퐸푄(푒
−푟휃퐴퐵퐴휃퐴퐵 ) + 퐿피푄(푒−푟휃
퐴퐵
). (12)
Both expressions can be solved as in the previous proofs. □
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